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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
In the early 1990s, there were a number of developments at the international and 
regional levels that created a unique opportunity for the Arabs and Israelis to end their 
decades long animosity. Many of the circumstances that prevented the Arabs and Israelis 
from negotiating a peaceful resolution to their disputes had changed. The disintegration 
of the Eastern European regimes in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
precipitated dramatic changes in Middle East politics. Along with these changes in the 
international arena, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the consequent Operation Desert 
Storm provided an opportunity for the United States to bring the Arabs and Israelis to 
peace negotiations.   
 
In the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, then U.S. President George 
H. W. Bush raised the hope for reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He declared the 
resolution of this conflict one of the most important U.S. Middle East objectives.1 The 
establishment of security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, regional arms control of 
weapons of mass destruction, and promotion of economic development in the region 
were among other U.S. objectives in the Middle East. The United States, therefore, 
proposed a peace plan based upon a land for peace formula and the principles of the 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.2 Thus, the U.S. in cooperation 
                                                 
1. “Transcript of President Bush’s Address on End of the Gulf War,” The New York Times, March 7, 1991, 
p. A8. 
2. In his speech to a joint session of the Congress in March 1991, President Bush said, “a comprehensive 
peace must be grounded in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle 
of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel’s security and recognition, and 
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with the Soviets invited Israel and its immediate neighbors, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan—
in a joint delegation with the Palestinians—to a peace conference in Madrid. Syria, which 
had long sought an international conference under the United Nations’ auspices based 
upon these UN resolutions, accepted the invitation and the Madrid peace conference was 
convened in November 1991.  
 
Hafiz al-Asad had accepted a land for peace formula since the early 1970s when 
he took power in Syria. But throughout the 1980s, Asad opposed negotiations with Israel 
because he believed that the Arabs were in a position of weakness, and therefore, they 
could not reach an honorable peace settlement with the Israelis. From Asad's point of 
view, the strategic imbalance in Israel’s favor was one of the main obstacles for the stable 
and lasting peace in the Middle East. Syria’s policy in the 1980s was to obstruct any 
peace initiatives that were based on separate peace plans between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. During this decade, Syria insisted on an international conference for peace in 
the Middle East with a Soviet-American role. Syria wanted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 
to be the basis of any peace negotiations and for the United Nations to play an important 
sponsorship role. Syria also long insisted on a united Arab delegation to demonstrate a 
common Arab position in dealing with Israeli demands. Moreover, Syria required Israeli 
commitment to full withdrawal before negotiations could begin, and sought to resist any 
attempts to exclude Syria from the peace process.  
 
However, the Madrid peace conference was the beginning of new peace 
initiatives, aiming to bring the Arabs and Israelis to both bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations for comprehensive solutions to their conflicts. The conference was designed 
to encourage bilateral talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors. It also promoted 
multilateral negotiations on regional issues with participation of the European Union and 
the United Nations in order to strengthen confidence-building measures between the 
parties at the regional level. Although it opposed negotiating regional issues before Israel 
conceded to the principle of withdrawal from Arab lands, Syria attended the conference 
                                                                                                                                                 
at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights.” (“Transcript of President Bush’s Address on 
End of the Gulf War,” The New York Times, March 7, 1991, p. A8.) 
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and agreed to bilateral talks with the Israelis. The United States had a significant role in 
convincing Syria to attend the conference.  
 
In the early 1990s, Hafiz al-Asad made what he called a ‘strategic decision’ to 
join the Middle East peace process in Madrid. Following the collapse of the East Bloc 
and disintegration of the Soviet Union, Syria lost its main benefactors3, and therefore, 
could not credibly be a serious threat to Israeli security. Syria also was not able to protect 
its own national interests in such an unacceptable imbalance of power that might come in 
the aftermath of radical changes in the Middle East. Hence, Syria’s options were highly 
limited: continuing the 1980s policy of rejectionism or adopting a new policy of 
integration into the new Middle East after the end of the cold war.  
 
The second Gulf crisis—the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait—provided 
Asad with an opportunity to make a strategic decision and at the same time forced him to 
make an important concession. Hafiz al-Asad decided to join the U.S.-led coalition to 
fight the Iraqi invasion, and also to participate to the U.S.-Soviet sponsored peace process 
after the Gulf war in October 1991. These two decisions marked a significant, radical 
change in Syria’s strategy toward peace in the Middle East. At the same time, it signified 
the effect of the power imbalance after the collapse of the East Bloc on Syria’s foreign 
policy: Syria conceded to participate in direct, unconditional, bilateral negotiations with 
Israel without any Israeli commitment for full withdrawal from the occupied lands. Syria 
was also forced to accept that Israel would not explicitly accept UN Resolutions 242 and 
338 requiring Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories. 
  
However, Asad's decision was not to abandon Syria’s goal of a just, honorable, 
and comprehensive peace, but rather to revise his strategy to accept new conditions of 
non-zero sum games in the Middle East. With the U.S. emphasis on the land for peace 
formula, and on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as the legal basis of peace negotiations, 
Asad believed that he could reach his goals through negotiations. Asad regarded the 
                                                 
3. Helena Cobban, The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1991), 
pp. 112-138.  
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letters of invitation from the United States and the Soviet Union to participate in the 
Madrid peace conference as assurance that the UN Resolutions 242 and 338 would be the 
legal basis of the peace process. In the letters, the United States and the Soviet Union 
announced they were “prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between 
Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.”4 However, neither the United States 
nor the Soviet Union promised explicitly that Israel would withdraw from all the 
occupied lands.  
 
In general, Asad's initial strategy was to end Syria’s isolation, to resituate Syria at 
the Arab center and to explore if he could regain the lost territories through an acceptable 
agreement. Meanwhile, Syria believes that they have the option to refuse any deal that 
ignores Syria’s rights for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. 
 
Moreover, Syria has long sought a direct and active American role as full 
participant in the negotiations with the Israelis. Among reasons is that Syria maintained 
that, because of its strategic relations with Israel, only the U.S. could strengthen 
confidence-building measures between Syria and Israel and pressure Israel to make the 
necessary compromises. The U.S. also could provide basic needs to address Israeli 
concerns about its national security through playing a key role among international 
peacekeeping forces and by providing Israel with sophisticated military equipment to 
maintain Israel’s superiority in the region.  
 
In addition, the Syrian-Israeli talks were basically different from other Middle 
East peace talks. These two countries had been in either a state of war, or no peace, no 
war status since Israel’s creation. Therefore, the need for a third party to facilitate the 
communication between the two countries, and to propose initiatives to overcome 
impasses had long been a crucial factor for the achievement of a peace treaty between 
                                                 
4. U.S. Department of State, “Invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference,” Department of State 
Dispatch, (November 25, 1991).  
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Syria and Israel. Given these considerations, Syria had long insisted that the United 
States should play an effective and central role in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks.5  
 
Moreover, maintaining Syria's need to restore its relations with the United States, 
Hafiz al-Asad appeared to use its participation in the peace process as a mechanism to 
advance Syria's relations with the United States. After Syria lost its main patron, the 
Soviet Union, the Syrians concluded that they desperately needed to have better, normal 
relations with the United States. Asad’s desire to improve relations with the U.S. was a 
major incentive for the Syrians to participate in the peace process.6 Better relations with 
the United States would also allow removal of Syria's name from the U.S. Department of 
State’s terrorist list, and thereby make Syria eligible for U.S. economic aid.  
 
In addition to Syria's need for improving its relations with the United States, the 
United States made clear to the Syrians that only through the achievement of a peace 
treaty with Israel could Syria hope for having better relations with the United States. The 
United States made improvement of its relations with Syria contingent on progress in the 
Syrian-Israeli track. The United States, therefore, exploited Syria's need for better 
relations to force Syria to limit its strategic relations with all other parties that oppose the 
peace process in the Middle East, such as Palestinian rejectionist groups, Hizbollah, and 
Iran. It was unacceptable to the Americans that Syria participates in the peace process 
while harboring Palestinian rejectionist groups, and maintaining strategic relations with 
Hizbollah.  
 
However, Syria wanted to be an effective player in the Middle East peace process 
while maintaining its special relations with these groups. So it remained unclear that to 
what extent Syria would limit its strategic relations with the above peace opponents. 
Syria, however, was aware of the need to make more concessions on procedural matters 
in order to reach its goals. Therefore, throughout the various negotiations in the 1990s, 
                                                 
5. In contrast, the Israelis traditionally discouraged Americans from playing such a central role and pursued 
direct talks with the Arabs. They wanted the United States’ role to be as minimal as possible in order to 
prevent the Americans from pressuring Israel to make major concessions.  
6. Andrew Bacevich, Michael Eisenstadt, and Carl Ford, Supporting Peace: America’s Role in an Israel-
Syria peace agreement (Washington D.C., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994), pp. 42-43.  
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Syria agreed to major concessions—such as normalization of relations, scope of 
demilitarized zones, and presence of foreign forces on the Golan Heights—although it 
appeared unlikely to compromise on territorial issues. 
 
At the same time, the United States policy toward Syrian-Israeli negotiations 
appeared to be based upon the idea that in order to reach a comprehensive peace between 
Syria and Israel, the U.S. must be engaged in the process as full partner.  Due to the 
mistrustful nature of Syrian-Israeli relations, U.S. officials concluded that only through 
an active U.S. participation could they achieve a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. 
The process also could create an opportunity for the United States to advance its regional 
national interests in the Middle East through achievement of a comprehensive peace 
between Syria and Israel. 
 
Therefore, tremendous diplomatic efforts took place by different U.S. 
administrations to bring Syria and Israel to the negotiating table during the 1990s. Several 
rounds of talks were convened by the United States in order to help the parties reach a 
meaningful understanding of basic needs to make a comprehensive peace. But in the end, 
it appeared to damage the U.S. position as full, active participant, and only mediator in 
the Syrian-Israeli peace talks because it could not convince both sides to make the 
necessary concessions toward the achievement of a durable and comprehensive peace.  
The disputes between Syria and Israel over the nature of peace and the extent of Israeli 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights, on one hand, and both the Israeli and Syrian rigidity, 
on the other, caused the Syrian-Israeli peace talks to be complicated and tense.  
 
The Syrian-Israeli track 
 
In October 1991, Israel, Syria and Israel’s other neighbors, Lebanon, and Jordan 
in a joint delegation with the Palestinians, attended a peace conference in Madrid, aiming 
to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria was engaged in bilateral peace negotiations 
with Israel since the Madrid peace conference. But there was no progress in the early 
months after the conference. Israel’s Likud-led government’s refusal of territorial 
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concessions to the Syrians made any progress in bilateral Syrian-Israeli negotiations 
impossible.  
 
Only after the new Israeli administration came to power in June 1992 was there 
some hope for substantive progress in the Syrian-Israeli track. In contrast to the Likud 
government’s rigid policy on retaining the Golan Heights, the Labor government of 
Yitzhak Rabin agreed to the “land for peace” formula and the possibility of peace with 
Syria based upon UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  
 
However, the negotiations did not resume until the Israelis concluded an interim 
agreement with the Palestinians in September 1993 regarding the Declaration of 
Principle. In addition, the Israeli negotiations with the Jordanians, which led to an Israel-
Jordan peace treaty in October 1994, created yet another pause to the Syrian-Israeli 
negotiations. Therefore, during the three years after the Madrid conference, there was no 
remarkable progress in the Syrian-Israeli track. The Israelis preferred to negotiate the 
tracks that would contain fewer or no territorial concessions, and therefore, postponed 
negotiating with the Syrians because Syria would not conclude a peace agreement with 
Israel without Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights.  
 
But Syria's position in the Middle East peace process was an important factor for 
Israeli integration into the Middle East. The stalemate in the Syrian-Israeli track would 
create uncertainties for the future of the peace process in the region, and interfere with 
Israel’s relations with other Arab countries. This is why American’s role in keeping the 
Syrian-Israeli peace process on track was so important. President Clinton’s meeting with 
Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in January 1994 and his first visit to Damascus in October that 
year emphasized Syria's crucial role in the peace process.  
 
Following the Geneva meeting, both Syria and Israel decided to engage in 
substantive negotiations on various issues, particularly a description of security 
arrangements. The meetings between the chiefs of staff of both Syria and Israel during 
December 1994 and June 1995 resulted in remarkable progress. These meetings—with 
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Americans in an active mediation role—led to a formal conclusion and a written 
agreement titled “The Aims and Principles of the Security Arrangements.”  
 
Although they reached important progress on the security arrangements during the 
last months of Rabin’s government, Syria and Israel still had significant disagreements on 
a variety of issues. Rabin was assassinated in November 1995, but his assassination did 
not bring a stalemate to the peace talks between Syria and Israel. He was succeeded by 
Shimon Peres who quickly renewed the Syrian-Israeli talks, aiming to reach a successful 
conclusion within the short period of time before the election, which was to be held in 
October 1996. The election was held earlier in May that year. 
 
With full American participation in the talks, both Syrian and Israeli negotiating 
teams held substantive negotiations on a variety of issues at Wye Plantation in Maryland 
between December 1995 and March 1996. For the first time, it seemed that both sides 
were close to reaching a meaningful conclusion. But the negotiations were again derailed 
because of Peres’s decision in February 1996 to hold an early election and most 
importantly because of a series of terrorist attacks in Israel in early 1996 by Palestinian 
opponents of the peace process. Consequently, Prime Minister Peres suspended the talks 
in March 4, 1996, the whole peace process came to a complete standstill, and relations 
between the two parties deteriorated. 
  
In the election of May 1996, Peres was defeated by the Likud party nominee, 
Binyamin Netanyahu. The new prime minister then not only refused to resume the 
negotiations at the point they were suspended by Peres, but also tried to reverse the 
achievement of the several rounds of talks that took place before he took office. At the 
same time, Syria also refused to resume the negotiations on a new basis, without any 
preconditions. Syria maintained such a policy would undermine the achievement of the 
previous talks. Consequently, the Syrian-Israeli talks did not resume during Netanyahu’s 
premiership and were stalled for almost four years.  
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Only after Ehud Barak was elected prime minister in May 1999 did the Israelis 
announce that they would restart the stalled negotiations with both the Palestinians and 
Syrians simultaneously. This brought new optimism for the Syrian-Israeli peace process 
in the expectation that the two parties, with American participation, would resume their 
negotiations from the point at which Peres had suspended them four years earlier. But 
there was no agreement on where that point was. It was several months before the United 
States could convince the parties to resume their negotiations. Finally both sides agreed 
to resume their talks from the point where they left off in March 1996, with the provision 
that each side have their own interpretation on what the point was. A two-day joint 
meeting convened in Washington in December 1999 between President Clinton and 
Syrian and Israeli officials for the purpose of discussing procedural matters of the Syrian-
Israeli talks. For the first time, both sides agreed to negotiate their differences with the 
highest ranking participants ever, Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Faroq 
al-Shara’.  
 
The Syrian-Israeli talks were resumed in Shepherdstown in January 2000 after a 
nearly four-year hiatus. The Shepherdstown talks were the last Syrian-Israeli negotiations 
at this writing. The talks focused on procedural matters, but finally stalled because of 
enormous disagreements over which issues should take priority in the negotiations. The 
Israelis wanted security arrangements to be addressed first, while the Syrians insisted that 
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights should take priority. Mutual mistrust and 
inflexibility on both sides were significant obstacles in these talks. Even an American 
proposal to convene technical committees to simultaneously discuss the main issues of 
contention could not bring a breakthrough. The talks were suspended but the parties 
agreed to resume their negotiations in 10 days. Syria later refused to participate in the 
negotiations unless Israel agreed to commit in principle to an unconditional withdrawal 
from the entire Golan Heights.  
 
Consequently, the Syrian-Israeli talks were deadlocked over the fact that Israel 
did not want to negotiate its withdrawal from the Golan Heights prior to concluding 
security arrangements and normalization of relations with the Syrians. The Syrians 
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argued it would be pointless to negotiate the future of relations with the Israelis while 
they did not know whether Israel would be willing to withdraw from the Golan Heights. 
The only hope for resumption of the talks was the Geneva summit (March 2000) between 
Presidents Clinton and Hafiz al-Asad. The Syrians hoped the presidential summit would 
bring a breakthrough to the stalled Syrian-Israeli track. But President Clinton failed to 
convince Hafiz al- Asad to resume the peace talks with the Israelis. The summit was the 
last chance for resumption of the Syrian-Israeli track under Clinton’s auspices. Hafiz al-
Asad died later in June 2000. 
 
Main questions and hypotheses 
 
Before the 1990s, The United States Middle East policy toward Syria was based 
on the perception of Syria as the surrogate of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, as a 
state sponsoring international terrorism, and as an opponent of the peace process in the 
Middle East.7 During this period, the United States policy toward Syria was designed to 
prevent escalation of conflict between Syria and Israel, to consolidate the Camp David 
Peace Accord, and to prevent Syria from sabotaging U.S. interests in the region. 
Consequently, Syria faced economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and was named by 
the U.S. administrations a pariah and rogue state. 
 
But in the early 1990s, a considerable shift in the U.S.-Syria relationship occurred 
because of drastic changes in international and regional affairs in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition to this, American hegemony in the Middle East, 
which was the immediate consequence of the U.S.-led coalition victory over Iraq, 
precipitated new changes in the United States’ relations with Syria. Syria's crucial 
decision to join the U.S.-led coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided 
common interests between the United States and Syria8 and, eased U.S.-Syria relations.9 
                                                 
7. Meredith R. Sarkees and Stephen Zunes, “Disenchantment With the New World Order: Syria's Relations 
With the United States,” International Journal Vol. XLIX, (spring 1994): p. 355. 
8. Syria and Iraq had long been bitter enemies. Rivalry between the two ruling Ba’th parties had been tense 
during the 1980s when Syria backed Iran after the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980. Disagreement on various 
regional issues intensified personal animosity between Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Hussein. The rivalry 
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Syria's participation in the 1991 Madrid peace conference signified this new phase and 
increased the possible role that the U.S. could play in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Thereafter, the United States convened several rounds of talks between the Syrians and 
Israelis, aimed at resolving the huge differences between the two countries, such as 
withdrawal of Israeli settlements from the Golan Heights, normalization of relations, and 
security arrangements. 
 
During the same time, Syria's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict had been crucial. 
The United States acknowledged on several occasions “a Syrian-Israeli agreement is key 
to achieving a comprehensive peace. Given Syria's important regional role, it will 
inevitably broaden the circle of Arab states willing to embrace peace. And it will build 
confidence throughout the area that peace will endure.”10 Syria has long been a key 
regional player in the Middle East and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be 
ignored.11 According to an analysis, “Syria still retains considerable leverage in Middle 
East peace diplomacy. Without Syria's imprimatur no Arab-Israeli peace can arguably be 
legitimate and hence durable. If its interests are not satisfied, Syria can obstruct Israel's 
full incorporation into the Middle East.”12 Therefore, Syria's participation in the Middle 
East peace talks was essential for the achievement of a reliable and comprehensive peace 
between the Arabs and the Israelis.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
between the two countries was so tense that Syria took the opportunity to join the U.S.-led coalition, 
fighting against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s. 
9. Meredith R. Sarkees and Stephen Zunes, p. 355. 
10. U.S. Department of State, “Progress Toward Achieving A Common Goal Of Peace In The Middle 
East,” Department of State Dispatch Vol. 5, Issue 10, (November 1994): p. 16. 
11. Talcott W. Seelye, “The Syrian Perspective on the Peace Process” American-Arab Affairs No. 17, 
(Summer 1986): p. 61. 
12. In their discussion regarding Syria's role and position in the peace process, Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 
argue, “a peace agreement with Syria offers the most practical opportunity to neutralize the main military 
threat Israel faces. The threats of Islamic fundamentalism and Israel's vulnerability to chemically or 
biologically armed missiles could also be much reduced by a Syrian peace. If Syria remains excluded from 
a settlement, it can continue to threaten Israeli security in small but bothersome ways. Asad could 
encourage Hizbollah pressure on Israel's security zone in Lebanon. He could attempt to mobilize the 
significant numbers of Diaspora Palestinians abandoned and embittered by the Oslo agreement. Anti-Oslo 
groups like HAMAS and Ahmad Jebril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command 
(PFLP- GC) can pull off spectacular anti-Israeli operations.”  (Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond 
Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Power in a Penetrated Regional System (Routledge, February 1997), p. 
174.) 
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The central theme of this research is to examine the United States’ role in the 
Syrian-Israeli peace process from the Madrid peace conference in November 1991 until 
the death of Hafiz al-Asad in June 2000. The main question is:  
 
What was the American role in the Syrian-Israeli peace process during the 
1990s? Did or did not the United States play a pivotal, constructive role in the 
search for a comprehensive peace between Syria and Israel? 
 
This research will address the U.S. role in the Middle East peace process within 
the context of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations during the 1990s. It will also examine the 
process to see if there is any continuity, similarity, or difference in the U.S. role of 
mediator in the Syrian-Israeli peace process during the successive U.S. presidencies of 
the 1990s. The main hypotheses below will provide an analytical framework to address 
the questions above. 
 
Although the United States had been an active participant in the negotiations for 
a comprehensive peace between Syria and Israel during the 1990s, it failed to bring an 
end to the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The strong U.S. interest in Israel, driven mostly by 
domestic politics, made it unwilling to pressure Israel to make the necessary concessions. 
Syrian inflexibility and Israeli unwillingness to compromise were also crucial factors. 
  
Therefore, 
 
The less willing the United States was to pressure Israel to make compromises, 
the more determined Syria became to resist making concessions to Israeli demands.  
 
The less ready Syria was to make the necessary concessions, the more the United 
States ignored Syria's core demand for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights as 
the basis for a comprehensive peace. 
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The less attention the United States paid to Syria's demands, the more Syria 
resisted and defied American peace initiatives. This scenario brought the whole peace 
process to several stalemates although Syria avoided sabotaging the initiatives. This was 
because Syria wanted to moderate its positions as accommodation to the new changes in 
the international and regional political systems, on one hand, and their need to better 
their relationship with the United States in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, on the other. 
 
There are few scholarly and systematic works on this subject. But the aim of this 
research is to evaluate the U.S. role in the Middle East peace process with specific focus 
on Syrian-Israeli talks. As mentioned, negotiations between the Syrians and Israelis in the 
1990s had been complicated and tense, rarely reaching a written agreement, and were 
suspended several times because of enormous differences on procedural matters. The 
Americans had tried to keep the talks on track, but due to the tentative nature of these 
talks, the Syrian-Israeli negotiations were derailed most times before the sides reached a 
conceptual framework for conducting the negotiations.  
 
The U.S. was not an impartial mediator. It has had strategic relations with Israel, 
and refused to improve its relations with Syria. The contribution of this research is to 
examine the American role in the negotiations between Syria and Israel, aiming to 
provide a better understanding of the patterns of influence by which the U.S. tried to 
affect Syria's position in the peace process. For example, although the U.S. 
acknowledged Syria has not been engaged in the international terrorism since 1986, the 
United States refused to remove Syria's name from the list. The United States also 
continued to impose sanctions on Syria, aiming to influence on Syria's domestic and 
foreign policy. The U.S. administrations implicitly made the improvement of their 
relations with Syria contingent on progress on the Syrian-Israeli track.  
 
This research will show how changes in the regional and international political 
systems after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait have 
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affected Syria's position in the Middle East and consequently facilitated the Syrian 
participation in the peace process.  
 
This research is organized into eleven chapters. Chapter one contains a discussion 
of the main questions and hypotheses. The second chapter is a brief discussion about the 
theoretical foundation of this research. Third chapter is an introduction to U.S.-Syrian 
relations. The next chapter describes early phases of the Middle East peace process that 
began in Madrid, Spain in November 1991. The reasons that led the Syrians to attend this 
conference will be discussed briefly in this chapter. The next chapter contains a 
discussion of the Oslo peace process and its impact on the Syrian-Israeli track. The 
ramification of this process for Syria and Syria's reaction to this accord will be discussed 
here. The sixth chapter addresses the slow progress in the Syrian-Israeli track during 
1993-1994. The events that caused yet another break in the Syrian-Israeli peace 
negotiations will be discussed in this chapter. The next chapter contains a discussion of 
an important phase of the Syrian-Israeli peace talks, one which includes negotiations on 
security arrangements between the Israeli and Syrian chiefs of staff. These negotiations 
occurred under American auspices during 1994 and 1995 in Washington, DC. Progress 
on the Syrian-Israeli track during Peres’s premiership will be addressed in the eighth 
chapter. The ninth chapter contains a discussion of the grounds that led to the longest 
stalemate yet in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks that occurred during Netanyahu’s 
government 1996-1999. The next chapter will address the resumption of talks between 
Syria and Israel in Shepherdstown in January 2000. This chapter also elucidates 
differences that prevented the Israelis and Syrians from reaching an agreement. These 
differences over procedural matters brought the whole peace process between Syria and 
Israel to a complete standstill. There has been no progress in the Syrian-Israeli track 
since. The last chapter contains general discussion and prospects for the Syrian-Israeli 
peace talks. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The realist and neo-realist approaches of international politics will provide a 
theoretical foundation for this study. The U.S. role in the negotiations for the 
reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria’s participation in the Middle East peace 
process and also Israeli position in regard to the negotiations could also best be explained 
through the prism of realist and neo-realist approaches of international politics. However, 
this work is not a theoretical work and because of that it will not include a 
comprehensive, critical examination of theories of international relations to see what 
theory could best be applicable to this study, if there is such a theory! 
 
Since each of the participants in the negotiations (the United States, Syria and 
Israel) carefully made a strategic decision in order to take part in the talks, the theory of 
decision-making process could provide a conceptual framework for a critical examination 
of U.S. peace initiatives, upon which the United States proposed the settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict through mechanism of simultaneous, bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations in the early 1990s. It also would be applicable to Syria’s willingness and 
Israeli’s reluctant position to join the Madrid peace conference.  
 
It was obvious that it is not going to be any peace between Syria and Israel while 
the latter continues its occupation of Syria’s territory. What did really lead the United 
States to propose a peace plan at the time that it was not clear whether its strategic ally, 
Israel, would agree to withdraw from the occupied Arab lands? There was a complex 
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ambiguity that the Israelis compromise their national interests by withdrawing from the 
strategic Golan Heights. What forces led the Syrians to make such a strategic decision to 
attend the Madrid peace conference while they knew that it was unlikely that Israel 
concede from its position? Why did Israel demonstrate its reluctance to participate to 
such a conference, and how the United States convinced both Syria and Israel to attend 
the conference?  
 
There is variety of factors that led to the arrangement of the Madrid peace 
conference. But what really made that decision is extremely difficult to answer. We could 
recognize different variables that somehow formulated this policy. There are a great 
variety of possible causes that affect the making of foreign policy. These variables were 
organized by different scholars into conceptual frameworks, such as the scientific work 
of James Rosenau.13 Therefore, it would be helpful to use his framework to encompass 
different variables that led to the establishment of peace process between the Arabs and 
Israelis in the early 1990s. However, the “power elite” and its significant role in the 
formation of U.S. foreign policy are not deniable. Therefore, a revisionist critique of 
decision-making process, in which scholars with a socialist orientation criticized the 
scientific study of foreign policy, would provide a theoretical alternative for this study. 
Particularly, the works of Gabriel Kolko is a great contribution to this approach.14 There 
will be a brief discussion at the end of this chapter. 
 
The peace negotiations between Syria and Israel began with Syria’s acceptance to 
participate in the Madrid peace conference in November 1991 and were ended in March 
2000, when the Americans frustratingly failed to bring practical initiatives to overcome 
the intractable stalemates in the Syrian-Israeli tracks. This research is mostly a case study 
to critically examine the ineffective role of the United States as a mediator and facilitator 
                                                 
13- James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 
1971).    
14- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: power and 
Justice, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 106-107. for more information see Kolko’s Roots of 
American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston: beacon Press, 1969); The Politics of 
War: The World and The United States Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1968); see also Joyce 
Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and The United States Foreign Policy, 1945-
1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).  
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in the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. However, in order to provide a better 
understanding, there will be a discussion, in brief, about the theories of international 
relations, realism and neo-realism approaches, and the making of foreign policies.  
 
Theories of international relations  
 
Theories of international relations, like other theories, is a reflection to the time, 
problems and difficulties that both scholars and policy-makers has had to analyzing 
important events of international relations. Stanley Hoffmann, a scholar of the 
traditionalist school, had defined contemporary theory of international relations as “a 
systematic study of observable phenomena that tries to discover the principle variables, to 
explain behavior, and to reveal the characteristic types of relations among national 
units.”15 David Singer defined theory of international relations as “a body of internally 
consistent empirical generalization of descriptive, predictive, and explanatory power.”16 
Following, there is a discussion, in brief, regarding the evolution of theories of 
international relations, Level of analysis, the complexity of explanation, and the utility of 
theory in international relations. It follows a brief discussion about the realism and neo-
realism approaches of international relations, and Roseau’s conceptual framework for the 
scientific study of foreign policy and Gabriel Kolko’s alternative approach. At the end 
there is a discussion about the realism in Syrian foreign policy.   
 
The evolution of theories of international relations  
 
In general, one could recognize different paradigms in the study of international 
relations, which include idealism, realism, radicalism (Marxism) and modernism.17 The 
different approaches of the study of international relation could also be simply 
categorized to traditionalist and scientific. The traditional approach includes both 
                                                 
15- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 25 Quoted from Stanley Hoffmann, Theory and 
International Relations, in International Politics and Foreign Policy, 2ed ed. Rev., ed. James N. Rosenau 
(New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 30.     
16- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 25.     
17- For a comprehensive review of theoretical Approaches to international relations see James E. Dougherty 
and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, (Addison-Wesley Educational 
Publishers Inc. 1997), pp. 1-45. 
  
24
idealists and realists. The idealism and realism were dominant approach in the study of 
international politics between 1920s-1930s and 1940s-1950s respectively. The scientific 
approaches of international politics, which was the achievement of modernism, consist 
from behaviorism (1950s-1960s) and post-behaviorism (after 1970). Each approach 
provides key concepts and framework for analysis, prediction and better understanding of 
international politics, while demonstrates the most important issues that had been the 
main concern of the great philosophers and thinkers of political science and international 
relations. 
 
There are some issues that have always been important for both politicians and 
scholars alike. Issues such as peace, war, conflict, cooperation, sovereignty, anarchy, 
power, and etc. have been remained significant. But the level of importance, analysis and 
understanding of these issues has been subject to different interpretations and 
descriptions, depending on using different approaches. For example, while power is the 
main focus of and central to the realism in international politics, the idealists place more 
weight to peace, and cooperation.  
 
The evolution of international relations passed through serious debates between 
philosophers and scholars of international politics. The first debate was in the aftermath 
of World War I, when idealists failed to predict and prevent the catastrophic War. The 
debate was between the idealists and realists. The realists then could provide a better 
understanding of power politics at the international level, and therefore, became a 
dominant approach of the study of international relations in the period between the late 
1930s and 1950s.  
 
The enormous empirical progress in the 1950s in social sciences, economy, 
psychology and other disciplines, on one hand, and the inadequacy and inability of realist 
approach to explain the most important events of the current international relations (the 
events that led to disastrous World War II), on the other, brought an inevitable challenge 
to realist school of thought in international politics. The challenge was an attempt to 
expand the new achievement of other disciplines to the study of international politics, and 
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it was mostly methodological, taking to the account the rise of new elements in the 
formation of the study of international relations. This debate was between traditionalists 
and behaviorists. This approach named behaviorism, which preoccupied the study of 
international relations in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
The third stage of evolution was when scholars of international politics realized 
the difficulties and inadequacy of behaviorism in the study of international relations. 
They tried to use every possible means, including traditional and new approaches, to 
provide a better understanding and prediction in the study of world politics. The debate 
was between idealism, realism, liberalism, radicalism and behaviorism. The result was 
led to focusing more on middle-range theory to explain specific issues of international 
relations, within new approaches such as post-behaviorism, neo-realism (structural 
realism), neo-liberalist institutionalism, dependency and interdependency, and etc. 
 
The disintegration of the Eastern European regimes, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War brought enormous challenges to the theories of 
international relations. The fact that none of these theories could explain beforehand the 
possibility of such drastic changes at this level was a total and complex failure.18 The 
theoreticians and scholars of international politics, therefore, tried to explain the reasons 
that led to this failure and, at the same time, had to reappraise the theories of international 
relations in such a way that they could provide a better interpretation of contemporary 
international politics and its complexities. 
 
Level of analysis 
 
Generally, there are three level of analysis: 1) Individual level, which usually 
refers to personal characters of policy makers, and their impact on the making of foreign 
policy. 2) Nation-state level that consist of various departments and bureaucracies that 
influence both on the process of decision-making and on the policy-makers. 3) 
                                                 
18- Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. International Relations Theory and the End of 
Cold War, (New York: Columbia university Press, 1995) pp. 1-17. 
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International political system that provides the structural frameworks for the interaction 
between its members. Both traditionalists and scientists have tried to analyze the impact 
of the structure of international relations on the formation of foreign policy.19 
 
The complexity of explanation in international relations 
 
There is variety of different approaches for the study of international relations. 
The diversity of these approaches came at different times, mostly in reaction to 
inadequacy of then current approaches. However, the impact of the achievement of other 
field of studies, particularly social science, economy, psychology, technology and etc. 
had also been important in the formation of the study of international relations. The field 
of International relations is an interdisciplinary field; and, the impact of the other 
disciplines on the study of international relations would be inevitable.  
 
In addition to unmanageable complexities of issues in international relations, the 
impact of other disciplines had significantly increased the level of complexity, although it 
provides a better framework for the explanation and analysis of various patterns of 
continuity, similarity and changes in international politics. But the problem of having 
many theoretical frameworks would definitely lead to contradictory explanations, at least 
in some cases.20 This complication, however, might prevent us from achieving to a 
meaningful explanation. Therefore, while we are using a theory in order to explain and 
analyze a case study, we have to be aware of the fact that such a theory might make a 
structural dilemma, making us to view the problem only through prism of that theory. 
Therefore, one should search for a set of alternatives; using theories to the extent that 
they could provide variety of variables that might have an impact on the making of 
foreign policy. 
  
 
                                                 
19- There are interesting works by Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron (classical realist) and Karl Deutsch 
and Morton Kaplan (behaviorist).     
20- See G. John Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoritical Essays (Addison-Wesley Educational 
Publishers Inc., 1999) pp. 7-10.  
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The utility of theory in international relations  
 
A conceptual framework could provide a better explanation and interpretation of 
past and contemporary international relations. International relations is a dynamic field; 
variety of factors and elements influence on its formation. And because of that, there are 
variety of different theories and approaches, with different key concepts, and different 
contributions to the study of international relations. There have been remarkable 
theoretical debates between different approaches in explaining important issues of world 
politics.  
 
The applicability of one theory to another in the study of international relations 
would defiantly depend on the consistency of a theory, on one hand, and on the issues of 
case study, on the other. The perception of researcher both in regard to the theory and to 
the case study also is a significant factor. We, however, do need some standards to 
evaluate the adequacy and applicability of a theory, and to see if a theory could provide a 
meaningful explanation of contemporary world politics. 
 
The utility of a theory is that if it could provide the variety of variables, specially 
the interaction between the variables that shape the international relations. A theory of 
international relations should also minimize, if it is even possible, the impact of 
parameters, such as personal belief, perception, etc. that might influence on the 
explanation of international relations.  
 
Realism  
 
Realism and neo-realism approaches of the study of international relations are the 
basis for a pragmatic study of international politics. Realism emerged as a reaction to the 
failure of idealism to provide a meaningful understanding of the international politics in 
the aftermath of the World War I. It, however, evolved through serious debates between 
realists and the opponents of this approach. The key concepts for realism are power, 
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national interest, and the struggle for power at the international level.21 Political realism 
maintains a negative view of human nature and the fact that human being are essentially 
self-interested. Hans J. Morgenthau who was proponent of the classic realist approach 
stated the principles of political realism as follow:  
 
1- “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by  
objective law that have their roots in human nature.”  
2- “The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the 
landscape on international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of 
power.”  
3- “The key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is 
universally valid.” 
4- “Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political 
action…Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to 
the actions of states…”22 
 
In general, the realist tradition emphasizes on power as the means (capabilities) 
and, at the same time, as the ends in international system; the system itself is 
characterized by anarchy. National interest is the basis for power, and the states are the 
primary actors in international relations. Since national interest is the core motivation for 
the struggle of power in international politics, it assumed that the states are rational actors 
that they are doing their best, using every possible means regardless of morality and 
values, to maximize their power in order to protect their national interest, which is mostly 
the increase of power in order to protect national security. 
 
Neo-realism23  
 
The complexity of international relations, the ambiguities of international and 
regional issues, and the rise of many other non-state actors to the international relations 
                                                 
21- See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 58. 
22- Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein and Jay Shafritz, Classic Reading of International Relations, 2ed ed. 
(Harcourt Brace College Publisher, 1999), pp. 43-47. 
23- See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, pp. 80-89. 
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brought enormous challenges to the approach of realist tradition. The challenges came 
also from other traditions that fundamentally disagree either with the principles or 
methodology of realism in the study of international relations. Therefore, the need for 
change was inevitable. A new approach, within the basic conceptual framework of 
realism, emerged to accommodate to the new changes in the contemporary world politics.  
 
Neo-realism that also called structural realism was an attempt to bring a new 
understanding to the international politics, looking to the issues of international relations 
from a new perspective, using both adequate elements of other theories and the 
achievements of other disciplines to provide a meaningful interpretation to the 
contemporary international relations. This approach identified with the work of Kenneth 
Waltz in “Theory of international politics”24 in the late 1970s. There are also other 
scholarly contributions that study international relations through different perspective of 
neo-realism.25 
 
According to James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, “Neo-realism purports to 
refine and reinvigorate classical realism by developing propositions based on the 
disaggregation of independent and dependent variables, and by integrating what is termed 
classical realist theory into contemporary framework based on comparative analysis.”26 
Neo-realism emphasizes on the structure of international system and on the fact that this 
structure shapes the relationship between its actors.27 There is a distinct difference 
between international system and domestic politics by reference to the fact that in 
international system there is no authority while there is a central, hierarchical authority in 
domestic politics. The structure of international system, therefore, is anarchy that defined 
by “the distribution of capabilities among the units…. The structure of the system, 
                                                 
24- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of international politics, (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1979). 
25-James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, pp. 80-89. 
26-James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 80. 
27- For more information about the international system see Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein and Jay 
Shafritz, Classic Reading of International Relations, 2ed ed. (Harcourt Brace College Publisher, 1999), p. 
71-87. 
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notably the number of actors and their respective capabilities, shapes the pattern of 
interaction that will take place.”28 
 
Foreign policy decision-making process 
 
Who or what makes foreign policies has long been an important question both for 
scholars and politicians alike. There is variety of academic works for theorization of 
foreign policy. Because there are enormous uncertainties in regards to the number of 
variables and the way that they influence on the making of foreign policies, making 
theory in order to generalize the outcomes to other cases is extremely difficult. These 
variables include, in fact, the variety of domestic, regional and international issues. It is 
also accurate to say that finally the individuals that make decisions, either in the name of 
a nation-state, organization or a group, have great impact on decision making, taking to 
the account their perceptions that could have considerable impacts on the making of 
foreign policy, regardless of our inability to measure them. In addition to these 
uncertainties, there are extensive ambiguities about the process that within which these 
variables interact and influence on the decisions making.   
 
A simple explanation of foreign policy would be that it consists of the ends and 
the means and the interaction between these elements, taking to the account the variety of 
other elements that shapes the ends and makes the means. “Foreign policy consists of two 
elements: national objectives to be achieved and the resources for achieving them. The 
interaction between national goals and the resources for attaining them is the perennial 
subject of statecraft. In its ingredients the foreign policy of all nations, great and small, is 
the same.”29 
 
The purpose of this study is not discussion about the elements that somehow 
influence on the decisions making process. It is, however, to introduce that to some 
                                                 
28- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p.82. 
 
29- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 89 quoted from Cecil V. Crabb, American Foreign 
policy in the Nuclear Age, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 1. 
  
31
extent the scientific work of James Rosenau, particularly his linkage theory, provides a 
good theoretical framework for this study. Rosenau categorized the variables that might 
influence on shaping foreign policy into five major groups: idiosyncratic, role, 
bureaucracy, national and systemic variables.  
 
Idiosyncratic variables 
 
The idiosyncratic variables refer to the very special and personal characteristic of 
individuals that has an important role in the decision making process. Ultimately, the 
decisions are made and implemented by the individuals that have a role in foreign policy. 
As Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin stated, “It is one of our basic 
methodological choice to define the state as its official decision-maker…State action is 
the action taking by those acting in the name of state.”30 Therefore, the perception of 
these individuals both in regard to the subject and to the implementation of the policy is 
an important factor. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff emphasize, “Perception is assigned a 
central place in decision-making theory. When dealing with the definition of the 
situation, most decision-making theorists regard the world as viewed by decision makers 
to be more important than objective reality.”31  The personality, education, the quality of 
life has great impact on people’s perception, and their perception in regards to human 
being, society, and of course in regard to the subject of decision itself, has deniable 
effects. However, the problem in this regard is that these characters are very personal and 
it is extremely difficult to examine and generalize to other cases.   
 
Role variables 
 
The second set of parameters is the role variables that usually “defined as job 
description or as expected rules of behavior for president, cabinet officers, high-level 
                                                 
30- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 458, quoted from “Decision-Making as an Approach 
to the study of International Politics,” in Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 65 and pp. 85-86.  
31- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 458.  
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bureaucrats…and other elites who affect, formulate and implement foreign policies.”32 
The importance of these variables is that people might change their view based on the 
position that they have or in another word the position could change people’s mind, and 
therefore their decisions as well.33  
 
Bureaucratic variables  
 
The third category is the bureaucracy variables, which include the structure, 
processes and procedures within which policy makers make the decisions. The 
importance of bureaucracy is that, due to the complexity of issues and their 
interdependency to variety of other issues, decisions usually make by various 
departments and bureaucratic structures that according to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff “find 
themselves in competition for the allocation of scarce resources.”34 However, according 
to Francis Rourke in Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy35  
 
“While they [bureaucracies] can shape the view of political leaders and the public 
on foreign-policy issues, and often possess technical capabilities that enable them 
to influence the flow of events, nevertheless bureaucratic agencies compose only 
one part of a democratic political system. Their power ultimately depends on the 
willingness of others—for example, Congress and the president—to support them, 
accept their advice, or legitimize their activities by going along with them.”36 
 
National variables 
 
The fourth set of variables is about national and domestic parameters. According 
to Rosenau, national variables include variety of issues such as political and economic 
system, geo-political position of a country, population, natural resources and many other 
                                                 
32- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 92. 
33- James Rosenau, pp. 177-184.  
34- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 460.  
35- Francis Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: MD: John Hopkins University Press, 
1972), pp. 49-50.   
36- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 461, quoted from Francis Rourke, Bureaucracy and 
Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 62-65.  
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issues that related to “tangible and intangible elements of power.” The impact of political 
system, and the fact that how does a democratic or non-democratic political system 
influence on the making of foreign policy discuss under this category. It does also include 
gross national products and the impact of industrial, and the level of social and economic 
development on decision-making in foreign policy. Diversity, culture, integrity and the 
state of ethnic and religious similarities or conflict, and the military capability have 
important effects on the making of foreign policy.37 However, as Theodore A. 
Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe put it, “These variables are numerous, and one should 
be conscious of their existence. In doing so, however, one should not try to reduce 
foreign-policy phenomena to simple cause-effect relationships.”38 
 
Systemic variables 
 
The last category is the systemic variables, which include external elements of 
foreign policies. The impact of structure of international system on the making of foreign 
policy is inevitable. To some extent, neo-realist approach was an answer and reaction to 
the importance of these variables on international politics. James Rosenau discusses in 
details the external environment as a significant variable in foreign policy analysis.39 He 
then links these variables to the national parameters in order to provide a conceptual 
framework for the linkage theory. According to Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. 
Wolfe, “systemic variables (such as structure of the international system, international 
law, international organizations and alliances, dependencies and interdependencies, and 
the actions and interactions of other states) affect a state’s foreign-policy 
formulation…systemic variables provide constraints and opportunities that outline the 
general directions of foreign policies.”40  
 
 
                                                 
37- for more information see: Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, pp. 94-97. 
38- for more information see: Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 97. 
39- James Rosenau, pp. 317-338. 
40- for more information see: Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 99. 
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Linkage Theory 
 
Emphasizing on the fact that “Modern science and technology have collapsed 
space and time in the physical world and thereby heightened interdependence in the 
political world”41, James Rosenau stated the need for the development of theoretical 
constructs for explaining the relations between the units and their environments. He, 
therefore, emphasizes on the fact that there is a great extent of interdependency between 
domestic and international politics.42 As Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe 
put it “That is, no foreign policies are made without regard to their domestic 
consequences, and vice versa. Indeed foreign and domestic policies are intimately linked; 
they can be separated only for the purpose of analysis and at the expense of some 
distortion of reality.”43 Therefore, one should consider the importance of interaction 
between the making foreign policy and domestic constrains. 
 
Elite Power theory 
 
As Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe stated, Gabriel Kolko’s works 
are quite representative of the critical approach of studying decision-making process 
through a scientific approach. Accordingly “Kolko has suggested in many of his works 
that it is near waste of time to study bureaucratic structures, to trace information flows, or 
to conduct social-origin studies in order to arrive at the sources or causes of bureaucratic 
decision-making behavior…Kolko believes that there is a “power elite” in the United 
States and that this elite is virtually synonymous with big business (specially, the 300 
largest corporation in the United States). This capitalist-oriented business elite, according 
to Kolko, has been responsible single-handedly for the definition of America’s national 
interests. A major premise of Kolko’s is that big-business interests have achieved a near 
monopoly in their ability to equate America’s foreign policies with the interests of large 
corporation.”44  
                                                 
41- James Rosenau, p. 371. 
42- James Rosenau, pp. 370-401. 
43- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 101. 
44- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 106. 
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Realism in Syria’s foreign policy  
 
There is variety of main issues that could support the idea that Syria’s foreign 
policy, during Hafiz al-Asad era, was formed through prism of realist approach of 
international politics. Hafiz al-Asad understood the importance of power politics in the 
region and the structure of international political system, and therefore tried to maximize 
its gains through playing an important regional role.  
 
For example, following the structural changes in the international political system 
in the aftermath of disintegration of Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War, Syria made 
a strategic decision to better its relation with the United States, the only remaining sole 
hegemonic superpower, in order to accommodate to the new changes in the Middle East. 
Syria, therefore, joined the U.S.-led coalition to fight against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and also participated in the Madrid peace conference, hoping these actions would end 
Syria’s isolation and lead to resituate Syria as an important regional actor.  
 
Whatever political, economical and social or other forces shaped Syria’s decision 
to adjust its foreign policy and to accommodate to the new changes in the Middle East 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main assumption of this research is that Syria 
made its decision based upon a prudent, rational calculation of its objectives and 
capabilities. Even though Syria had no better option but to moderate its foreign policy, 
Syria’s decision was based upon a rational, realist approach and therefore this decision 
could best be explained through the realism and particularly neo-realism approach of 
international relations.  
 
 
Roots of realism in Syria’s foreign policy during Hafiz al-Asad’s era 
 
The Socialist Ba’th party, which Hafiz al-Asad belonged to them, took power in 
Syria in 1963. At the time, Syria’s foreign policy was preoccupied by both the political 
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instability and the enormous threat from Israel. The Ba’th party was dominated by the 
radicals and formulated by anti-Zionism, anti-imperialism and pan-Arab attitudes. 
Accordingly, the main goals of Syria’s foreign policy were the liberation of Palestine and 
destruction of Israel. The defeat of 1967 war, and the fact that Arabs could not do 
anything from the position of weakness, provided an opportunity for a moderate and 
pragmatic member of the Ba’th party to take control of government of Syria in the early 
1970s.  
 
When Hafiz a-Asad came to power in 1970, he tried to balance between Syria's 
objectives and capabilities. His main goal was to downgrade the objectives of Syria's 
foreign policy from the liberation of whole Palestine to the recovery of the Arab lands 
that were occupied by Israel in the aftermath of the 1967 War, and finally to the recovery 
of only Syria's Golan Heights, which he lost when he was defense minister in 1967. Hafiz 
al-Asad also, at he same time, tried to upgrade Syria's capabilities through strengthening 
Syria's military power and most importantly through playing an important, crucial, 
formidable role in regional crises. The interesting point was Asad’s fascinating ability to 
use power politic in the region, particularly in Lebanon, as an important mechanism for 
the manipulation of power and for making Syria an indispensable regional player that 
both the United States and other regional powers could not ignore or bypass Syria's 
important role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
 
Given Syria's tangible and intangible elements of power, and the fact that Syria 
was a poor country that neither had the wealth of rich Arab countries, nor the population 
and military strength of the others, Hafiz al-Asad adopted a policy upon which 
pragmatism and a realist view of regional and international power politics were an 
essential element in the formation of Syria's foreign policy.  
 
The study of Syria's foreign policy during Hafiz al-Asad’s presidency demonstrated 
variety of pragmatic and realist indications of the making of foreign policy. In discussing 
Hafiz al-Asad’s role in the making of Syrian foreign policy, Raymond Hinnebusch well 
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explained his characters and the implication of Asad’s personality on Syrian political 
orientation. He stated  
 
“President Hafiz Al-Asad, a man of strong personality, unique authority within 
the elite, and possessed of wide powers of office, is clearly the dominant 
decision-maker. Asad is, first of all, an intense nationalist, strongly committed to 
the Arab cause, and unprepared to concede major principles…Asad is also a 
realist rather than an ideologue…Asad tends to think in the objective strategic 
terms of the military professional…He is cautious, never moving without 
thorough analysis of the balance of forces, and less ready to expend than to 
accumulate power used to influence; He is flexible and will bargain if it can be 
done from a position of enough strength to win some advantage…Asad also has a 
cool nerve, can recover from setback, and is uneasily panicked… Determined, 
intelligent, energetic, able to learn from mistakes…Asad is a shrewd practitioner 
of power politics, able to manipulate power balances, proxies, threats, and 
subversion, ruthless toward opponents, and a true Machiavellian prepared to use 
any means, from the bombardment of civilians to assassinations.45  
 
According to Raymond Hinnebusch the implication of Hafiz al-Asad’s 
personality for Syria was the reality that he “contrasted his realism with the theory of the 
Ba'th radicals who allowed ideology to dictate policy to the neglect of the calculus of 
power… [and] with a keen grasp of international affairs, he has developed into a 
statesman of more than local stature. It is he who almost single-handedly has turned Syria 
from a pawn of stronger states into a credible actor in the regional power game.”46 
 
There are many other examples that Syria during Hafiz al-Asad’s presidency 
approached a realist policy rather than being predominated by the ideology of Ba’thism 
(pan-Arabic sentiments). These policies could be summarized as 
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Bahgat Korany and Ali al-Din, The Foreign policy of Arab States: The Challenge of Change (Boulder: 
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1- Syria’s intervention in Lebanese Civil War during 1975-1990, and the fact that Syria 
first intervened in 1975 to fight against the National Movement that were originally 
linked to Syria. Syria, however, adopted its foreign policy to its previous position after 
they succeed to make a balance of weakness among the Lebanese and Palestinian 
factions. 
  
2- Syria’s policy toward Egypt after president Sadat concluded a peace treaty with the 
Israelis in the late 1970s.  
 
3- Syria’s support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). In spite of the fact that 
some maintain that this policy was unrealistic, Syria was going to strengthen its position 
after Egypt made peace with Israel and at the same time playing a crucial role through 
having strategic relation with Iran.   
 
4- Syria’s decision to resume its relation with Egypt in the late 1980 in order to end its 
isolation and resituate Syria's position in the Arab politics is another example of Asad’s 
pragmatism. 
 
5- Syria's strategic decision to join the American-led coalition to fight against the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait was a realistic approach to build confidence-building measure with 
the Americans and to provide an opportunity to better its relations with Americans at the 
time that they were the only hegemonic superpower in the region. 
 
6- Syria's participation in the Arab-Israeli negotiations despite the fact that they were 
aware of the American strategic relations with Israel, and the fact that it was unlikely that 
the Americans could pressure Israel to concede to the Arab’s demands. The following 
chapters would include a detail discussion about Syria's participation in the peace 
process.     
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According to neo-realism, the structure of international system determines the 
making of foreign policy and the interaction between the actors at state and non-state 
level. As we see, in regard to Syria, the change in the international system form bipolarity 
to a hegemonic role of the United States in the early 1990s had an important effect on 
Syria's decision both to join the U.S.-led coalition and to participate in the peace process. 
However, we should not simplify a complex process in which nation-states make their 
policy. At the same time, we should not make this process to be more complicated 
through using various conceptual frameworks. A good combination of theory and 
practical analysis would be useful. 
 
The United States and the peace initiatives  
 
The United States’ initiatives, in the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait, to 
bring the Arabs and Israelis to a conference for the reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was a significant decision that also could best be explained through prism of a 
neo-realist approach of international politics. The impact of the end of Cold War on the 
structure of international system led to an unprecedented hegemonic role of the United 
States in the Middle East. This situation convinced the Bush administration that they 
could reconcile the Arab-Israeli conflict based upon the land for peace formula and the 
principles of United Nation Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The theory of 
decision making, particularly Alison’s three model of decision making process,47 could 
best explain the difficulties, complexities and lack of integrity in Bush’s initiatives for a 
plan to resolve the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict, perhaps within a short period of time.  
 
The assumption of this study is that making decision, in the aftermath of U.S. 
victory over Iraq in 1991, in order to provide an opportunity for the Arabs and Israelis to 
reconcile their long decades animosity was based upon the principles of a rational foreign 
policy. The U.S. was the only superpower in the region with unchallengeable hegemonic 
power. So the Bush administration calculated that the time was ripe for the Arabs and 
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Foreign Policy: Theoritical Essays (Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999) pp. 413-452. 
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Israeli to compromise their differences and to agree to an honorable, comprehensive 
peace plan that recognize the basic rights of both Israelis and Arabs. The hypothesis of 
this research is that the strong U.S. interest in Israel, driven mostly by domestic politics, 
made the United States unwilling and unable to pressure Israel to make the necessary 
concessions that were inevitable for making a comprehensive peace between the Arabs 
and Israelis. Therefore, the U.S. administration during the presidency of Gorge Bush in 
1991 made a big mistake in proposing such peace initiatives, because the failure of the 
Americans to bring peace to the region, and the fact that they took Israeli side in the 
negotiations for the peace fundamentally damaged U.S. prestige in the region.   
 
Given Bush was interested in making peace between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors, but it was not only he that could make such a decision. The role of “power 
elite” in the formation of U.S. foreign policy, the significance of Zionist lobby and their 
enormous influence on U.S. executive branch, and the fact that Israel could benefit from 
a vast majority support in U.S. Congress, ultimately, made the United States unwilling 
and unable to pursue a just, honorable, and comprehensive peace between the Arabs and 
Israelis. It demonstrates also that the United States was an ineffective mediator in the 
Arab-Israeli negotiations and in the Syrian-Israeli tracks, in particular.  
 
 Therefore, Israel not only was reluctant to recognize the Arab’s rights, but also 
opposed strongly any territorial concessions. They did not recognize the UN Resolutions 
242 and 338 as the basis for peace in the Middle East. Having great support in many U.S. 
administrations, and non-state actors in the United States, Israel made a realist decision to 
be reluctant in the negotiations for the peace during the 1990s, and to be determined in 
conceding to the Arabs.  
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Chapter 3 
 
U.S.-Syrian Relations 
 
 
Introduction 
 
American relations with Syria have been strained by various factors. During 
recent decades, the two countries occasionally had good relations, but the relations 
usually deteriorated. The United States has generally supported Israel and this policy 
affected its relations with Syria. Moreover, Syria has been on the U.S. list of state 
sponsoring international terrorism since this list was created in 1979. This was mostly 
because Syria supported and provided safe-haven for some Palestinian and Lebanese 
groups and other organizations that U.S. administrations considered terrorist groups. This 
alleged role in international terrorism has been among the main reasons the United States 
has not yet improved its bilateral relations with Syria. The U.S. Congress, therefore, 
imposed several sanctions upon Syria, aiming to make this country ineligible to receive 
U.S. aid or purchase U.S. military equipment and high tech products. These sanctions 
have made improvement of relations between the two countries very difficult and 
contingent upon fundamental changes in Syrian foreign and domestic policy. 
 
1) Historical Background 
 
Until 1947 when the United States announced its support for a Jewish state, the 
United States had a very positive image in Syria. The image was created mostly by the 
activities of American educators, missionaries and administrators who helped to establish 
and promoted educational institutions in some parts of Greater Syria, most prominent 
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among them, the American University of Beirut48. By the mid-19th century, Syria began 
to experience a national movement. According to the Palestinian author, George 
Antonius, the American missionaries’ “contribution was all the more productive as it was 
governed by ideas as well as by enthusiasm.”49  
 
 “The educational activities of the American missionaries in that early period had, 
among many virtues, one outstanding merit; they gave the pride of place to 
Arabic…with vigor to the task of providing an adequate literature. In that, they 
were pioneers; and because of that, the intellectual effervescence which marked 
the first stirrings of the Arab revival owes most to their labors.”50 
 
The impact of the educational activities of the Americans in Syria was important 
not only because they established some educational institutions, but even more because 
of the contributions of their graduates to the Arab awakening. Antonius believes  “when 
account is taken of its contribution to the diffusion of knowledge, of the impetus it gave 
to literature and science, and of the achievement of its graduates, it may justly be said that 
its influence on the Arab revival, at any rate in its earlier stage, was greater than that of 
any other institution.”51 
 
The impact of Zionism 
 
The creation of the state of Israel in Palestine had strong negative ramifications 
for the popular image of the United States in the Middle East. The United States endorsed 
the United Nations’ plan to partition Palestine and thereafter supported the new Jewish 
state of Israel. The United States became Israel’s chief benefactor and backed Israel in its 
conflicts with the Arabs. Consequently, this policy marked a period in which the positive 
image of the United States began to change.   
                                                 
48. By the mid-19th century, American had established thirty-three schools in Syria. Approximately one 
thousand students attended these schools (George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab 
National Movement (London: Hamilton, 1955), p. 42.)  
49. George Antonius, p. 41. 
50. George Antonius, p. 43. 
51. George Antonius, p. 43. 
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Syria was concerned because it perceived Israel as an immediate threat to its 
national security. Syria also viewed the creation of Israel in Palestine, historically a part 
of Greater Syria, as an “imperialist-created colonial settler state unjustly implanted in the 
heart of the Arab world, as well as a security threat and an obstacle to Arab unity.”52  
 
Until World War II, the American presence in the Middle East was presented by 
protestant missionaries to the region, who established schools and colleges providing 
liberal education and medical personnel. By the end of the war, the priority of American 
interests changed from the humanitarian to the political, military and economic. Because 
of its natural resources and geopolitical situation, the United States viewed the Middle 
East as vital to U.S. interests. In the U.S. policies of the cold war, the region was 
important as a buffer to contain Soviet Union influence, and for the enormous oil 
resources of the area.  
 
Viewing Middle East issues through the prism of the East-West conflict,53 U.S. 
policy makers focused on the Arab states to contain Soviet Union influence into the 
region. Therefore, U.S. policy was designed to support pro-Western Arab countries and 
to prevent any radical group from taking power in this region. The U.S. urged Arab 
countries to join the Turkey-Pakistan pact of April 1954. But only Iraq signed this pact in 
195554; thus Iraq became the only Arab country to join the anti-Soviet arrangement. 
According to a report by the National Security Council staff, “American friendship for 
Israel and Israeli dependence on American aid had thoroughly alienated the Arab people 
and their leaders, likely precluding Arab agreement to join an anti-Soviet defense 
arrangement in cooperation with the United States or Britain.”55 
 
 
                                                 
52. Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), p. 98. 
53. John Dumbrell, The Making of US Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), Second 
Edition, pp. 3-11.  
54. This pact was named the Baghdad Pact after Iraq signed this accord.  
55. Bonnie F. Saunders, The United States and Arab Nationalism: the Syrian Case 1953-1960 (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 1996), p. 26. 
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The U.S. attempt to overthrow Syria’s government, 1955-1957 
 
In the mid 1950s, the United States was concerned about the possibility that a 
radical pan-Arab nationalism might take control of power in Syria. There was major 
concern that such a radical national government might act as a Soviet surrogate and 
provide an outpost for Soviet influence in the region. Syria's geographic position in 
relation to the NATO allies, Turkey, as well as its borders with Israel was important to 
containment of the Soviet Union and communism in the Middle East.56   
 
Believing that Syria would provide the ground for Soviet expansionism in the 
Middle East, the U.S., under the “Eisenhower Doctrine”,57 attempted to alter Syria’s 
government.  Hence, on several occasions in the mid 1950s, the United States, with 
cooperation of the British intelligence services, intervened in Syria’s internal politics in 
order to tip the balance of power toward a pro-Western government. According to an 
analysis, “when U.S. official[s] believed that communism was making significant inroads 
into Syrian politics and society, they tried harsher methods. In 1955, 1956, and 1957, the 
Central Intelligence Agency attempted several times to overthrow the government of 
Syria.58 Under the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, the president offered military aid, for 
possible use against Syria, to pro-Western countries in the region, most notably Jordan 
and Turkey.”59 
 
Consequently, Syria viewed the United States policy in conflict with its national 
interests. And according to Saunders, “each action that Eisenhower administration took to 
minimize Soviet influence in Syria seemed to have the opposite effect…. The sharp anti-
Syria and anti-Arab nationalist rhetoric uttered by American officials throughout the 
                                                 
56. Burton I. Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States (New York: Twayne Publisher, 1996), 
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57. David W. Lesch, Syria and the United States: Eisenhower’s Cold War in the Middle East (Westview 
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(Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 52-54. 
58. George Lenczowski, pp. 54-57. 
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period and CIA covert operations drove Syria ever closer to the Soviets, who welcomed 
the opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East.”60 
 
The United Arab Republic 1958-61 
 
Fearing Syrian communists might take control of the government and army, the 
members of the Arab Socialist Revolutionary Party (ASRP) then in power decided to 
disband the government of Syria to form a unified government with Egypt. The United 
Arab Republic (UAR) was formed on February 1, 1958. In addition to the perceived 
threat of communist activities in Syria, the desire for Arab unity was another reason that 
ASRP leaders voluntarily surrendered Syria’s sovereignty only 12 years after achieving 
independence from France in 1946.  
 
Syria had a minor role in the united government, and found itself to be a 
subordinate province. However, after three years of increasing dissatisfaction, Syrian 
nationalists realized that the UAR was not what they had expected.61 Therefore, a group 
of nationalist officers instigated a coup d'état in 1961 which led to re-establishing Syria’s 
sovereignty.  
 
The U.S. reaction toward the union of Syria and Egypt was mixed. Despite 
recognizing the UAR immediately, U.S. officials were concerned that Nasser, Egypt’s 
president and then president of the UAR, had increased power. According to Ambassador 
Seelye, “while the unity scheme was acknowledged by Washington as an effort by Syrian 
nationalist[s] to reduce the growing influence of Syrian Marxists, it also appeared to offer 
expansionist opportunities in the Arab world to Nasser, a figure the Eisenhower 
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Administration distrusted, despite its intervention on Egypt’s behalf during the 1956 Suez 
Canal crisis.”62 
 
2) U.S.-Syrian Relations During the Presidency of Hafiz al-Asad 
 
A moderate member of the Ba’th party, Hafiz al-Asad came to power in 
November 1970, was elected president of Syria in March 1971. The Arab Ba’th Socialist 
Party took over the government of Syria in 1963. The Ba’th Party opposed U.S. policies 
in the region and, therefore, its takeover of the Syrian government did not improve the 
already strained relations between the two countries. At this time, Syrian foreign policy 
had been shaped by Arab nationalism and was preoccupied with threats of Israeli 
expansionism. When the Ba'th party seized power in Syria, it called for the total 
liberation of Palestine.63 Under the original, radical Ba'th party (1963-1970) “it was Syria 
that challenged Israel, giving support to the Palestinian fedayeen and trying to push the 
Arab states into preparation for a war of Palestinian liberation.”64 This policy led to the 
1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which Israel captured vast areas of all its Arab neighbors, 
including the Golan Heights. 
 
Because the U.S. supported Israel in the 1967 war, most of the Arab countries, 
including Syria, severed their relations with the United States. At the same time, the Arab 
defeat in the war brought a new era of “revisionism” in Syrian foreign policy and Syria's 
relations with the other Arab countries. Raymond Hinnebusch argues, “This defeat 
generated intense new security fears in Syria, gave new roots to revisionism, and further 
locked Syria into the conflict with Israel and its backers… and provoked the rise to power 
of Hafiz Al-Asad.”65 Therefore, when Hafiz al-Asad came to power, U.S. relations with 
Syria were already at the lowest point ever. 
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When Hafiz al-Asad seized power in November 1970, a new era of realism in 
Syrian foreign policy began, in which he carefully moderated Syria’s foreign policy 
goals. “The role of ideology was relegated, and the new determinants of foreign policy 
have been shaped primarily by the international political system.”66 Hafiz al-Asad, 
“scaled down Syria's objectives, focusing them on recovery of the occupied territories, 
defense of the Syrian state, and enhancement of its stature in the Arab world; he also 
greatly upgraded Syrian capabilities.”67 In an obvious move toward reconciliation of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, Hafiz al-Asad announced in March 1972 that Syria would accept 
Security Council Resolution 242.68 Syria had refused to accept this resolution when it 
was adopted originally after the June War of 1967. This acceptance was coincident with 
the expulsion of thousands of Soviet advisors from Egypt and Egypt’s readiness to pursue 
a diplomatic strategy to restore Arab rights. According to Mark Tessler, “… from the 
Arab point of view at least, the United States did little in response to these overtures and 
made no attempt to encourage meaningful Israeli movement in the direction of territorial 
compromise….”69 
 
The United States and Syria resumed their relationship in June 1974 following the 
October 1973 War. Then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger arranged a ceasefire 
between Israel and Syria. Thus through an active American mediation role the peace 
negotiations led to the Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. Upon this agreement, 
Syria regained territories they lost during the 1973 war as well as parts of the land it had 
lost during the previous 1967 war. 
 
Although U.S.-Syrian relations were restored in 1974, the relations between the 
two countries did not improve. Syria refused to continue its cooperation with the United 
States for negotiating a Second Disengagement Agreement on the grounds that U.S. 
policy in the region favored Israel. According to Talcott W. Seelye (a former U.S. 
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Ambassador to Syria) "To Asad, the United States seems determined to deny Syria what 
it considers its legitimate regional interests or to reduce its importance in the area...Syria 
also fundamentally distrusts the United States.  This is important to keep in mind in 
discussing Syria's peace perspective, inasmuch as the United States has a central role to 
play in any peace initiative.”70  
 
The impact of the Camp David Accord 
 
Egypt’s initiatives to make a separate peace with Israel had a significant impact 
on deteriorating U.S.-Syrian relations. Following the first disengagement agreement 
between Egypt and Israel in 1974, Egypt’s president Anwar Sadat moved toward 
reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict through diplomatic means. He tried to reach an 
agreement with the Israelis to recover just the lands that Egypt had lost during the 
previous war with Israel. Sadat’s policies for a second disengagement was viewed by the 
other Arab countries as “a desire for an accommodation with Israel.”71 Syria and other 
Arab countries criticized Sadat’s policies, fearing that his unilateral postwar diplomacy 
would weaken the position of all other Arab states in their negotiations with Israel. Hafiz 
al-Asad viewed the Sinai II Agreement between Egypt and Israel “as plot by the 
Americans to neutralize Egypt, thus maintaining the existing balance of power in the 
area, which to the Syrians was heavily in favor of Israel.”72 
 
Moreover, two important events increased mistrust among the Syrians and other 
Arab parties regarding Egypt’s policy: Sadat’s meeting with the new U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter in April 1977 in Washington and his unprecedented journey to Jerusalem 
on November 19th of that year significantly damaged the inter-Arab relationship. These 
events also strained relations between Syria and the United States because Syria strongly 
opposed Sadat’s peace initiatives.  
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Despite all the criticism, Egypt continued to try to reach an agreement with Israel 
through American mediation. But the huge differences between the two countries 
prevented the parties from achieving a peace treaty. Following the impasse in the 
negotiations between Egypt and Israel, U.S. President Jimmy Carter invited both 
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israel’s prime minister Menachem Begin for 
historic, face to face negotiations at Camp David. The summit convened September 5-17, 
1978, and despite tense negotiations, the talks led to a peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt, known as the Camp David Accord.73 
 
The Camp David Peace Treaty divided the Arab countries and further weakened 
their already feeble positions in regard to the conflict with the Israelis. Syria objected to 
the treaty and simultaneously tried to isolate Egypt from the Arab world and to unify the 
Arab position against any unilateral agreement.74 “Realizing that a separate peace had 
weakened the Arab position after Egypt had accepted the terms of Camp David in 1979, 
Syria sought to coordinate the policies of the Arab parties.”75 
 
Syria's opposition to Egypt’s unilateral peace policy, and specifically its 
disagreement with U.S. peace initiatives in the Middle East, made more difficult the 
restoration of U.S.-Syrian relations from the late 1970s onward. The United States 
viewed Syria as a rejectionist state, whose policy was to undermine the peace process in 
the Middle East. To make matters worse, Syria's strategic relations with the Soviet Union 
at that time led the United States to view Syria as a Soviet surrogate.  
 
Therefore, inasmuch as U.S. policymakers tried to exclude the Soviets from 
Middle Eastern affairs and, from the peace process in particular,76they pursued a policy 
of containment in regard to the Syrian role in the peace process, or at least to involve 
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Syria as little as possible in the process. Consequently, this U.S. policy provoked Syria to 
disrupt the process on the grounds that this U.S. policy ignored Syria's primary national 
interests in the region. In response, Syria adopted a policy that was designed to prevent 
any unilateral agreement with Israel that would lead to the expansion of Israeli hegemony 
in the region.  
 
The impact of the Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990 
 
Syria's role in the Lebanese Civil War77, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, was an 
important element in shaping U.S. relations with the Syrians.78 During this period, the 
U.S. and Syria periodically confronted each other in Lebanon.79 However, at other times, 
Syria's role as a hegemonic power was approved or, at least, ignored, by the U.S. 
administrations. The ambiguity was due to Syria's geo-strategic position and its changing 
relations with the Lebanese factions. In order to prevent escalation of the civil war in 
Lebanon, and to establish stability in this country, there was a need for an influential 
power to maintain a balance of power in the Lebanese conflict. Syria was the only 
country that could play such a role. Ambassador Talcott Seelye argues, “Despite mutual 
suspicions and disagreement regarding basic Middle East policy, Syria and the United 
States have cooperated and consulted on Lebanon. Both Syria and the United States have 
a common goal of reestablishing order there and of maintaining a balance between 
disputing factions.”80 
 
Although American-Syrian relations were frequently strained because of 
disagreement over various regional and international issues, the events in Lebanon in the 
mid 1970s somewhat improved relations between the two countries. Following the Civil 
War in Lebanon between the National Movement (including Palestinian groups, leftist, 
Muslim, and Druze factions) and the Maronite Christian forces (the Phalangists), Syria, 
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with the support of the Arab League, deployed thousands of its troops into Lebanon in 
order to stabilize the situation. Syria’s main goal was to maintain a deliberately 
precarious balance of power between the Lebanese factions. To that end, Syria intervened 
militarily on behalf of the Maronites and against the National Movement factions, 
although these factions had once been supported by Syria and were originally linked to 
the Syrians.81  
 
According to an analysis, “Syria moved its troops into Lebanon in 1976 with U.S. 
approval. Several times during Syria's occupation of Lebanon, the United States has gone 
on public record to characterize Syria's role in Lebanon as constructive….”82 Therefore, 
Syria's action created an opportunity to improve its relations with the United States. Both 
the U.S. and Syria had a stake in preventing the Lebanese government from being 
defeated by the National Movement factions. Cooperation between the two countries led 
to a better understanding of their mutual interests. Syria played an important role in 
maintaining the balance of power in Lebanon although it sought to manipulate the 
Lebanese crisis for its domestic and regional interests.83  
 
However, in response to outside influences, Syria once again returned to its 
previous position in the early 1977, in which it supported the Palestinian and other 
National Movement factions. The Maronite Christian forces, therefore, turned to the 
Israelis and increased their connections with them. Also in 1977, Sadat’s visit to 
Jerusalem and his unilateral, separate peace initiatives exacerbated Syria's relations with 
the United States. Syria traditionally maintained that the Arab countries should be unified 
to strengthen their position in dealing with the Israelis.  
 
By the end of 1970s, there were some dramatic changes in the aftermath of the 
Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These events jeopardized U.S. 
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interests in the region and led to a new U.S. policy in the Middle East. When Ronald 
Reagan came to office, he viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict through the prism of the Cold 
War in the context of rivalry with the Soviet Union. Because of Syria's strategic relations 
with the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration viewed Syria as “an outpost of the 
Soviets” and therefore adopted a policy of confrontation with the Syrians.  
 
The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon and its Aftermath 
 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 further strained U.S.-Syrian relations. 
U.S. military and economic aid for Israel was approved by the U.S. Congress in 
December 1982 even as Israel invaded Lebanon. This action demonstrated to the Syrians 
that the Americans were behind the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Syrian forces suffered 
major losses and the Lebanese suffered massive civilian casualties and lost much of their 
infrastructure.  
 
Relations between Syria and the United States became extremely difficult when 
the Israelis, with American support, negotiated the normalization of relations with the 
Lebanese government in early 1983. The negotiations led to the May 17, 1983 
Agreement, according to which Israel would withdraw from Lebanon within six months 
and both countries would establish normal relations.84 Syria strongly objected to the 
accord and persuaded its allies in Lebanon to reject and to sabotage the agreement. Syria 
had already warned the Reagan administration that “no agreement could be carried out 
without its consent, and that Israel must not be allowed to achieve political or military 
gains in return for ending its occupation in Lebanon.”85 But the U.S. administration 
ignored Syria's warning and maintained that they could impose a peace treaty on Lebanon 
on Israeli terms.  
 
According to Ambassador Talcott W. Seelye, Syria rejected the May 17 Accord 
on the grounds that the agreement “undermined Lebanese sovereignty…it had all the 
                                                 
84. Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, pp. 43-56.  
85. Talcott W. Seelye, U.S.-Arab Relations: The Syrian Dimension, p. 8. 
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earmarks of a Camp David-like peace treaty in which American diplomacy had shunted 
Syria aside…. Assad also saw the Agreement as an Israeli challenge to Syria's 
preeminent position in Lebanon and as strengthening Israel's security position at Syria's 
expense. He was particularly taken aback by one provision that would have authorized 
Israeli soldiers on patrol in Lebanon to operate along the Syrian border only 15 miles 
from Damascus.”86  
 
Because of Syria's rejection of the May Accord the Reagan administration viewed 
Syria as a spoiler in Lebanon. To demonstrate its dissatisfaction with American policy in 
Lebanon, Syria discontinued its cooperation with President Reagan's Middle East envoy 
Ambassador Philip Habib and finally declared him persona non grata. As a result of these 
events in Lebanon, Syrian-U.S. relations became more tense and hostile.87 The relations 
came to a critical point when large U.S. casualties were incurred as a result of a terrorist 
car bombing at the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, which was probably carried out by the 
Syrian allies. The explosion caused huge damages to American troops. Accordingly, 
following the bombing, “the National Security Council met and agreed on a tough policy 
of confronting Syria with a combination of U.S. and Israeli military power.”88  
 
Thereafter, American forces intervened militarily against Syrian positions in 
Lebanon. But finally, as a result of enormous U.S. casualties, the U.S. administration 
decided to withdraw its troops from Lebanon in February 1984 while the Syrian allies 
were gaining more power in Lebanon. Consequently, “Syria could then declare itself the 
victor in its confrontation with the U.S. over Lebanon. While the U.S. suffered a 
considerable loss of prestige and credibility in its clash with Syria over Lebanon, it saved 
itself from even greater disasters that would likely have occurred had American troops 
remained.”89 
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Finally understanding that Syria could play a more important role in stabilizing 
the Lebanese crisis, the United States reached the conclusion that they could not ignore 
Syria's interests in Lebanon. This understanding was based upon events including the 
failure of U.S. military intervention in Lebanon 1982-83, Syria's good will was shown by 
facilitating the release of American hostages in Lebanon, and Syria's influence in 
stabilizing the tension in Lebanon and establishing balance of power between the 
Lebanese factions. Consequently, “while not always happy with Syrian tactics, the United 
States has recognized that the Lebanon's current chaotic situation [1975-1990] 
necessitates the presence of the firm hand of an outside power-- and that only Syria has 
the appropriate credentials and the will to act in this capacity.”90 As a result, all these 
circumstances “seemed to make Asad's point that Syria cannot be ignored...and with its 
co-operation things can be achieved in the Middle East.”91 The United States, therefore, 
shifted its focus and began to help dampen tension between Syria and Israel in Lebanon. 
And Syria, thereafter, implemented a policy to relax the tension in its relations with the 
United States.  
 
In spite of these acts, Syrian-U.S. relations became tense once again in 1986 as a 
result of a report in which it was alleged Syria had a role in an attempt to blow up an 
Israeli airplane. The U.S. and other European countries withdrew their ambassadors from 
Damascus. However, the U.S. ambassador returned to Syria in 1987 when Syria showed 
its willingness to restrain the radical Palestinian group Abu Nidal. This group, according 
to the Americans, was obviously engaged in terrorist activities. Syria later on expelled 
this group. The expulsion of this group and Syria's continuing help in securing the release 
of several hostages in Lebanon were important in easing the tension between the two 
countries. Syria also cooperated with the United States and other Arab countries in 
negotiating the Ta’if Accord92 in September 1989. The Accord brokered by the Arab 
league, outlined a comprehensive reform plan for ending the Lebanese civil war. The 
Accord also endorsed Syrian military presence in Lebanon.   
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Finally, Syria's historic decision to join the American-led coalition against the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 improved their relationship. U.S.-Syrian relations 
further advanced as a result of Syria's strategic decision to participate in the American 
peace initiatives, which convened in Madrid in November 1991. Syria agreed for the first 
time to negotiate its disputes within the context of bilateral negotiations with Israel. 
 
In conclusion, there were several factors that made the improvement of Syria's 
relations with the United States very difficult even though both countries had significant 
mutual interests in Lebanon and in the Middle East peace process. These factors included 
the legislative sanctions that were imposed on Syria by the U.S. Congress as a result of 
Syria's alleged role in international terrorism. Syria has been on the U.S. list of states 
sponsoring international terrorism since the list was created in 1979. Because of the 
importance of these two factors in U.S.-Syrian relations, it is necessary to discuss how 
these obstacles prevented U.S.-Syrian relations from achieving normalcy.  
 
3) Sources of Tension in U.S.-Syrian Relations93 
 
1) Sanctions 
 
The U.S. sanctions imposed upon Syria had long been among the main obstacles 
to improving the relations between the United States and Syria. The U.S. imposed several 
economic and military sanctions on Syria in the late 1970s and the mid-1980s. They also 
banned Syria from receiving American economic aid. The sanctions minimized U.S.-
Syrian trade and limited the two country’s relations in various fields of cooperation. The 
first set of sanctions was imposed on Syria in 1979 because the United States perceived 
Syria as a state that supported acts of international terrorism. These sanctions will 
hereafter be called legislative sanctions. The second set of sanctions came in the mid-
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1980s when the U.S., in solidarity with the British, decided to join the European Union in 
restricting trade with the Syrians. 
 
In the second half of the 1970s, the U.S. Congress passed two acts to terminate 
economic aid to the countries that support international acts of terrorism: the International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and the Export 
Administration Act of 1979. These two acts became the source of sanctions on Syria and 
other countries that the U.S. viewed as states sponsoring terrorism. The purpose of these 
two acts was to terminate foreign assistance to countries that sponsor terrorism, and to 
increase the role of Congress in determining the U.S. relations with those countries. 
Therefore, these acts required the Secretaries of Commerce and State to notify Congress 
before licensing export of goods and technology to the countries that might come under 
the provision of these acts.94  
 
A by-product of these acts was a “terrorism list” that was made by the U.S. 
Department of State in 1979. Syria has been on the list since its creation and therefore has 
not been eligible to receive any kind of economic, military, or technological assistance 
from the United States. Until now, the U.S. has opposed the sale or transfer of any 
American military equipment as well as other advanced equipment and technology that 
could be used for military purposes. The U.S. also has prevented the sale or transfer of 
United States military equipment and technology (for military purposes) from other 
countries to Syria.  
 
A second set of sanctions, originating with the U.S. president, came in 1986 
following what was said to be proof that Syrian government agents had directed the 
hijacking of an Israeli airplane in London. Britain thereafter severed relations with Syria. 
The European Union also downgraded their relations with Syria and imposed several 
economic sanctions on this country. In solidarity with Britain, the United States 
condemned Syria’s role in that act of international terrorism and announced that the U.S. 
would consider strict political and economic sanctions against Syria. By reducing the size 
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of diplomatic representation in both the United States Embassy in Damascus and the 
Syrian Embassy in Washington,95 the U.S. downgraded its relations with Syria. The 
United States also recalled its ambassador to Syria. The economic sanctions were 
intended to tighten export controls on things such as aircraft and helicopters, to ban the 
Syrian Export-Import bank, and to terminate an aviation agreement with Syria.  
 
Congressional Actions against Syria 
 
Since 1950, the United States has provided a total of $627.5 million in aid to 
Syria.96 Most of this aid was after Syria’s acceptance of U.S. role in disengagement 
negotiations between Syria and Israel in the aftermath of the October 1973 war. 
However, after Syria rejected the Camp David Accord of 1979 the United States 
decreased its aid to Syria. Finally on November 13, 1983, after Syria’s alleged role in 
bombing the U.S. Marines Barracks in Beirut, the U.S. Congress voted to stop all 
remaining U.S. aid to Syria.97  There has been no U.S. economic aid to Syria after 1983. 
 
In recent decades, the U.S. Congress, spearheaded by Israel’s supporters, has 
taken an unfavorable view of Syria and toughened the restrictions against it.98 Congress 
constricted relations with Syria in order to apply more pressure on Syria to comply with 
certain conditions before improving relations with the United States, and to be eligible for 
U.S. economic aid. As a result, even in a period when conditions were ideal for 
improving relations with Syria (after Syria joined the U.S.-led coalition to fight against 
Iraq and when Syria participated in the Madrid peace conference), Congress passed 
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several restrictions against Syria that made improving relations contingent upon Syria 
making fundamental changes in its policies.99 
 
In March 1992, the House of Representatives passed another resolution, in which 
improving relations with Syria was made yet more difficult, if not impossible. Section 
609 of 1992 H.R. 4546 determined,  
 
“United States assistance may not be provided to Syria until the President 
determines, and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees, that- 
(1) the Government of Syria has demonstrated its willingness to enter into direct 
bilateral negotiations with the State of Israel; (2) the Government of Syria- (A) 
does not deny its citizens, or any segment of its citizens, the right or opportunity 
to emigrate, (B) does not impose any tax on emigration or on the visas or other 
documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever, and (C) 
does not impose any tax, levy, fine, or other charge (other than a nominal fee for 
administrative expenses) on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such 
citizen to emigrate to the country of his or her choice; (3) the Government of 
Syria no longer supports groups responsible for acts of international terrorism and 
no longer provides safe haven for terrorists; (4) the Government of Syria is 
withdrawing its armed forces from Lebanon; (5) the Government of Syria is no 
longer acquiring chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, and the President has 
received credible assurances that any such weapons now in the Syrian arsenal will 
not be used to threaten Syria's neighbors; (6) the Government of Syria is fully 
cooperating with United States antinarcotics efforts and is taking steps to remove 
those members of the Syrian Government who are involved in the drug trade; and 
(7) the Government of Syria has made progress in improving its record of respect 
for internationally recognized human rights.”100  
 
                                                 
99. U.S. Congress, “House Resolution, 4546, Section (609),” (1992). 
100. U.S. Congress, “House Resolution, 4546, Section (609),” (1992). 
  
59
Although Syria attended the Madrid peace conference, which satisfied the first 
condition, the other conditions directly related to Syria’s national interests and were 
regarded by Syria as interfering in its domestic politics. According to Rabil, “the 
administration and Congress has been conducting a tug-of-war over Syria during the 
delicate time of the on-going peace process. The administration wanted to improve its 
relations with Syria by paving the way to remove sanctions, thereby ridding itself of the 
legislative shackles either to reward Syria for its participation in the anti-Iraq coalition or 
to provide it with incentive to enter into a peace agreement with Israel.”101 
 
General Sanctions against Syria 
 
At present a variety of legislative and executive provisions prohibit U.S. aid to 
Syria and therefore restrict bilateral trade between Syria and the United States. A general 
list of sanctions applicable to Syria is summarized as follows:  
 
- The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 [P. L. 
94-329] requires termination of foreign assistance to countries that aid or abet 
international terrorism. 
 
- The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P. L. 96-72] requires the secretaries of 
State and Commerce to notify Congress before licensing export of goods and 
technology to countries that sponsor acts of international terrorism. 
 
- The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 [P. L. 101-222], 
section 4 under Exports to Countries Supporting Terrorism requires a valid 
license for the export of goods or technology to the countries on the terrorist 
list.102 
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- The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Years 1994-1995 prohibits the 
sale or lease of U.S. defense articles and services to “any country or international 
organization that, as a matter of policy or practice, is known to have sent letters to 
United States firms requesting compliance with, or soliciting information 
regarding compliance with, the Arab League primary or secondary boycott of 
Israel.”103 
 
In addition to the general sanctions which were imposed on Syria because of their 
presence on the “terrorism list”, there are some other legislative provisions that specify 
Syria by name and thereby prohibit Syria from receiving U.S. economic aid. According 
to the various House Resolutions under “Prohibition against Direct Funding For Certain 
Countries”104 Syria is barred from receiving any direct or indirect U.S. economic 
assistance. For example, Section 507 of House Resolution 4811 (P. L. 106-429) prohibits 
the obligation or expenditure of funds appropriated under this act for any direct assistance 
to Syria. Based on this act, “the prohibition on obligations or expenditures shall include 
direct loans, credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its 
agents.”105 Section 523 of this act also refers to indirect assistance to Syria (among other 
countries) and specifies that:  
 
“None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act 
shall be obligated to finance indirectly any assistance or reparations to Cuba, Iraq, 
Libya, Iran, Syria, North Korea, or the People's Republic of China, unless the 
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President of the United States certifies that the withholding of these funds is 
contrary to the national interest of the United States.”106 
 
The last sanction on Syria approved by the U.S. House of Representative in 
October 2003. Following the escalation of violence in the Middle East, the U.S. Congress 
voted with the majority of 398-4 the legislation—the Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Resolution Act—which enable the U.S. president to impose new sanctions 
on Syria.107 In conclusion, the immediate impact of sanctions against Syria has affected 
Syrian-U.S. bilateral trade. According to some sources, total U.S. exports to Syria mainly 
industrial equipment and machinery parts came to $223 million in 1995 and $226 million 
in 1996. In 1997 it dropped to $180.5 million and then to $161.4 million in 1998. In 1999 
the total U.S. exports to Syria reached $170 million. The comparison of U.S. exports to 
other countries in the Middle East with exports to Syria show how very restricted is 
between these countries. For example, U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia in 1999 came to $7.6 
billion, followed by $6.3 billion to Israel, and $3.0 billion to Egypt.108  
 
2) Terrorism 
 
Syria’s alleged involvement with international terrorism has been a longstanding 
concern and source of contention between Syria and the United States. In the early 1990s, 
`two dramatic watersheds helped Syria to improve its relationship with the United States: 
Syria’s participation in the U.S.-led coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
Syria’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991. However, the 
continuing presence of some Palestinian groups in Syria and Syria’s alleged support for 
such groups involved in international terrorism have remained the main obstacles in the 
United States’ relations with Syria. Syria’s relations with the United States was 
particularly strained over Syria’s support of the following groups: the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Islamic 
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Resistance Movement109 (HAMAS), the Abu Nidal Organization, Hezbollah, the Kurdish 
Workers Party, and the Japanese Red Army. 
 
In addition, some observers believe Syria was involved in the 1983 bombing of 
the U.S. Marine barracks110 and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut111, or that at the very least, 
Syria had foreknowledge of these attack by Shi’ite Muslim militants in Lebanon. 
According to the New York Times, “the United States has accused Syria of responsibility 
for the suicide bombing of the United States Marine barracks in Lebanon in October 
1983, which killed 241 servicemen, and for the bombing of the American Embassy in 
Beirut”112 in April 1983. According to some sources, Syrian intelligence was implicated 
in an abortive attempt to place a bomb on an Israeli jet airliner in London in 1986.113 
Thereafter, the United States withdrew its ambassador from Damascus and imposed strict 
sanctions against Syria. Relations between the two countries deteriorated and only after 
Syria expelled the Abu Nidal group,114 did the U.S. ambassador return to Damascus and 
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relations begin to improve. Some observers believe that the Abu Nidal group was 
responsible for the attack.  
 
Also, initial reports regarding destruction of the Pan American flight over 
Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988 asserted that it was the work of some Palestinian 
groups headquartered in Damascus probably the Palestinian Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).115 Syria was again blamed for 
hosting these groups in its territory. However, subsequent investigation shifted suspicion 
to Libya.116 
 
Syria’s support of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) had been another source 
of concern regarding Syria’s terrorist activity. The PKK117, which was established in 
1974 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group, has been engaged in an armed struggle 
against the government of Turkey. According to some sources, Syria provided safe haven 
within its borders and in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon for the PKK and its leader, 
Abdullah Ocalan, who resided at least part-time in Syria. Syria’s support for the PKK had 
been one of the main roots of hostility between Syria and Turkey.118  The relations 
between the two countries deteriorated in early 1996 when Syria refused to extradite 
Ocalan. Turkey then suspended all official contact with Syria. However, in response to 
Turkish pressure and a simultaneous U.S. demand, Syria agreed to expel PKK leaders in 
late 1998.119  
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Since the U.S. Department of State in 1979 created a list of countries sponsoring 
international terrorism, Syria has been on the list. The United States frequently accused 
Syria of having alleged role in supporting terrorist groups or having a role in international 
terrorism. The then Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Philip Wilcox, stated 
in 1996 that the U.S. policy of opposing Syria's support for terrorism has been constant. 
“It has been reiterated publicly…U.S. officials have emphasized to Syria the seriousness 
of this problem in U.S.-Syrian relations.”120 U.S. officials believed that the terrorist 
groups, which were allowed to operate within Syria or parts of Lebanon under Syrian 
control, were a threat to Israeli security and to the peace process. They also maintained 
that although Syria agreed to participate in the Middle East peace process, it did not act to 
stop anti-Israeli attacks by Hezbollah and Palestinian rejectionist groups in southern 
Lebanon.121 
 
According to Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, which was released in April 
2000 by the Department of State, “Syria continued to provide safe haven and support to 
several terrorist groups, some of which maintained training camps or other facilities on 
Syrian territory…. In addition, Syria granted a wide variety of terrorist groups—
including HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ [Palestinian Islamic Jihad]—basing 
privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley under Syrian control...[also] 
Syria permitted the resupply of rejectionist groups operating in Lebanon via 
Damascus.”122 However, the report also maintains that the Syrian government continued 
to restrain the military activities of terrorist groups based in Syria, limiting their actions 
to the political realm.   
 
Moreover, according to the State Department’s report on Syria in April 1999 
“there is no evidence that Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or 
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executing international terrorist attacks since 1986.”123 Based on another report the State 
Department also announced  “the Syrian Government continues to restrain the 
international activities of some groups and to participate in a multinational monitoring 
group to prevent attacks against civilian targets in southern Lebanon and northern 
Israel.”124 On July 25, 1996, Ambassador Philip Wilcox, speaking before the Committee 
on International Relations of the House of Representatives, testified that Syria has not 
been directly involved in any terrorist acts since 1986. He said:  
 
“There is no evidence of direct Syrian involvement in terrorist acts since 
1986…Syria has used its influence from time to time to restrain Hizballah rocket 
attacks across the Israeli border…The Syrian government has also demonstrated 
that it can use its influence to deter Palestinian rejectionist groups resident in 
Syria to avoid acts of international terrorism outside Israel and the West Bank and 
Gaza.”125  
 
Ironically, while the issue of terrorism has been an obstacle in U.S.-Syrian 
relations, it has played an important role in maintaining the relationship between the two 
countries. The United States needed Syria’s help in dealing with terrorism, and therefore 
was trying to maintain relations. In addition, Syria played a significant role in the release 
of American and western hostages in Lebanon in the mid-1980s and early 1990s in 
Lebanon.126  
 
To improve its relations with the United States, Syria also has used its influence 
to restrain the activities of radical groups within Syria and in parts of Lebanon 
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under Syria’s influence. Hafiz al-Asad, on his part, had “assured the United States 
in the past that he would not tolerate terrorists on Syrian territory.”127 Syria was 
also prepared to expel militant groups if provided with direct evidence of their 
involvement in terrorist activities such as when Syria forced the Abu Nidal group 
to leave Syria after it found they had a role in terrorist activities. However, Syria 
acknowledged on several occasions that it would support the Palestinian and 
Lebanese groups in their struggle against Israeli occupation. Syrian officials 
consider such operations the legitimate rights of Palestinians and Lebanese to 
resist occupation while maintaining, “all attacks on Israel and the occupied 
territories are legitimate national liberation”128. They make a clear distinction 
between those operations and terrorist activities.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Madrid Peace Conference 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the Gulf war in 1991, the United States realized that there was 
an exceptional opportunity for the achievement of a peace treaty between Israel and its 
neighboring Arab parties.129 Moreover, the disintegration of the East Bloc had created a 
unique prospect for the Arabs and Israelis to reach an agreement, bringing an end to their 
conflict. The United States, thereafter, viewed this conflict through the prism of its own 
interests in the region and not that of rivalry with the Soviet Union. Therefore, with 
cooperation of the Soviets, the United States commenced diplomatic initiatives in order 
to facilitate negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis, based upon the United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace.130 
 
Following U.S.-led coalition’s victory over Iraq,131 President Bush gave his 
important speech on March 7, 1991 before the Congress. Several days later, Secretary of 
State James Baker made his first of many trips to the region in order to discuss the new 
opportunity for reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He expressed optimism about 
the prospect for peace in the Middle East. In his testimony to the House of 
Representatives Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Baker said, 
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“We’ve been engaged in a rather intensive effort to find a path to a 
comprehensive settlement through direct negotiations between Arabs, Palestinians 
and Israel…. Since we began that effort, I've had no illusions about the challenges 
and difficulties involved…. But I also had a strong sense that the Gulf war might 
have created some new possibilities for peacemaking in the region and that the 
United States has a unique obligation to help explore those possibilities.”132 
 
Between March and October 1991, Baker made eight trips to the region before he could 
convince the Arab states and Israel to reach compromise their demands and attend the 
conference in Madrid. At this time, the Bush administration policy on the Middle East 
peace was based on the following understanding:133 
  
1) Peace in the Middle East should be grounded on the need for comprehensive 
peace based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principles of territory 
for peace, security for Israelis, and legitimate rights for Palestinians. 
2) Dual tracks of direct, simultaneous negotiations between Israel and the Arab 
states on one hand, and Israelis and Palestinians on the other. 
3) Multilateral negotiations on regional issues between Israel, Arab countries, 
and other regional and international powers.  
  
In his first trip, Baker pursued the policy of a two track, direct negotiations 
between Israel and both the Palestinians and other neighboring Arab states—Syria and 
Jordan. On the eve of his first trip, Baker said, “We think it is reasonable, in the aftermath 
of what has happened in the region, to approach the peace process from both sides of it. 
That is from the Arab state-Israel side and from the Israel-Palestinian dialogue side.”134 
Although Baker failed to make a breakthrough in his early trips to the region he did make 
a little progress. In his endeavors to promote compromise and build confidence between 
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the Arabs and Israelis, Baker made several more trips to the region in April and May 
1991. These trips also proved unsuccessful. Soon after, Baker made another trip in June, 
but he could not reach regional consent. A sixth trip by Baker in July 1991 then ended in 
a certain agreement. Syria eventually approved Baker’s proposed conference and agreed 
to attend.  Soon afterwards, the rest of the Arab states followed Syria and agreed to attend 
the peace conference in Madrid in October 1991.135 
 
Syria's Participation in the Conference 
 
 As mentioned above, Syria was the first state that agreed to attend the peace 
conference. There were circumstances that forced Syria to accept the Bush peace 
initiatives.136 Among them were the disintegration of the Eastern European bloc, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the United 
States’ demands for the reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.137  
 
The Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries had long been Syria's main 
benefactors. They supported Syria's position in its conflict with Israel and provided Syria 
with a variety of political, military and economic support. During the era of the cold war, 
Syria had benefited well from this support in its conflict with Israel, and therefore it 
strengthened its position and remained steadfast in its demands for reconciliation of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The disintegration of the Eastern European bloc in the late 1980s 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s had enormous effects on Syria.138 
In past decades, Syria could balance its political and military position with the east bloc’s 
support. But as Syria lost its main patron, Syria's political and military position 
diminished, and consequently Syria could no longer pose a tangible military threat to 
Israel. Moreover, without the backing of a major power, Syria’s diplomatic positions 
were also in a weakened state under sustained pressure, which undermined Syria's 
regional policy. Therefore, Syria had no option but to adopt its foreign policy to the new 
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circumstances on both international and regional levels. Although Syria remained 
resolute on some of its demands, a realistic option was to accept the Bush initiatives and 
join the peace process.  
 
Moreover, the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided a great 
opportunity for Syria to adjust its regional policy to the new era of American hegemony 
in the Middle East. The Iraqi invasion and the consequent liberation of Kuwait marked 
the emergence of a new political climate in the Middle East. These changes, along with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, brought uncertainty to the future of former Soviet 
clients such as Syria. This uncertainty challenged Syria's ability to conduct its 1980s 
policy of rejectionism, and thereby made it more vulnerable to U.S. hegemonic power in 
the region. On one hand, Syria did not have the power to resist U.S. demands for 
convening a peace conference and hence had to modify its policy concerning the 
conference. On the other, Syria needed an opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to 
establish a new relationship with the United States in the aftermath of the cold war.  
 
The Gulf War provided an ideal opportunity by allowing Syria to make the 
strategic decision to join the U.S.-led coalition to fight the Iraqi invasion and to realign its 
foreign policy toward the United States at the time that the United States needed Syria's 
participation. It was crucial for America to legitimize its operation against Iraq and to 
minimize the risk of anti-American sentiment in the region following the operation 
against Iraq. Syria's participation in the U.S.-led coalition was an important contribution 
that helped the U.S. to achieve its strategic goal of defeating the Iraqi army without 
provoking anti-American sentiment in the Arab world. It provided a pretext for the 
United States to conduct its operation without jeopardizing U.S. interests in the region. 
These mutual interests provided a chance for Syria to make a strategic decision to join the 
U.S. peace initiatives for reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In an analysis 
regarding Syria’s participation in the Madrid peace conference, Hafiz al-Asad stated,  
 
“Long discussions that lasted for months were held with the American 
administration, especially with the Secretary of State at that time, James Baker, 
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after which we agreed that the initiative, which had become clear, aimed at 
building a just and comprehensive peace on the basis of Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338, including a political settlement for the rights of the 
Palestinian people, along with an American assurance that the United States does 
not endorse the annexation of any part of the territories occupied in 1967, in 
keeping with a past American position that rejected the application of Israeli law 
to the Golan. On that basis we took part in the Madrid conference and in the 
discussions that were held in Washington.”139  
 
In general, Syria, through its participation in the U.S.-led coalition, not only 
managed to make an important contribution but also played an important role in the 
formation of the Middle East peace conference in Madrid. For Syria, participation in such 
a peace conference140 was recognition of its central role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
an important achievement for its foreign policy. Syria had long sought a settlement to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of international legitimacy and relevant UN resolutions 
for the establishment of a just, honorable, and comprehensive peace.141 When it realized 
that there was a better chance for such a peace in the Middle East after the second Gulf 
War, Syria made the strategic decision to join the conference. In an interview with 
Patrick Seale, Hafiz al-Asad noted, “There is a phenomenon emerging in Israel which we 
may consider new, and which we have noticed particularly in the past two years. This is 
that the trend of opinion in Israel in favor of peace is growing. This phenomenon is 
bound to have an impact on Israel’s rules. We did not notice this trend in the past…. But 
today, it seems to be gaining strength.”142  
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Israeli Preconditions and Arab Concessions 
 
Syria and other Arab countries made several important concessions to attend the 
peace conference. Although in the early 1990s there had been several encouraging 
developments for Syria to attend the conference, a number of events occurred designed to 
frustrate the Arabs, in general, and the Syrians, in particular. At the time of the 
conference Israel inaugurated a new settlement on the Golan Heights. Also, Israel’s 
parliament, the Knesset, voted that the status of both Jerusalem and the Golan Heights 
would be non-negotiable.143 Shamir rejected President Bush’s call that the conference be 
based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of trading land for peace. On 
several occasions, he stated that he would refuse to negotiate the question of Jerusalem. 
Moreover, Shamir denied the U.S., Soviet and Arab interpretation of UN Resolutions 242 
and 338, which emphasize ‘the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war’ and call 
for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands. 
 
Moreover, the Israeli government approached the Madrid peace conference with 
many procedural and substantive preconditions. Shamir opposed the recognition of the 
Palestinian rights of self-determination144 and also refused to commit Israel to stop 
building new settlements in the occupied Arab lands. The Israeli government, moreover, 
rejected negotiations with the Palestinians living outside of the occupied territories, 
refusing to recognize them as peace partners at the time of the conference. This led to a 
compromise allowing for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Furthermore, the 
Israelis had sought unconditional loan guarantees for housing then new Soviet 
immigrants145, something that the United States tried to link to restrictions on Israeli 
policy of building new settlements in the occupied territories. Eventually, the United 
States, the Arabs and the Palestinians had to accept Israel’s substantive preconditions for 
its participation to the conference. The participation, however, did not mean that 
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Shamir’s government would agree to trade land for peace or to stop settling the occupied 
territories.146 
 
The principle of land for peace  
 
The Bush administration proposed a peace plan based on UN Resolutions 242 and 
338 and the principle of land for peace. But the Shamir government rejected the idea and 
refused to agree to withdraw from the occupied Arab lands, the point once insisted upon 
by the Arab states as a pre-condition for their participation in the conference. According 
to the Washington Post, “Shamir and the religious and right-wing parties in his coalition 
staunchly oppose any Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, 
or East Jerusalem, all territories that Israel captured from the Arabs in the 1967 war….” 
A senior adviser to Shamir here quoted “We have some problems with the very concept 
that in order to make peace you have to make territorial concessions.”147 In response to 
Israel’s criticism of the Bush peace proposal, the United States announced that it “would 
not impose a solution to the Palestinian problem on the Israelis… We aren't going to 
dictate a final plan or an outcome.”148  
 
In general, Shamir’s refusal to commit Israel to President Bush’s call for a 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the concept of land for peace was one of the 
most important obstacles for a comprehensive peace in the region. Prime Minster Yitzhak 
Shamir and his coalition was committed to keeping the occupied Arab lands and to 
increasing the numbers of settlements in a way that making any concessions in the future 
be impossible.149 The Likud bloc believed that “Israel must permanently retain the West 
Bank, which they call Judea and Samaria, because they believe that this area is their 
ancient patrimony and it is vital for their defense. … [They] were not satisfied with the 
original borders of Israel as envisioned in the November, 1947, U.N. General Assembly 
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recommendation to partition Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state or as 
established by the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and the armistice agreements of 1949.”150  
 
 Syria had long been calling for an international conference under the auspices of 
the United Nation and based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for 
peace. Syria wanted Israel to commit to withdrawal before the conference, but Israel 
refused to do so. And Syria, under the new circumstances at both international and 
regional levels, had to retreat from its previous position. Syria, However, received a joint 
U.S.-Soviet letter of invitation to the Madrid conference in which both the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union assured Syria that the Madrid peace conference would be based upon UN 
resolutions.151 It mentioned in the letter that “The United States and the Soviet Union are 
prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace 
settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab 
states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace.”152 Syria assumed 
from the content of this letter that the conference would be based upon the principle of 
land for peace. But Shamir’s position was that Israel would “negotiate without 
preconditions”153 which meant Israel would not accept the concept of trading land for 
peace as requested in the UN resolutions and demanded by both the Americans and 
Arabs.  
 
New settlements  
 
Beside Israel’s refusal to trade land for peace, the building of new settlements in 
the occupied territories was also another obstacles to the peace conference. “The 
settlements that were built to enhance Israel’s security in the West Bank and Gaza have 
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now become albatross.”154 Despite the U.S. request that Israel freeze its settlement 
activity in the occupied territories,155 Israel continued to confiscate Palestinian lands and 
to build new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.156 Even during Secretary 
Baker’s trips to the region to persuade Israel to attend the conference, Shamir continued 
the policy of establishing or expanding new settlements. In a meeting with the far-right 
wing Tehiya Party, Shamir assured them that “settlements would continue and … [that] 
he would never trade land for peace.”157  
 
This Israeli policy frustrated U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. In an interview, 
he said, “we were very disappointed to learn … that there is yet another settlement that 
has been established in the occupied territories. I think that probably points up rather 
visibly that it is easier to obstruct peace than it is to promote it and that the establishment 
of those settlements certainly doesn’t help the effort of those who are interested in 
peace.”158 After making four trips to the region, Baker expressed his disappointment with 
the development in the pre-negotiation phases to convene the peace conference. In 
testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Baker 
said, “I do not think there is any bigger obstacles to peace than the settlement 
activity…nothing has made my job of trying to find Arab and Palestinian partners for 
Israel more difficult than being greeted by a new settlement every time I arrive [in 
Israel].”159 
 
Despite Bush’s position on new Israeli settlements, “Shamir announced near the 
beginning of Baker’s seventh trip that Israel had constructed 15,780 housing units for 
Jewish settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.”160 This settlement building was 
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crucial to gaining permanent control of the West Bank and Gaza. As Shamir’s cabinet 
minister once declared “the 1967 borders [are] obliterated… talk of land compromise is 
irrelevant… .We believe our boundaries are at the Jordan River… We won’t freeze the 
settlements at any price. Not even at the cost of the American loan guarantees.”161 
  
The United States continued to criticize Israel’s settlement policy, but that did not 
alter Shamir’s position on settling the occupied lands. Since Israel has always had strong 
support in U.S. Congress, the U.S. government usually failed to put pressure on Israel (in 
a case they wanted) in order to Israel comply with the basic needs for peace in the region: 
abandoning the settlements and trading land for peace. According to Robert G. Neumann,  
 
“It lies in the peculiar nature of American politics that lobby’s influence and 
pressure is primarily directed at the Congress. Elections are expensive in 
America, and congressional candidates for election or reelection depend on 
outside, not party, funds to win…. The pro-Israel lobby has for many years 
perfected its skill and superb organization by offering enticements as well as 
threats. By targeting specific senators and congressman for defeat, the lobby, 
centered especially in the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) but 
commanding other organisms as well, has shown how dangerous it can be to 
oppose the policies of Israel.”162  
 
In general, the Bush Administration viewed new settlements in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip as “illegal” and an “obstacle to peace”163, while the Shamir Government 
viewed it as a “means to guarantee Israeli control of the territories.”164 Accordingly, the 
United States tried repeatedly to stop Israel from building new settlements in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. The Americans believed these settlements would make it more 
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difficult to convince the Arabs to attend the conference. Therefore, the Bush 
administration proposed a delay of 120 days over the $10 billion loan guarantees. Israel 
needed this loan for providing houses and facilities for thousands of Jewish immigrants 
from the Soviet Union.165 Consequently, the U.S.-Israeli relations declined in summer 
1991 due to Israel’s policy of settling occupied Arab lands and the disagreement between 
the two countries over the housing loan guarantees. 
 
 
The U.S. maintained a belief, according to Secretary Baker, that if the United 
States approved Israel’s demand for the housing loan guarantee without the stipulation 
that they halt building new settlements in the occupied Arab lands, the Arabs might pull 
out of the conference. In contrast, the Israelis wanted the United States to approve the 
housing loan guarantees without any such stipulation so they could use it to continue 
building new settlements for Soviet immigrants. Eventually, the United States did link the 
loan guarantee to an exclusion of new settlements in the occupied territories in order to 
accommodate the Arabs’ demand.166  
 
Palestinian representative 
 
The presence of Palestinian representatives at the peace conference was another 
main obstacle. Israel explicitly did not recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) as the Palestinian representative and hence refused to negotiate with them.167 
Shamir’s government regarded the PLO as a terrorist organization and made it clear that 
it would not talk directly with them or with anyone considered as PLO proxies.168 
Although the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized the existence of a Jewish State in 
1988, this did not alter Israel’s position towards the PLO till late 1992.169 Arafat’s 
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support of Saddam Hussein during the second Gulf War170 made it enormously difficult 
for the PLO to be as a partner at the peace conference.171  
 
Syria insisted that the Palestinian issue would be interdependent with all other 
issues. So, it was crucial to the conference to have this issue on its main agenda. Syria 
believed the absence of independent Palestinian participation could undermine the 
fundamental goal of the conference. As part of a comprehensive solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the conference should address the Palestinian issue in order to fulfill the 
Arab interests.  
 
Israel’s refusal to talk with the PLO forced the Arabs to concede to Israel’s 
demands. In order to get Israel’s agreement to participate in the conference, the Arab 
parties agreed to a joint Palestinian-Jordanian negotiating team. The United States also 
assured Israel that Palestinians would not attend the conference as a separate delegation 
but would be represented at the peace talks by Jordanian King Hussein in a joint 
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.172 According to an agreement, the Palestinians in this 
delegation would be residents of the West Bank and Gaza with no formal contact with the 
PLO.173 Moreover, Israel demanded the right to approve the Palestinian delegates on a 
joint negotiating team with Jordan.174 Prior to the conference, the United States assured 
Israel that “The U.S. has no intension of bringing about a dialogue between Israel and the 
PLO or negotiations between them.”175 The Bush administration also reassured the 
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Israelis that “The U.S. will not support the creation of an independent Palestinian 
state.”176  
 
Eventually, the United States, the Arabs, and the Palestinians had to accept 
Israel’s substantive preconditions to participate in the conference. As mentioned above, 
even before the conference, Israel said that it would not negotiate the status of Jerusalem; 
it would reject the concept of trading land for peace, and it would not accept the U.S., 
Soviet, and Arab interpretation of the UN resolutions, which require Israeli withdrawal to 
pre-1967 borders. Although demanded by the United States and the Arabs, Israel refused 
to stop settling the occupied lands. Israel also set strict conditions on Palestinians taking 
part in the conference—among them the Israeli rights to approve the Palestinian 
delegation in a joint Jordanian negotiating team.177  
 
The Arab states showed flexibility on these issues. While they maintained that 
“without the principle of land for peace, peace cannot be achieved…without recognizing 
the rights of all parties to security and self-determination, there can be no peace 
process”178. The Arab states also conceded the issue of settlements.179 Although Israel did 
not agree to halt the settlement activities, the Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and a representative from the Gulf Cooperation Council—assured the United 
States that they would attend the conference.  
 
The Structure of the Madrid Peace Conference 
 
The structure of the peace process in the Madrid conference was designed based 
on the role of the United Nation as a “silent observer”180, the concept of bilateral 
discussions, and multilateral negotiations on regional issues. The conference also built 
upon the notion that it had no power to impose a solution on the parties. The cosponsors 
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of the conference (the U.S. and the Soviet Union) could only facilitate the negotiations; 
they would have no rights to veto any agreements reached by the active participants; and 
there would be no mediators or arbitrators in the negotiations.    
  
UN attendance at the conference 
 
Syria had called since 1974 for an international conference under United Nation 
supervision based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of 
land for peace. Israel had opposed this idea and rejected any international conference 
under the auspices of the UN on the grounds that such a this conference, with the 
presence of a wide range of Arab and major powers, could pressure Israel to concede the 
principle of land for peace and to comply with Arab demands. 
  
Moreover, from Israel’s point of view, the United Nations had disqualified itself 
from offering any solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict a long time ago. In 1975, the UN 
General Assembly adopted one of its most controversial resolutions, no. 3379, which 
passed 72-35 with 35 abstentions, equating Zionism with racism. As a result of this 
resolution and similar resolutions Israel distrusted the United Nations and accused the 
UN of being biased in favor of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli disputes. Israel argued that 
“this resolution is one of the main reasons why the UN should be disqualified from taking 
part in any Middle East peace conference.”181 As Richard Bernstein182 expressed,  
 
“Virtually every committee and commission in the United Nations has created 
some sort of unit whose main function is to condemn Israel and to express 
solidarity with the P.L.O. There is a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 
Rights of the Palestinian People; the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied 
Territories. There is a United Nations-mandated International Day of Solidarity 
with the Palestinian People. In the Secretariat, there is a Division for Palestinian 
                                                 
181. The Independent, May 15, 1991, 12.  
182. The chief of the Times bureau at the United Nations. 
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Rights. Since 1967, the Security Council has voted on some 200 anti-Israeli 
resolutions, which were either adopted or were defeated only by an American 
veto.”183  
 
 There are other causes for deteriorated relations between the United Nations and 
Israel that could be summarized as follows: 
 
1- The Security Council condemnation of the Israeli occupation of the Arab 
territories in the Six Day War in June 1967. 
2- The granting of observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization by the 
General Assembly after the October War of 1973.184 
3- The establishment by the General Assembly of the Palestine Committee, a 
“committee for the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people” 
which regularly reports on the violation of human rights by the Israelis.185  
4- An official call in 1983 by the General Assembly for an international peace 
conference under UN auspices to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.186  
5- The designation of a day by the General Assembly as “International day of 
solidarity with the Palestinian people” in 1977, which is celebrated each year 
on November 29.187 
 
Israeli officials distrusted the UN as biased and pro-Arab. Therefore, the presence 
of the UN at the Madrid peace conference was one of the most contentious issues 
between the U.S. and Israel. During his eighth trip to the Middle East, Baker convinced 
Shamir that the UN would be a “silent observer” that would not hurt Israel.188 Earlier in 
September 1991, U.S. President George Bush called upon the United Nations to repeal its 
1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism. President Bush was trying to ease 
                                                 
183. Richard Bernstein, “The UN Versus The U.S.,” The New York Times, January 22, 1984: Section 6: p. 
18. 
184. The New York Times, October 15, 1985, p. A1. 
185. The New York Times, January 22, 1984, Section 6: p. 18. 
186. See: Muhammad Hallaj, “A Monroe Doctrine for the Mideast,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 
26, 1985, p. 18. And The New York Times, September 16, 1984, Section 6: p. 59. 
187. The Jerusalem Post, “Festival of hate against Israel set for UN,” November 29, 2001, p. 2. 
188. The Washington Post, October 27, 1991, p. A1. 
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deteriorated relations between the UN and Israel, on one hand, and between the U.S. and 
Israel, on the other. In his speech, President Bush said, “Zionism is not a policy, it is the 
idea that led to the creation of a home for the Jewish people, to the state of Israel. …This 
body cannot claim to seek peace and at the same time challenge Israel's right to exist…. 
By repealing this resolution unconditionally, the United Nations will enhance its 
credibility and serve the cause of peace.”189 With U.S. pressure,190 Israel finally agreed to 
attend a peace conference but a conference that the United Nations would have no role 
more than a silent observer with no right to address the conference.191 
 
The bilateral negotiations192 
 
As mentioned above, the structure of the peace process in the Madrid conference 
was based on a limited role for the United Nation and on the concept of direct, face-to-
face, bilateral negotiations between Israeli and each of its Arab neighbors. While the 
Syrians had long insisted that any conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict should be based 
upon relevant UN resolutions, the Israeli official rejected this assumption and insisted on 
direct, bilateral negotiations in order to pursue separate peace deals with its Arab 
neighbors.  
 
                                                 
189. The New York Times, September 24, 1991, p. A14.  
190. According to the testimony of John H. Kelly, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, the Bush administration believed that “the UN should have a role at the conference. A role for 
the UN should pose no problem, since this is a conference that cannot impose its preferences and cannot be 
a court of appeal.” (U.S. Department of State, “Recent Developments in the Middle East,” Department of 
State Dispatch (June 24, 1991). 
191. Thomas R. Mattair, “The Arab- Israeli conflict: The Madrid conference and Beyond,”, p. 18. 
192. From November 1991 till December 1992 several rounds of bilateral negotiations took place between 
the Arabs and Israelis:  
First bilateral round of talks: Madrid November 3, 1991 
Second round: Washington, D.C., December 4-17, 1991 
Third round:  Washington, D.C., January 13-16, 1992 
Forth round: Washington, D.C., February 24- March 4, 1992 
Fifth round: Washington, D.C., April 27-30, 1992 
Sixth round: Washington, D.C., August 24- September 24, 1992 
Seventh round: Washington, D.C., October 21- November 20, 1992 
Eight round: Washington, D.C., December 7-17, 1992 
For more information about these negotiations See: Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: the Israeli-
Syrian Negotiations, pp. 54-84. and Camille Mansour, pp. 10-28. 
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The Arab states particularly Syria have sought the convening of an international 
conference attended by all concerned parties, including the PLO as well as other major 
powers, such as the permanent members of the Security Council. The Arabs expected that 
the conference could reconcile the most contentious disputes of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and force Israel to comply with the principle of land for peace and the concept of self-
determination for the Palestinians. Israel has long rejected an international conference 
fearing it could be forced to make unwanted concessions. Israel’s main concern was to 
avoid such an unexpected outcome resulting from a wide international forum. The United 
States also, particularly during the cold war, opposed the idea of international conference, 
fearing that any Middle East international peace conference would give the Soviet Union 
an opportunity for involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and it might pressure Israel to 
comply with the Arab demands.193  
 
There are some other reasons why Israel opposed the idea of international 
conference during the 1970s-1980s. As mentioned in one of Israel’s Cabinet statement, 
there was a concern about attending a conference with the participation of countries that 
do not maintain relations with Israel. The Soviet Union and other Communist 
governments broke diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War.194 Due to 
the Soviet position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli officials believed that such a 
framework that would include the Soviet Union would not serve the goal of peace and 
only would bring about radicalization between the parties.195 Therefore, Israel continued 
insisting on its preconditions that it would refuse to attend an international conference 
with Soviet participation until Moscow recognized Israel and reestablished diplomatic 
relations with the Jewish State. Israel also insisted that the Soviet should soften their 
stance on Jewish emigration and allow free emigration of Soviet Jews.  
 
Furthermore, Israeli opposition to an international conference was based partly on 
the assumption that such a conference would include the European Community and the 
                                                 
193. See: Muhammad Hallaj, “A Monroe Doctrine for the Mideast,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 
26, 1985, p. 18. See also The New York Times, September 16, 1984, Section 6, p. 59. 
194. The Los Angeles Times, August 5, 1986, Part 1, p. 7. 
195. The New York Times, June 3, 1985, p. A1. 
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Palestinian participation, particularly the Palestine Liberation Organization.196 Israel also 
had been against the European role in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of its fear that 
such a role could be in favor of the Arabs. The European Community has long demanded 
implementation of relevant UN resolutions to resolve the Arab-Israeli disputes and had 
long supported the notion of an international conference under the auspices of the United 
Nations with participation of all the parties concerned, including representatives of the 
PLO. 
 
Moreover, Israel has long sought direct and bilateral negotiations with each of its 
neighboring Arab states, reasoning that this approach would first require Arab 
recognition of Israel as a sovereign state. In an analysis of why Israel long insisted on 
direct negotiations, the Jerusalem Post in mid 1991 expressed that  
 
“The more pertinent reason for Israel's insistence on direct talks is that it is Arab 
refusal to recognize Israel's legitimacy which is the root cause of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. It is, in fact, virtually unique to this conflict, and there is no hope of 
establishing peace between Israel and the Arab states as between equal 
sovereignties unless it is removed. Giving the talks international cover is 
tantamount to licensing this Arab refusal to recognize Israel's legitimacy. It does 
not matter that the parties would be required to talk face to face. As long as there 
is a higher authority lurking over them, the talks are doomed. They will be 
deadlocked by those who would pretend that Israel is not a sovereign negotiating 
partner, and essential points of dispute would be referred to the conference 
sponsors, who are known to oppose most of Israel's positions. This will bring not 
peace but mutual recriminations and the exacerbation of tension.”197 
 
 Meanwhile, most of the Arab states have feared that any direct negotiations with 
Israel would mean de facto recognition of the Jewish State before Israel accepted the 
concept of trading land for peace and recognized Palestinian rights. They argued that 
                                                 
196. Israel had long accused the PLO of being a terrorist organization and therefore refused to negotiate 
with them. However, both sides reached an agreement in September 1993, the Oslo Accord. 
197. The Jerusalem Post, May 14, 1991. 
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recognition of Israel, as sovereign state without any precondition, would make Israel 
more reluctant to comply with the principle of land for peace formula. The Arab states, 
particularly Syria, have long maintained that separate bilateral negotiations, which 
ultimately might lead to separate peace deals with Israel, would undermined the Arab 
positions in the negotiations with the Israelis. Therefore, Syria favored a collective Arab 
delegation in direct negotiations with Israel, a notion that was rejected by both the United 
States and Israel.  
 
 Finally, the Arab states agreed to direct negotiations with Israel despite Israel’s 
well-known interpretation that the UN resolutions would not require Israeli withdrawal to 
the pre-1967 borders.198 Furthermore, Israel insisted that the Madrid conference should 
convene once only to facilitate launching direct, bilateral negotiations with each of its 
Arab neighbors. Israeli officials also emphasized that the conference would have no 
arbitration role and that the cosponsors would have no operational role as mediators or 
arbitrators between Israel and the Arab states. The conference also neither could veto the 
outcome of the conference nor could impose a solution on the parties.199 Moreover, Israel 
announced that it would not accept the Soviet Union as a cosponsor of the conference 
until Moscow restored its diplomatic relations with Israel.200  
 
The Multilateral talks on regional issues 
 
 The Madrid peace conference was scheduled in three phases: the initial phase was 
a ceremonial session in which each party presented its views on Middle East peace; the 
second phase was designed for bilateral negotiations between Israel and its immediate 
Arab neighbors; and the third phase featured multilateral talks on regional issues with the 
participation of most regional countries and some of major powers. The multilateral talks 
were organized into five working groups, and were designed to be an essential part of the 
bilateral negotiations in order to enhance confidence-building measures between the 
                                                 
198. The Washington Post, April 12, 1991, p. A1. 
199. Thomas R. Mattair, “The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,”, pp. 62-64. 
200. Before the conference convened, the Soviet Union ended 24 years of severed relations with Israel and 
formally restored full diplomatic relations with the state of Israel on October 18, 1991. (The New York 
Times, October 19, 1991, Section 1, p. 5.) 
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Israelis and Arabs. Although Syria agreed to attend the bilateral negotiations, its 
participation in the multilateral talks was contingent on Israel’s intention to implement 
relevant UN resolutions, which in Syria’s understanding, explicitly required Israel’s 
withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands.  
  
The cosponsors of the Madrid peace conference proposed that the multilateral 
track be convened within two weeks of the initial phase. But due to the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and disagreement between parties, this track was delayed for over two 
months.201 Finally, on January 28, 1992, 36 parties, including 11 Arab states, attended a 
meeting in Moscow and established five working groups to study the most important 
regional issues vital to the comprehensive peace between the Arabs and Israelis. 
 
The origins of multilateral talks 
 
The multilateral negotiations originally were designed to address regional 
problems that had long been the cause of tension and instability in the region. They were 
intended to bring regional countries as well as other major powers into a comprehensive 
discussion on regional issues. These talks were also designed to encourage social and 
economic relations between the Israelis and Arabs. The U.S. maintained that broader 
human contact at the regional level would advance bilateral negotiations between Israel 
and each of its Arab neighbors. Therefore, to advance the prospect of peace in the Middle 
East, this track was designed “to be an essential complement to the bilaterals--to tackle 
those regional problems that are themselves a source of tension and instability.” Edward 
Dierijian, the then U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, in addressing the 
multilateral talks in the Arab-Israeli peace process at the Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy said that,    
 
“In preparing the multilateral track for Madrid, we had a vision of the fruits  
of peace in terms of economic, human, social, developmental, environmental, and  
                                                 
201. Marvin Feuerwerger, “How the Moscow Talks Can Benefit Mideast Peace,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, January 29, 1992, p. 19.  
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security needs. We recognized that many functional problems affected the  
entire region, from the Maghreb to the Gulf. In order to address these  
problems effectively, we needed as broad a regional participation as possible. …  
We recognized, too, that in order to deal comprehensively with the problems of 
the Middle East, we had to include extra-regional parties.”202 
 
The bilateral negotiations brought the Israelis into direct negotiation with four 
Arab parties, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians. But the multilateral track 
brought the Israelis into contact with seven more Arab states, among them the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, and some of the North African Arab countries. While the 
multilateral talks were important themselves, it was assumed that their most significant 
function was to improve the bilateral negotiations-- the negotiations that could facilitate 
and normalize Arab-Israeli relations. The multilateral track also brought other major 
powers such as the European Community, China, Japan, and Canada to the regional 
discussions. These parties could make important contributions to regional development.  
 
Furthermore, the multilateral negotiations brought new elements to the peace 
process.203 Not only did the number of parties involved in the peace talks increase, this 
track also provided a forum for discussing issues critical to establishing and maintaining 
peace in the region, such as arms control and regional security, water, and regional 
economic development. Consequently, all theses events, particularly the participation of 
Arab states provided more recognition for Israel at the regional level, although Israel had 
not yet agreed to concede to Arab demands: withdrawal from the occupied lands and 
recognition of Palestinian political rights.   
 
 
The first meeting of the multilateral talks convened in Moscow in January 1992, 
in which the parties agreed to establish five working groups204 in order to advance 
                                                 
202. Edward P. Djerijian, “The Multilateral Talks in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,” Department of State 
Dispatch Vol. 04 No. 41 (October 11, 1993). 
203. Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: the Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, p. 76.   
204. The U.S. and Russia led the sub-committee, “Arms Control and Regional Security” in order to 
implement some confidence-building measures and to advance communication between parties on a 
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regional talks on issues important to the Arab-Israeli conflict: arms control and regional 
security, environment, economic development, refugees, and water resources. Also, the 
Steering Group was created to monitor and to organize the multilateral track.  
 
Syria’s position on the multilateral talks 
 
Although Syria made some important concessions to attend the bilateral 
negotiations with Israel, it refused to participate to the multilateral negotiations on the 
grounds that these negotiations would imply normalization of relations with Israel before 
Israel committed itself to a comprehensive peace. Syria declined to join the multilateral 
process until there was tangible progress in the bilateral negotiations. Syria maintained 
that until the bilateral peace negotiations attained concrete progress toward achieving a 
just, honorable and comprehensive peace, there would be no reason for Syria to attend the 
multilateral process. Syria argued that negotiations on security and economic cooperation 
required development at the bilateral talks between Israel and the Arab states without 
which any proposal on regional cooperation would fail to achieve results.  
 
Syria's foreign minister, Faroq Shara’, argued Syria's position on refusing to 
attend the multilateral regional talks on the ground that discussing such issues before 
resolving the main issues of the Arab-Israeli disputes would undermine the whole peace 
process. In an interview he said, “we are sincere about wanting to reach that stage, [the 
multilateral talks] but we don't want to jeopardize the process by running to the 
multilaterals before we can move our feet slowly on bilaterals.”205 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
regional level. The European Community chaired the Economic Development working group, which 
mainly planned to act on the regional level to provide a framework to help the countries of this region 
increase trade and economic relations. The Japanese and Canadians respectively led the Environment and 
Refugee Working Groups. The main purpose of the Environment Committee was to advance cooperation of 
all regional countries and to address regional environmental problems. The Refugee Committee worked on 
one of the most contentious issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Water Resources working group was led 
by the United States. Its main purpose was to address the very real problem of water sharing between Israel 
and its Arab neighbors. 
205. The New York Times, November 29, 1991, p. A16. 
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Syria also tried to discourage other Arab parties from attending the multilateral 
negotiations206, reasoning that normalization of relations with Israel before Israeli 
withdrawal or Israeli commitment to withdraw from the Arab lands would enormously 
undermine Arab’s bargaining positions in the negotiations with Israel. From Syria’s point 
of view, such this negotiations would definitely jeopardize the entire peace process. Syria 
had long insisted on the necessity of a strong Arab bargaining position in negotiations 
with Israel for achieving a just and reasonable peace.  
 
Despite Syria's insistence, the Arab countries, except Lebanon, ignored Syria's 
demand.207  Consequently, the Arab states, including the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
some of the North African Arab countries attended the multilateral talks to negotiate 
regional cooperation with Israel. However, they assured Syria that “they will not 
normalize relations with Israel before it withdraws from occupied Arab lands”208  
                                                 
206. The Los Angeles Times, October 25, 1991, p. A1. 
207. The Los Angeles Times, October 25, 1991, p. A1. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Oslo Peace Process 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As we have seen, structural changes in international and regional arenas in the 
1990s provided new possibilities for reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although 
the parties to the conflict agreed in October 1991 to convene the Madrid peace 
conference, they could not achieve significant progress; the negotiations were obstructed 
from the very beginning. The main core of the conflict remained unresolved. But 
following the election in June 1992 of the left-wing Labor Party,209 which was led by 
Yitzhak Rabin,210 the Israeli government, which had earlier refused to negotiate with the 
PLO, legalized contact with them211, providing an opportunity to negotiate directly with 
this organization as a Palestinian representative. Since negotiations with the Palestinian 
                                                 
209. For more information about the election, Labor Party and the impact of the Rabin’s victory on the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations See: Leon T. Hadar, “The Israeli Labor Party: Peacemaker or Likud 
II?,” Journal of Palestine Studies vol. XXI, no. 3 (Spring 1992): pp. 80-94. George T. Abed, “The 
Palestinians In The Peace Process: The Risks And The Opportunities,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 22, 
No. 1 (Autumn 1992): pp. 5-17. Herbert C. Kelman, “Acknowledging The Other’s Nationhood: How To 
Create A Momentum For The Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 22, No. 1 
(Autumn 1992): pp. 18-38. 
210. According to an analysis “Yitzhak Rabin’s victory thus inspired both hope and doubts about the 
prospects of the peace talks. On the one hand, he was ready to move the peace talks forward and to 
accelerate the negotiations on Palestinian autonomy. One the other hand, given his worldview and record, 
he was likely to act with great caution in order to safeguard what he considers to be Israel’s overriding 
great security interests. In a sense, he replaced the ideology of Greater Israel with the secular ideology of 
national security.” (Avi Shlaim, “Prelude to the Accord: Likud, Labor, and the Palestinians,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1994): pp. 12-13). 
211. In late 1992, although Israel’s officials refused to talk directly with the PLO, they did legalize contact 
with members of the PLO. This was a significant move by the Israeli government to further peace 
negotiations. 
  
91
representatives in the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation did not reach a solution212, 
Israelis and Palestinians began secret negotiations outside of the Madrid peace 
conference framework. The secret negotiations led to a historic reconciliation in 
September 1993, in which Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization agreed to 
recognize each other’s legitimacy and put an end to decades of hostilities.  
 
In August 1993, many observers were surprised by the news that the PLO and 
Israel had reached an agreement through secret negotiations. These negotiations were 
conducted mainly in Norway, facilitated by Norwegian diplomats. The agreement 
astonished the Arab parties to the Middle East peace process, especially Syria that had 
sought a unified approach to dealing with the Israelis. After months of secret 
negotiations, a bilateral agreement had been achieved on a “Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements”213 (DOP). This resultant Declaration of 
Principles was signed on September 13, 1993 at the White House214 by high-ranking 
officials on each side, in the presence of President Clinton, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat 
and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.215 The initial phase of the agreement was 
known as Gaza-Jericho First Plan216 and the full series of agreements became known as 
the Oslo Accords.217 Also the negotiations between the PLO and Israelis that led to the 
agreement of September 1995 became known as Oslo II. 
 
Prior to this agreement, the PLO chairman declared that his organization 
recognized “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” renounced “the 
use of terrorism and other acts of violence”,218 and accepted United Nations Security 
                                                 
212. Among other reasons, earlier rounds of talks failed to reach an agreement because Israel agreed to 
negotiate only with the Palestinians of their own choosing. Also, exclusion of the PLO by Israel from 
participating in the peace negotiations was another reason for the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian talks. 
213. “Israel-PLO Declaration of Principle, Washington, D.C., 13 September 1993,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies Vol. 23, No. 1 (Autumn 1993): pp. 115-124. 
214. “The White House Ceremony,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1994): pp. 119-
124. 
215. The New York Times, September 10, 1993, p. A1. 
216. Raja Shehadeh, “Questions of Jurisdiction: A Legal Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement,” Journal 
of Palestine Studies Vol. 23, No. 4 (Summer 1994): pp. 18-25. 
217. For a comprehensive review of the accord see: Burhan Dajani, “The September 1993 Israeli-PLO 
Documents: A Textual Analysis,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1994): pp. 5-23. 
218. The New York Times, September 10, 1993, p. A12.  
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Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for the reconciliation of the conflict with the 
Israelis. The PLO also committed itself to “a peaceful resolution of the conflict between 
the two sides”219 through negotiations and announced that those articles of the Palestinian 
Covenant that contradict this commitment would no longer be valid.220 In response, the 
government of Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people 
and commenced officially to negotiate with them within the context of the Middle East 
peace process.221  
 
The Declaration of Principles neither was a peace treaty nor a resolution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian disputes; it was an agreement, providing a framework on how to 
continue the negotiations in order to reach a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict within the next five years, beginning May 1994. The agreement 
established a timetable for reaching a permanent settlement through gradual Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and partial transfer of power to the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). The Clinton administration welcomed the PLO-Israeli 
initiatives, and with the active support of the United States, the Oslo Accords became a 
central theme in the peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians.  
 
The Accords were based upon the concept that both parties would agree to put an 
end to decades of confrontation and animosity, and to recognize their mutual legitimate 
rights in order to achieve an honorable, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement 
through a historic reconciliation. As was stated, the main purpose of this agreement was 
                                                 
219. The New York Times, September 10, 1993, p. A12.  This led to the improvement of U.S. relations 
with PLO. For more information see: David W. Lesch, ed. The Middle East and the United States: A 
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to establish a “Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority” in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, for a transitional period, not to exceed five years. The agreement also was to 
be a framework for permanent reconciliation of the conflict based on UN Resolutions 242 
and 338. 
 
The first step toward implementation of this agreement was known as “Gaza-
Jericho First”, in which Israeli forces were to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho 
and transfer some civilian responsibility to the Palestinians.222 According to the DOP, 
negotiations finalizing the nature of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement including, borders, 
Jerusalem, and refugees would commence not later than the beginning of the third year of 
the interim period (May 1996). Following that, the permanent status would be 
implemented, which under the DOP was to be by May 1999, five years after the 
implementation of the first agreement, (the Gaza-Jericho plan). 
 
The second stage of the process came after months of difficult negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians. They concluded a major agreement in September 
1995, which became known as Oslo II. The accord specifies, step by step, the partial 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank, the election of the Palestinian 
Council223, and the transfer of security arrangements to the Palestinian police.224  
 
                                                 
222. On May 4, 1994 Israel and the PLO reached an agreement in Cairo on the initial implementation of the 
1993 Declaration of Principles. The agreement paved the way for Israel to start handing over parts of the 
West Bank (Jericho) and Gaza Strip (except for Jewish settlements). After Israeli withdrawal, partial 
control of civilian administration was transferred to the Palestinians.  
223. Khalil Shikaki, “The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 25, No. 
3 (Spring 1996): pp. 17-22. 
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As many Palestinians opposed the agreement,225 the Israeli right also saw the 
accord as a surrender of the biblical land of the Jews and called the accord a tragedy and 
swore to obstruct the accord.226 In response to his opponents, Israel’s then Prime Minster 
Rabin, reiterated that “the final settlement would not return to 1967 boundaries, that 
Jerusalem would remain united and part of Israel, and that Israel's "security border" 
would stay at the Jordan River.”227 However, the whole process was halted after the 
assassination of Rabin228 in November 1995 and came to total deadlock when Binyamin 
Netanyahu came to power in May 1996.229 
 
The critical point of these agreements was that the Accords did not offer any 
solutions for the sensitive issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security 
arrangements, and borders. The Accords explicitly stated that these issues were to be 
excluded from the interim arrangements. Moreover, the Accord did not give the 
Palestinians sovereignty over the self-rule area; it granted them restricted self-rule only 
in limited areas such as educational and cultural affairs, health, and social welfare. The 
Jewish settlements continued in the areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.230 And most 
importantly, the Accords left all security arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
under Israeli control.231 
 
The PLO and Israel’s Position at the Time of the Accord  
 
The Oslo Accords came at a time when the Palestinians were in a feeble position. 
The PLO supported Saddam Hussein during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This policy had 
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enormous negative effects on PLO.  It undermined PLO’s relations with many countries, 
including key Arab countries. The result was financially disastrous for the PLO because 
they lost the main sources of financial aid such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the 
Palestinians who worked in these countries and other Persian Gulf States. The isolation of 
the PLO led to the loss of its credibility and legitimacy as a Palestinian representative. 
The PLO was under massive regional and international pressure and, therefore, forced to 
concede to Israeli demands and preconditions for a limited autonomy in a small area of 
the occupied territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
 
Realizing the difficulties in reaching a comprehensive agreement with the Arabs, 
Israel had based its policy upon negotiating separate and bilateral deals with its Arab 
neighbors. The Rabin government prepared to negotiate with the PLO at the time that this 
organization had already been isolated because of its regional policy. Israel’s goals were 
neither to reach a comprehensive solution with the Palestinians nor to provide the 
Palestinians legitimate rights of self-determination and statehood. Among other 
considerations, Israel’s tactic was to separate the Palestinian question from other Arab 
parties, particularly from Syria and Jordan.  
 
The value of this approach for Israel was to undermine Syria's policy. Hafiz al-
Asad had long insisted that peace negotiations should be conducted in the context of a 
collective, unified position of the relevant Arab states in order to reach a comprehensive 
solution.232 On several occasions, both before and in the aftermath of the Madrid peace 
conference, Syria rejected the concept of a separate and bilateral deal with the Israelis. 
Hafiz al-Asad once said that “The Golan was originally occupied in a battle waged for 
the sake of Palestine, and so was Sinai.”233 In 1993, the Syrian foreign minister also 
affirmed, “Syria would not sign a treaty with Israel, even if the whole Golan were 
returned, until the Palestinians accepted an interim self-government agreement.”234 In an 
interview, Hafiz al-Asad said that,  
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“He would insist that any peace accord with Israel cover the interests of all Arab 
parties to the Middle East talks, and he said Syria had no intention of signing a 
separate treaty with Israel…a bilateral deal was out of the question. Damascus 
would not abandon the goals of the Palestinians, Jordanians, and Lebanese.”235  
 
Therefore, according to some Middle Eastern observers, Israel pursued secret 
dialogues with the PLO representatives due to Asad’s intractable position. Another 
reason for these negotiations was that such agreement with the PLO did not require a 
total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and had none of the preconditions 
demanded by the Syrians. In the early stage of the Madrid peace conference, Syria 
insisted that even negotiations with the Israelis should be based upon Israel’s 
commitment to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights.  
 
Moreover, the agreement was designed to serve Israel’s interests; it was 
deliberately vague in the powers that it gave to the Palestinians, but was clear about the 
things that the Israelis could achieve through implementation of the accord. From another 
point of view, the Oslo Accords was also an important achievement for the Israelis. First 
of all, the PLO assumed the responsibility of providing security for the Israelis and were 
to stop militants opposing the peace in the Middle East. Netanyahu once said, “The core 
of the initial Oslo agreement was the Palestinian Authority’s [PA] commitment to act 
against terror organizations from areas under its jurisdiction.”236 But perhaps the most 
important accomplishment for the Israelis was the recognition of the Jewish state by 
some of the Arab countries and many other countries around the world. The removal of 
the secondary Arab boycott was also an enormous economic benefit for the Israelis.  
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Syria’s Reaction to the Oslo Accords 
 
 After the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP), Syria’s official 
newspaper, al-Ba’th, stated, in a news analysis, that the DOP would bring neither a just 
and comprehensive peace to the region nor stability and security to the Israelis. Referring 
to Rabin’s statements in which he declared that there would be no withdrawal to the 1967 
borders, and that there would be no dismantling of the Jewish settlements in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, the al-Ba’th analysis concluded that only full implementation of the 
relevant UN resolutions and the land-for-peace principle would bring a just peace, not a 
unilateral, separate, interim agreement based upon an ambiguous notion.237 
 
 In an address to Syria's then newly elected parliament in September 1994, Hafiz 
al-Asad expressed his deep disappointment with the unilateral agreement that both the 
Palestinians and Jordanians reached with the Israelis. He said,  
 
“For decades, Syria waged the Arabs' battle against the Israeli occupation, to 
liberate the land and recover the (Arabs') rights…. We have exerted great efforts 
to restore Arab solidarity in recent years, … From the beginning, our decision was 
clear: coordination with the Arab parties participating in the peace process…. 
because we realized that by all standards, unilateral negotiations can never be in 
the interests of a single Arab party, which is weak (on its own) and has no option 
but to submit to the pressures and make concessions…but instead we were 
surprised by the Palestinian-Israeli agreement, followed by the Jordanian-Israeli 
agreement…. [The] reality makes unambiguously clear the enormity of the 
damage that unilateralism has inflicted on the core of the causes for which we 
have long fought and struggled.”238 
 
 After the Oslo Accords, the Syrian-Israeli track was slowed, and Syria 
even refused to attend another round of negotiations with Israel. Encouraging both 
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Syrians and Israelis to continue their negotiations, president Bill Clinton met with 
Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in January 1994. In the meeting, Hafiz al-Asad stated his 
concern about the unilateral agreement that Arafat reached with the Israelis. He 
said,  
 
"To me, there is no difference between the Golan, South Lebanon and the 
occupied parts of Palestine or Jordan…. It is all one Arab land as far as I 
am concerned, with no part of it more precious to me than another. What I 
demand for one part I demand for all, and that is only natural, because it is 
all one land for one nation. This fact reveals the secret behind the failure 
of unilateral settlements or unilateral peace agreements to end the historic 
conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs…. Peace cannot be peace 
unless it is comprehensive. You have before you three experiments that 
did not make peace or end the conflict: Camp David in 1978 with Sadat's 
Egypt, May 17 1983 with Amin Gemayel's Lebanon, and the Gaza -
Jericho accord with Yaser Arafat on September 13, 1993. These are 
enough to indicate that unilateral solutions, even if they multiply, do not 
make peace.”239 
 
 Referring to the PLO-Israel agreements, Asad maintained that Israel had been 
taking advantage of “some Arab officials' moments of weakness to steal their signatures 
for agreements.” He continued that such an agreement “built on force and coercion is not 
peace. It is nothing but an agreement of submission, that which is imposed by an 
occupier….”240 In an obvious reaction, Hafiz al-Asad said that he felt “personally 
betrayed by the Israel-PLO accord.” He continued that the accord “undercuts efforts to 
forge a comprehensive peace in the region.” Asad also said,  
 
“We were of this perception, of this understanding that the coordination among 
the Arab countries would achieve its objective of pushing the peace process 
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forward and of achieving success and security for the peace process as a whole. 
Suddenly we hear about a secret agreement that takes place between some PLO 
leaders and Israel. From my point of view, this certainly was not their best option. 
And it is not the best way to achieve peace.”241  
 
 On several occasion, Hafiz al-Asad made it clear that unilateral solutions would 
complicate the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He insisted, “The Arabs are one people. 
If I were to sign an agreement similar to that signed by Arafat, I would have faced great 
problems. You all know that there are Arab leaders who paid with their lives as the price 
for such separate behavior.”242 
 
 However, Syria's official position was that it would neither oppose nor support the 
accord. As Hafiz al-Asad said in an interview that although “this was not a [the] best way 
to achieve peace… we decided not to hinder the agreement which they had reached not to 
obstruct it…[T]his responsibility belongs to the Palestinian people and their 
institution”243. However, Damascus clearly announced that it would not approve the Oslo 
Accords on the grounds that separate agreements and unilateral solutions would not bring 
peace and security for the region; it could also become a new source of tension. Syria also 
considered the accord a violation of the principles upon which the peace process was 
built, referring to the UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and the land-for-peace principle.244  
 
 According to al-Hayat, Syrian officials believed that “the agreement does not 
address any of the Palestinians substantive issues: there is no end to the occupation, not 
even an acknowledgment that the land is occupied; no return for the refugees; no Arab 
right to Jerusalem…[T]he agreement is a leap into the unknown. It turns part of the 
Palestinian population into a police force for the protection of Israel, and it is an 
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instrument that the Israelis are using to squeeze concessions out of the Arabs, not least of 
which is an end to the Arab boycott.”245 
 
 In conclusion, Syria criticized the agreement and Arafat’s concessions to reach a 
restricted self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. However, they remained neutral 
and publicly expressed that the Palestinians could do whatever they considered 
advantageous to their national interests. Syria's foreign minister asserted that while “the 
others, or some of the others, have broken away and negotiated for the West Bank, 
Jerusalem and the Jordanian territories. Thus Syria does not wish to be more royal than 
the king.”246  
 
 Nevertheless, Syria's media strongly criticized Arafat and condemned the Oslo 
Accords. In an analysis Mohammad Khair-al-Wadi, editor of the Tishreen, stated that the 
Oslo Accords were an absolute disaster for the Palestinian people. Not only did the 
accord not bring peace but it also worsened the Palestinian situation under Arafat’s rule. 
There are a few facts regarding this accord:  
 
 1) The Oslo Accord was not an agreement between two parties equal in terms of 
power. It was a “suspicious deal whose thrust was the PLO's submission to all Israeli 
terms.” According to him, the Israeli government “did not offer anything that can 
effectively contribute to just and comprehensive peace, whereas the PLO relinquished 
almost everything—land, rights, dignity and even its role as leader of the Palestinian 
liberation struggle….”247 Khair-al-Wadi continued that the PLO abandoned its principles 
in a “humiliating manner” by accepting the accord upon which Israel defined new 
missions for the PLO, i.e. to protect the Israeli occupation, to provide security for the 
settlers, and to demolish Palestinian resistance.  
 
 2) Events in the year after the implementation of the initial phase of the accord 
(the Gaza-Jericho First plan) presented evidence that the accord did not constitute a step 
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towards peace. Although in the beginning it provided some hope for Arab-Israeli 
reconciliation, this optimism did not last. The Rabin government continued the settlement 
policy and refused to dismantle the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. And 
because of that, the Oslo Accord caused a new cycle of tension and violence in 
Palestinian-Israeli affairs.  
 
 3) The Palestinian Authority in the area of its self-rule, the Gaza, and other West 
Bank cities, did not bring prosperity, security and stability for the Palestinians. Several 
factors contributed to the Palestinian Authority’s inability to do so. Among them is the 
Palestinian self-rule agreement, in which Israel retains enormous control over Palestinian 
affairs. Moreover, beside the corruption of Palestinian authority,248 Arafat’s policy to 
contain the Palestinian resistance and to submit to Israeli demands had an important 
influence on the deterioration of conditions of the Palestinian inhabitants under 
Palestinian self-rule.249  
 
 In conclusion, the main point of Syria's disapproval of the Oslo Accords was that 
such unilateral solution would favor only the Israelis by furthering their plans to divide 
the Arab parties in order to reach separate, interim agreements with them. Syria agreed to 
attend the Madrid conference on the grounds that it was to be based on the principle of 
land for peace. Syria expected that the negotiations to be within the context of the 
conference, i.e. avoiding secret talks and unilateral solutions. Therefore, the Oslo 
Accords, from Syria's point of view, was a violation of the basic notion on which the 
current peace process—the Madrid peace conference—was established. Syria's main 
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concern was that this agreement would undermine the Arab’s position in negotiating with 
the Israelis.  
 
The Effects of the Oslo Accords on Syria 
  
 The Oslo Accords had several important effects on Syria. First, it undermined 
Syria's concept of a comprehensive peace. Second, both Israelis and Palestinians 
excluded Syria from the negotiations over Palestine. Third, the accord stalled further 
progress in the Syrian-Israeli track. And finally, the accords brought Syria under pressure 
to stop the Palestinian groups in Damascus that opposed Arafat’s agreement with the 
Israelis. Thus, this time, Syria's ability to place limitations on these opponent groups 
made Syria more important to the peace process than ever.      
 
 Syria maintained a belief, as Hafiz al-Asad once said that, “Peace cannot be peace 
unless it is comprehensive.”250 When the PLO concluded a separate deal with the Israelis, 
which was followed by the Jordanian decision to do the same, Syria had no option except 
to revise its concept of a comprehensive peace. Syria could not be “more royal than the 
king”, and demand more for the Palestinians and Jordanians who conceded to Israeli 
preconditions.  
 
 In an interview, Syria's foreign minister analyzed the difficulties that this 
agreement brought for the Arabs. To answer the questions of whether Syria would sign a 
separate deal with Israel and if Syria had changed its stance regarding the necessity of 
Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, he said,  
 
“Syria's stance has never changed. Syria insisted and continues to insist on 
withdrawal from all the Arab lands occupied in 1967. [But] under the current 
political atmosphere and in view of the developments that have taken place since 
the Oslo Agreement, Syria cannot consider the comprehensive peace to be that 
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which existed in the past. …Thus, after what has happened, Syria says that 
comprehensive peace is one that will lead to full withdrawal from the Golan up to 
the 4th June 1967 line, as well as from southern Lebanon. This is the Syrian 
position…”251  
 
 The second effect of the Oslo accords on Syria was that it led to the exclusion of 
Syria from the peace process by the other parties. By signing the Oslo accord, the PLO 
excluded Syria from negotiating on behalf of the Palestinians. Israel also wanted to 
exclude Syria from negotiating on other Arab-Israeli disputes. Syria viewed the question 
of Palestine as the core dispute of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and even believed that the 
Palestinian cause belonged to all the Arabs and not just to the PLO. Because of that, Syria 
challenged the PLO on several occasions (e.g. in the 1983 Lebanese war and its 
aftermath), particularly when the organization was on the verge of adapting a unilateral 
approach in dealing with the Israelis or Jordanians.  
 
 Third, the accord hindered further progress on the Syrian-Israeli track. One of the 
reasons was Rabin’s opinion that Syria was not a priority. His priority was to reach an 
interim agreement with the PLO, because a total withdrawal was not an issue in the PLO-
Israel agreement. Furthermore, the substantive issues in the Palestinian-Israeli disputes, 
i.e. Jerusalem, refugees, and borders, were postponed for future decision. Asad’s reaction 
was strong. He said, in an interview, “Priority is exclusively for the peace process…. 
Nothing in the peace process ground rules speaks of priorities. The Arabs, in other words, 
are not queuing for Rabin’s decisions. Israel set up a number of delegations for bilateral 
talks with each of the Arab sides simultaneously. This new logic proves that the Israelis 
do not want peace. On our part, we want peace but we are not begging for it. If the other 
side does not want peace, we can also take the same attitude.”252 
 
 Fourth, in the aftermath of the Oslo accord, several different Palestinian groups, 
who resided in Syria, strongly criticized Arafat’s unilateral decision. These groups based 
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their position on the fact that the Oslo Accord “deals with the Palestinian people on the 
basis of sub-dividing them…[and that it is a] new method other than direct Israeli 
military and administrative control of densely-inhabited Palestinian population 
centers.”253 To further the negotiations between the PLO and Israel, the United States 
asked Syria to silence Palestinian opposition to the agreement. Syria's leverage over these 
groups made Syria more important to the United States and to the peace process. As one 
observer said, “these groups can be held on a tight leash or let loose. They are obligated 
to Syria and they can be persuaded to change course.”254 
 
 In response to a request that Syria should silence the Palestinian opposition to the 
Oslo agreement, Hafiz al-Asad said, “If Syria is being asked to silence Palestinian 
opposition to the agreement, why is no one asking the Israeli government to silence 
Israeli opposition to the agreement? There are a number of parties in Israel that are 
strongly and firmly opposed to this agreement.” Asad continued, “Even if (Syria) were 
elated with the agreement, it has no right to act as a policeman, preventing other people 
from expressing their views on a central cause which has been the focus of their struggle 
for several decades.”255 
 
The Impact of the Oslo Accord on the Palestinians  
 
 The Oslo accord had enormous effects on various aspects of the Palestinians 
situation.256 As mentioned before, the Oslo Accord, which called for an end to terrorism, 
mutual recognition of the PLO and Israel, creation of Palestinian self-rule, and for Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, increased optimism for peace and 
reconciliation of the Israeli-Palestinian disputes. That optimism caused the Palestinians, 
remarkably, to support peace negotiations and oppose terrorism. According to a 
Palestinian public opinion survey, in September 1995, more than 71 percent of the 
Palestinians supported continuation of the peace process. This support reached 81 percent 
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by June 1996, having dropped to less than 60 percent in the year after Netanyahu came to 
power. At the same time, support for attacks against Israelis had steeply dropped from 57 
percent in November 1994, and 56 percent in February 1995, to 21 percent in March 
1996.257  
 
The Oslo accord brought the PLO international recognition as an organization that 
transformed its struggle for Palestinian statehood from a guerilla war to diplomacy. 
Although the deal that PLO leadership signed with the Israeli government in September 
1993 had many disappointing features,258 the achievement had an important result for the 
PLO—following the agreement, the PLO could restore its status at the regional level as 
well as in the international arena. In addition to the Israeli government, the United States 
recognized the PLO as the Palestinian representative and commenced negotiating with 
them in order to facilitate communication between the Israelis and Palestinians.  
 
One of the most important effects of the Oslo accord on Palestinian society was 
that the accord provided a framework for national reconstruction. Based upon that 
framework, the Palestinians had their first general election to establish the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and other electoral bodies for self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Insofar as the Palestinians believed the peace negotiations progressed toward 
reconstructing their aspirations of statehood, they continued to support the concept of the 
Oslo Accord. In contrast, as implementation of the Oslo Accord stalled—especially 
when Binyamin Netanyahu came to power in May 1996—the support of the peace 
process among the Palestinians dropped significantly. In particular, Israel’s response to 
the Palestinian resistance movement and to the violence that targeted Israelis, including 
collective punishment and containment of Palestinian people, led to more Palestinian 
frustration and increased uncertainties regarding their future status. Accordingly, the 
result was a cycle of violence and frustration on both sides. Needless to say, that this 
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frustration was one of the main causes of Palestinian resistance and attacks on Israeli 
targets.   
 
Another criticism of the Oslo Accord was that although the accord led to general 
elections and establishment of the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Palestinian 
Administration did not lead to a democratic society. Corruption and mismanagement in 
the Palestinian Administration frustrated the Palestinians as much as the lack of progress 
in negotiating peace with the Israelis. According to a public opinion survey, only a 
fourth of the Palestinians believed that the Palestinian Authority was moving toward 
democracy.259 A considerable majority of Palestinians were dissatisfied with the political 
order that caused Arafat to dominate in various aspects of their political life. 
   
The lack of economic growth also caused the Palestinians to be disappointed with 
the accord. However, although more than 80 percent of the Palestinians disapproved of 
the PA’s performance, most Palestinians believed that a stalemate in the peace process 
had been the main source of their economic suffering, and not the PA’s flaws. According 
to a public opinion survey, “In 1997, 57 percent said that the peace process had a 
negative impact on the Palestinian economy. Similarly, in 1995, only 8 percent reported 
that their personal economic situation had improved since the beginning of the peace 
process, while 53 percent reported that it had worsened—statistics that show little sign 
of changing.”260 
 
In conclusion, the Oslo accord, in theory, sought to establish confidence-building 
measures during the five years of the interim agreement, and to transform Palestinian 
society into a community supporting peace and coexistence, and to bring peace and 
tranquility to both the Israelis and Palestinians. But in practice, its insufficiencies 
gradually became clear. In reality, the ambiguity and uncertainties of the accord made it 
futile and ineffective as a framework for reaching a just, honorable and comprehensive 
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peace between the Israelis and Palestinians.261 The fact that Israel could interpret it 
whichever way they wanted, clashed with Palestinian anticipation that this accord would 
lead to statehood, making things more complicated.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Slow progress between the Oslo Accord and the Wye 
Plantation talks 
 
1993-1995 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As mentioned, the Oslo Accord had significant effects on Syrian-Israeli peace 
negotiations. The agreement extremely undermined Syria's bargaining position wherein 
Hafiz al-Asad insisted on a unified, strong, common Arab stance in order to secure Arab 
rights. Moreover, the accord undermined Syria's goal of a comprehensive peace in 
negotiating with the Israelis. Although Syria neither supported nor opposed the accord, 
Hafiz al-Asad threatened that Syria would foil the accord if it become clear that it would 
create major damage to Syria's national interest.262 
 
The accord also stalled further progress along the Syrian-Israeli track. Since the 
initial phase of the Middle East peace process in October 1991, the negotiations between 
Israel and Syria had been stuck on setting priorities: should Syria’s acceptance and 
definition of full peace come first or Israeli commitment to withdrawal from the Golan 
Heights? The talks were deadlocked over enormous differences between Syria's 
expectations and Israel’s. Syria had proposed full peace in return for full withdrawal from 
the Golan Heights. But they refused Israeli demands that they explicitly define what full 
peace would mean lest it be defined too rigidity or too narrowly. Accordingly, Israel also 
had refused to define the extent of its withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and even 
refused to commit itself to the principle of land for peace until Syria defined the meaning 
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of peace. Therefore, having been discouraged by the prolonged deadlock in the bilateral 
negotiation with Israel, Syria's frustration was intensified by the separate, interim PLO-
Israel accord of September 1993. This circumstance led Syria's foreign minister in late 
September 1993 to declare, “Syria would boycott the next round of peace talks unless 
Israel offered a prior commitment to withdraw from the Golan Heights.”263 
 
The stalemate in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations brought more uncertainty about 
the future of the whole peace process. In order to stimulate the peace process, The United 
States encouraged the two parties to resume negotiations. President Clinton even met 
with Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in January 1994, and visited Syria later that year in 
October. The meeting between the presidents in Geneva and Damascus provided an 
opportunity for Syria to spell out its concept of peace. It also helped Syria to improve its 
relations with the United States and to convince the U.S. president to assert Syria's key 
role in the Middle East peace process. However, during this time there were some events 
that triggered more violence between the Palestinians and Israelis, such as the Hebron 
Massacre in February 1994. The massacre and consequent Palestinian response had 
negative impacts on Syrian-Israeli talks. The Jordanian separate peace deal with the 
Israelis in November 1994 also undermined Syria's position in the peace process. The 
ramifications of these events will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Clinton-Asad Meeting (January 1994) 
 
The Clinton-Asad meeting on January 16, 1994 in Geneva was part of the United 
States effort to further the Arab-Israeli peace process. The meeting between the 
Presidents was also a reminder that Syria was a major player in the Middle East, and that 
the United States could not ignore or bypass Syria in the peace process. By that time, it 
was clear that a peace accord between Syria and Israel would remove the remaining 
direct military threat to Israel. It was expected that such an accord would improve 
Israel’s relations with all the Arab countries, which was essential for Israel’s integration 
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into the Middle East. Moreover, there was no doubt that progress in Syrian-Israeli peace 
negotiations could eliminate or at least significantly reduce Syria’s support for the 
Palestinian groups opposed to peace.  
 
Despite the difficulties in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, a comprehensive 
peace in the Middle East was believed to depend on progress on the Syrian-Israeli track. 
A meaningful agreement between Syria and Israel was expected to further progress on 
the other tracks, especially the Lebanon and Palestinian one because Syria had long had 
enormous influential power in Lebanon and over Palestinian opposition groups residing 
in Syria. It was because of Syria's important role in the peace process that the U.S. 
president decided to meet with Hafiz al-Asad, although the U.S. continued to list Syria 
as a state which allowed so-called “terrorist groups” to use its territory to attack U.S. 
interests in the region.  
   
 Therefore, despite the fact that the meeting could improve U.S.-Syrian relations, 
the U.S. administration continued to keep Syria on the list of countries sponsoring 
terrorist groups. That meant, according to Anthony Lake, National Security advisor, the 
meeting between the presidents would not result in a change of U.S. policy toward Syria. 
He stated “We are well aware of Syria's support for organizations involved in terrorist 
acts and its own involvement in the attempt to bomb an El Al jetliner in 1986…. This 
justifies its continued inclusion on the State Department's list of states which support 
terrorism. We are thus maintaining sanctions against Syria and have no intention of 
removing Syria from the terrorism list until and unless it ends its support for these 
terrorist organizations.”264 The U.S. officials repeatedly said that Syria had long 
encouraged Lebanese groups attacking Israeli troops in south Lebanon and Palestinian 
groups opposed to the PLO-Israeli peace agreement. 
 
In general, Syria's international and regional position was an important factor in 
Syria's approach toward peace in the region. Syria's bargaining position was weakened 
by the collapse of its chief benefactor, the Soviet Union. That made Syria more 
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vulnerable to U.S. hegemony in the region. Hence, Syria's priority was to improve 
relations with the United States. Having lost its main patron, Syria was eager to appear 
more flexible and willing to enter into a process that would further U.S. interests in the 
region.  
 
But Syria's maneuverability was still restricted by the fact that the U.S. Congress 
would not accept any changes in the U.S.-Syrian relationship until Syria modified its 
general policy to their satisfaction. The U.S. Congress had long been dominated by the 
pro-Israeli lobby. That meant that the overall U.S. policy toward Syria would remain 
unchanged, even though Syria entered the peace process. Hafiz al-Asad was aware of 
this fact, and of the pro-Israel bias of the Clinton administration in particular.265 
Nevertheless, the peace process was perhaps the only avenue open to Syria to seek better 
relations with the United States and to convince U.S. officials that Syria's role was 
indispensable to the process. 
 
During their press conference, President Clinton acknowledged Syria's key role in 
the peace process. He said “I was personally committed to the objective of a 
comprehensive and secure peace that would produce genuine reconciliation among the 
peoples of the Middle East…. I believe Syria is the key to the achievement of an 
enduring and comprehensive peace that finally will put an end to the conflict between 
Israel and her Arab neighbors.”266 This acknowledgement pleased Hafiz al-Asad who 
had long insisted that peace in the Middle East could only be possible through a 
comprehensive solution that address all Arab-Israeli disputes. In the opening statement 
at the joint conference, Hafiz al-Asad stated:  
“Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a strategic choice that 
secures Arab rights, ends the Israeli occupation and enables our peoples in the 
region to live in peace, security and dignity. In honor we fought, in honor we 
negotiate, and in honor we shall make peace. We want an honorable peace for our 
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people … we want the peace of the brave -- a genuine peace which can survive 
and last -- a peace which secures the interests of each side and renders all their 
rights.”267  
After the meeting, President Clinton said that he believed Asad sincerely wanted 
peace: “He is very smart and very tough. I think he has reached the conclusion that it is 
in the interest of his people, his administration and his legacy to make a meaningful and 
lasting peace. I believe that.”268 Asad’s statement, referred to peace as Syria's strategic 
choice, and the most significantly, was the first instance in which he defined peace as 
“normal, peaceful relations” with Israel.  In the context of a news conference following 
the meeting, Asad further indicated his flexibility when in response to a question 
regarding what Syria would be willing to give Israel for a withdrawal from the Golan 
Heights, Asad signified Syria's understanding of “the requirement for peace” and that of 
Syria's readiness to “respond to these requirements.”269 This meant that he was ready to 
make concessions about the requirement for peace: normalization of relations and Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied territories.     
Asad’s direct reference to achieving “normal, peaceful relations” with Israel was 
interpreted by the U.S. officials as greatly encouraging and very important; a significant 
advance for the Syrians since the Israelis had long wanted Syria to define the meaning of 
peace.270 President Clinton also was asked if Hafiz al-Asad committed himself to full 
diplomatic relations with Israel, i.e. establishing an open border, trade, and exchange of 
embassies. He said, “The short answer is yes. I believe that President Asad has made a 
clear, forthright and very important statement on normal, peaceful relations.”271 
Accordingly, U.S. officials argued “Assad's language met Israel's demands for a clear 
Syrian commitment to full peace.”272 They maintained the words “normal peaceful 
relations”, and Asad's acknowledgement of Syria's readiness to respond to the 
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requirements of peace were considered a major departure for Asad and a significant 
development in the Syrian-Israeli peace process.  
However, Israel responded with skepticism and caution. Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin said “Normalization has been mentioned by Syria in the past…. The problem is 
still, what is the meaning behind this term 'peace' and what is the timetable for achieving 
this peace and what is the price Israel is going to have to pay for this peace.”273 Peres 
also maintained that the Syrian leader's priority was improving relations with the United 
States through making peace with Israel.  
In the final analysis, Hafiz al-Asad did not commit Syria to the normalization of 
relations with Israel in terms and conditions that Israel required. Hafiz al-Asad said, “We 
want the peace of the brave--a genuine peace which can survive and last, a peace which 
secures the interests of each side and renders to all their rights. If the leaders of Israel 
have sufficient courage to respond to this kind of peace, the new era of security and 
stability in which normal peaceful relations among all shall dawn anew.”274 Asad 
referred to “normal, peaceful relations” but made them contingent upon Israel’s 
agreement with a “genuine peace” which can protect the interests of all the parties.  
In conclusion, the meeting between the Presidents of the U.S. and Syria did not 
produce any tangible progress in U.S.-Syria relations. The U.S. did not remove Syria's 
name from the list of states sponsoring terrorist groups, and thereby did not make Syria 
eligible for U.S. economic aid, investments, and purchase of advanced technology. 
However, the meeting helped Syria to spell out its basic and uncompromising position 
and was an opportunity for Syria to promote the importance of its role in regional issues, 
particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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The Hebron massacre 
The Clinton-Asad meeting in January 94 encouraged both the Israelis and Syrians 
to resume their peace negotiations. But before the talks began, the Hebron Massacre275 
took place on February 25, 1994. In this unprecedented incident, an American Israeli 
Jewish extremist, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, killed forty-eight Palestinian Muslims praying 
in the ancient Ibrahim Mosque in the holy month of Ramadan in Hebron. The massacre 
triggered more violence between the Palestinians and Israelis during the rioting that 
broke out subsequently in Hebron and elsewhere.276 
Soon afterward, reactions to the carnage were predictable. The massacre had 
significant repercussions for the broader Middle East peace process. The events 
exacerbated the already aggravated situation between the Israel and Arabs. As a result of 
the Hebron massacre and in solidarity with the Palestinians, Arab parties to the peace 
process broke off their participation in the process and thereby suspended all round of 
talks.277 The immediate effect of the massacre was that the Palestinian opponent groups 
argued the massacre confirmed that peace with Israel would be impossible. However, 
supporters of the peace process, led by Israeli Prime Minster Rabin condemned the 
massacre, calling it “a loathsome criminal act of murder.” Rabin vowed, “We will do 
everything necessary to advance the peace talks, to prevent misunderstandings, to 
remove obstacles in the way and to reach, together, the day of peace…”278 
Nevertheless, because of the U.S. position in the peace process, especially 
President Clinton’s direct involvement in the peace talks between Syria and Israel, the 
negotiations were resumed quickly, although the parties did not reach a breakthrough in 
their deep differences. According to an analysis, “The U.S. position had been that getting 
Israel and Syria to negotiate seriously was crucial to maintaining momentum in the 
peace process after the Israeli-Palestinian accord was in place.”279 For that reason, 
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President Clinton became directly involved in the Syrian-Israeli track, particularly after 
the Israelis and Palestinians reached an agreement a year before in September 1993. 
Therefore, President Clinton met with Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in January 1994. He also 
visited Damascus in October 1994 for the first time since President Richard Nixon’s visit 
in 1974 in the aftermath of the 1973 October War. President Clinton seemed determined 
to visit Syria after Jordan and Israel reached an agreement on October 26, 1994 in order 
to persuade both Syrians and Israelis to restore a momentum in their bilateral 
negotiations. 
Realizing the difficulties of the peace negotiations, Syria, according to some 
observers, persuaded other Arab parties to resume the negotiations, and worked toward 
easing Syrian-Israeli disagreement over the peace talks. Despite the series of setbacks in 
the Arab-Israeli negotiations during 1994, including the Hebron massacre, Syria's 
position on resuming the negotiations was a demonstration that peace, as Hafiz al-Asad 
repeatedly said, was Syria's strategic choice. It was also an indication of Syria’s 
understanding of the linkage between progress in the Syrian-Israeli track, on one hand, 
and improvement in the relationship with the United States, on the other.  
The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 
On July 25, 1994, King Hussein of Jordan reached an agreement with the Israelis 
(the Washington Declaration) upon which both countries hoped to end decades of 
animosity. Although the Declaration was not a peace treaty, it paved the way for a 
formal peace agreement two months later in October 1994. The “Washington 
Declaration” of July 1994 led to the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of October 1994. But 
once again, this breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict resulting from separate, 
bilateral negotiations undermined Syria's position in the peace process. 
 
 Israel and Jordan had been in a state of war since the establishment of the Jewish 
state in 1948. Jordan was among the Arab countries that took part in the conflict of 1948. 
In 1967, Israel captured the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which at that time were under 
Jordanian control. In the 1973 October War, when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise 
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attack both from Sinai and the Golan Heights, Jordan did not participate in the attack. 
According to some observers, Israel and Jordan had covert relations many years before 
they signed a formal peace agreement. For that reason, Jordan’s peace with Israel was not 
considered as major a breakthrough as that of the PLO accord with the Palestinians a year 
before in September 1993. 
 
There were several reasons why Jordan was willing to achieve a separate 
agreement with Israel. Among them the following considerations had enormous effects 
on Jordan’s decision-making process: Jordan’s vulnerability, the impact of the Oslo 
accord, the difficulties in the Syrian-Israeli track, and Jordan’s need to end its isolation 
and restore its relationship with the United States.280   
 
First of all, Jordan’s geopolitical and economic position in the Middle East made 
it militarily and financially vulnerable to U.S. hegemonic power and Israel’s superiority 
in the region. Jordan’s stance in the 1990 Gulf War and its opposition to the use of 
military force against Iraqi occupation of Kuwait not only alienated it from the United 
States and its allies but also made Jordan more vulnerable to pressure from them.  
 
Second, the impact of Israel’s accord with the PLO—the Oslo Accord—was 
significant for the Jordanians. Although the accord undermined Arab’s unity and brought 
more uncertainties and ambiguities to the whole peace process, Jordan enjoyed its 
outcomes, upon which it could pursue its own national interests without fear of being 
influenced by other regional powers, mostly Syria. The accord weakened Syria's position 
in the peace process while it helped Jordan to distance itself from Syria's leverage. The 
Accord also made it possible for Jordan to ease its tensions with the Israelis in a 
separate, bilateral deal, rather than waiting for Syria and Israel to reach an agreement.  
 
Third, realizing the difficulties on the Syrian-Israeli track, in which neither Syria 
nor Israel were willing to concede to each other’s immediate demands, King Hussein 
decided to put an end to the state of belligerency with Israel fearing the whole peace 
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process would be stalemated if Syria and Israel could not reach a meaningful agreement. 
Moreover, the Madrid peace process was based upon bilateral negotiations between 
Israel and each of its Arab neighbors. So, from Jordan’s point of view, there was no need 
to consider progress on other Arab-Israeli tracks.  
 
Fourth, Jordan’s position during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in which Jordan 
supported Saddam Hussein and disregard the UN resolutions against Iraq, led to the 
disastrous consequences of Jordan’s isolation in the international and regional 
community. Therefore, in a move aimed at ending its isolation, King Hussein completed 
an agreement with Israel and ended the state of war between the two countries. In the 
past, Syria had enjoyed a considerable ability to challenge any unilateral solutions to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Although it could not prevent Egypt’s initiatives in the late 1970s, 
Syria was strongly opposed the Camp David Accord and severed its relations with 
Egypt. However, due to enormous changes in the international and regional arena, Syria 
could neither manipulate Jordan’s initiatives nor could it prevent Jordan from making a 
separate peace deal with Israel.  
 
Finally, Jordan’s need to reestablish its relations with the United States was 
another factor influencing its decision to pursue a separate agreement with Israel. Having 
good diplomatic relations with the United States could underpin Jordan’s economy, 
which had long been suffering economic crises. This remarkable change in Jordan’s 
foreign policy was a minimum prerequisite for U.S. economic and diplomatic support to 
Jordan.  
 
 Because of King Hussein’s support for Iraq during the Gulf war, and his violation 
of the United Nations sanctions against Iraq, the Congress cut off U.S. economic aid to 
Jordan. However, after Jordan’s decision to participate in the Madrid peace conference, 
the U.S. resumed its economic and military aid. Moreover, to reward Jordan’s full 
cooperation in the Middle East peace talks, specifically, King Hussein’s strategic 
decision to bring an end to the Jordanian-Israeli belligerency, the Congress responded 
positively to President Clinton’s plea to forgive Jordan's $700 million debt to the United 
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States.281 The decision was also aimed at encouraging other Arab parties to complete 
their bilateral negotiations with Israel in order to benefit from U.S. economic assistance.  
 
The effect of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty on Syria  
 
The accord once again undermined Syria's policy of comprehensive peace. It was 
a remarkable breakthrough because it did not involve any Israeli territorial concessions. 
Syria's quest for a collective Arab position in negotiating with the Israelis was badly 
damaged when Jordan pursued its own peace initiatives. The accord brought more 
ambiguity and uncertainty for Syria. Syria lost its credibility as an Arab peace 
coordinator, and therefore could no longer insist on a comprehensive solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. However, Jordan’s decision was based upon the grounds that the 
time was ripe to pursue its own national interests. But such a policy was not acceptable to 
the Syrians282 because it could pave the way for Israeli integration into the Middle East.  
 
From the beginning, when Syria realized that coexistence with the Israelis would 
be the only remaining option, Syria had continued to maintain that the peace process in 
the Middle East was a struggle to prevent Israel’s hegemony in the Arab world. 
Regardless of the Arab-Israeli peace process, Syria viewed the Zionist movement as a 
severe challenge for Syria and for the Arab countries. Syria opposed reconciliation of 
relations with Israel and did not attend the multilateral talks fearing that the talks would 
legitimize Israel’s integration into the Middle East before Israel committed to withdraw 
from the occupied Arab territories.  
 
In January 1994, Syria's vice president, Khaddam, reiterated that “the Zionist 
challenge and the foreign designs” were the most serious challenges for the Arab 
nations.283 Khaddam expressed that Arab nations had faced these challenges under very 
complicated circumstances: the lack of balance in the international arena and the 
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fragmentation and division in inter-Arab relations. He emphasized that the Arabs were 
suffering from this fragmentation; all joint pan-Arab values had vanished and were 
replaced by the Arab states’ national interest while Zionism remained the most serious 
challenge because the movement was founded upon “an ideology and a strategy based on 
the establishment of a major power in this region.”284 From Syria's point of view, 
separate and unilateral peace treaties between Israel and the Arab parties had severely 
undermined the Arab struggle with Israel.  
 
The Jordanian peace treaty had some ramifications for Syria. It significantly 
reduced Syria's maneuverability, so it could not bargain anymore for the Palestinians and 
Jordanians who had already reached an agreement with the Israelis. The Jordanian peace 
deal, also like the Oslo accord, had substantial benefits for the Israelis. It helped Israel 
establish commercial relations with the other Arab countries, including the states of the 
Gulf Council Cooperation. Moreover, by signing the peace treaty with Jordan, Israel 
could successfully isolate Syria from negotiating on other Arab-Israeli disputes. The 
accord also paved the way for Israel to participate in the first regional economic 
conference—the Casablanca Conference in November 1994.285 Syria refused to attend 
the conference on the grounds that it would legitimize Israel’s integration into the Middle 
East before Israel conceded Arab rights. 
 
 In reaction to the Jordanian unilateral peace treaty, Hafiz al-Asad stated that the 
treaty caused great damage to Arab interests. He said, "For decades, Syria waged the 
Arabs’ battle against the Israeli occupation, to liberate the land and recover the [Arabs’] 
rights…. We fought for the land and the recovery of rights, and the conflict continued to 
achieve that aim…. We strove for a just and comprehensive peace that would restore land 
and rights.” Asad continued that in order to achieve Arab rights, Syria had based its 
policy upon coordination with the Arab parties participating in the peace process. Asad 
argued that coordination between the Arab parties was necessary because “by all 
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standards, unilateral negotiations can never be in the interests of a single Arab party, 
which is weak (on its own) and has no option but to submit to the pressures and make 
concessions.” Asad explicitly stated, “We wanted to help the Arab parties, but instead we 
were surprised by the Palestinian-Israeli agreement, followed by the Jordanian -Israeli 
agreement. I do not want to discuss what they (the Palestinians and Jordanians) arrived at, 
but reality makes unambiguously clear the enormity of the damage that unilateralism has 
inflicted on the core of the causes for which we have long fought and struggled.”286  
 
In conclusion, the Jordanian peace accord had several implications for Syria. It 
led to the failure of Syria's comprehensive policy. It also brought more pressure on the 
Syrians to conclude an agreement with the Israelis. The accord also essentially restricted 
Syria's alternatives in negotiating with the Israelis; the prospect of concluding a separate 
peace remained Syria's only alternative. Given that other Arab parties participating in the 
peace process decided to not wait for a solution in the Syrian-Israeli track, Syria could 
no longer coordinate the final outcome of the peace process. That severely undermined 
Syria’s position in its own track with the Israelis, too. The only thing that Syria could 
insist on was that, as Asad repeatedly said, “Syria recognizes the importance of a peace 
that guarantees a full withdrawal, and it recognizes that peace has its objective requisites 
and will fulfill the objective requisites of peace on which agreement is reached.”287 
 
Clinton Visit to Damascus (October 1994) 
 
 
President Clinton’s visit to Damascus was the first in 20 years by an American 
president. It was surprising that Clinton decided to visit a country that had been branded a 
sponsor of international terrorism by the United States. But Clinton decided to visit 
Damascus on the grounds that Syria's role in the peace process was indispensable and 
that the United States would remain a peace mediator between Syria and Israel.  
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The meeting reflected a grudging, mutual respect between the two countries. On 
one hand, because of the U.S. strategic relations with Israel288 and the nature of Syrian-
Israeli disputes, Syria believed that the constant U.S. role as a third party in the 
negotiations with the Israelis was essential. On the other hand, the U.S. maintained that 
Syria's role in the Middle East peace process was crucial for the entire process to reach a 
meaningful conclusion that would assure both Israel’s security and integration into the 
region. Therefore, the meeting was expected to improve U.S.-Syrian bilateral relations, 
since the two countries reached an understanding, that with mutual cooperation, they 
could achieve their national interests in the region.   
 
However, it was clear that the U.S. president’s visit to Damascus would not bring 
a breakthrough on the Syrian-Israeli track. The purpose was to reassure Syria that the 
United States would play a constructive role as a full partner and an honest broker to 
advance the Syrian-Israeli track. As President Clinton stated in a joint press conference 
with the Syrian president, “the role of Syria in the security and stability of the region is 
absolutely critical. I don't think we can finish a comprehensive peace or maintain peace in 
the region unless there is peace between Syria and Israel.”289 He furthered stated “A 
Syrian-Israeli agreement is key to achieving a comprehensive peace. Given Syria's 
important regional role, it will inevitably broaden the circle of Arab states willing to 
embrace peace, and it will build confidence throughout the area that peace will 
endure.”290  
 
President Clinton also reaffirmed Syria's stance on the peace process; Syria 
insisted that peace be based on the relevant UN resolutions and the principle of trading 
land for peace. Clinton said, “For peace to endure, it must also be just. Peace between 
Israel and Syria must be based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 and the principle of land for peace. Peace must also be real. More than mere words 
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on paper, more than just the absence of war, nations must establish normal, peaceful 
relations.” 291 
 
In the joint press conference, Hafiz al-Asad also clarified Syria's position on the 
peace process; he reaffirmed to President Clinton that Syria would pursue peace as a 
strategic choice. Asad furthered defined peace as a process that “secures Arab rights, 
ends the Israeli occupation of the Arab lands in conformity with Security Council 
Resolutions 242, 338 and 425 and enables all peoples of the region to live in peace, 
security and dignity.” As one important step in progress toward reconciliation of the 
Syrian-Israeli conflict, Hafiz al-Asad stated Syria's readiness “to commit itself to the 
objective requirements of peace through the establishment of peaceful normal relations 
with Israel in return for Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan to the line of June 4, 1967 
and from the South of Lebanon.”292  
 
Due to Syria's vulnerability in the aftermath of the PLO and Jordan’s separate 
peace treaties with Israel, Syria had no alternative but to adjust its foreign policy from 
negotiating on behalf of the Arabs to bargaining for sovereignty over its own territories, 
the Golan Heights. This revision was a remarkable breakthrough in Syria's foreign policy 
that could advance the Syrian-Israeli track. Up to this point, Asad had refused to 
explicitly talk about the nature of peace and “peaceful normal relations” with Israel. 
Peace meant for the Syrians the end of belligerency, and not diplomatic relations. But due 
to Israel’s inflexibility, no significant progress was made until that time. Also Syria’s 
suspicion about Israel’s attempted domination in the region brought more difficulties to 
the negotiations between the two countries, and finally led to a series of stalemates, some 
of them persisting for a rather long period of time. Therefore, neither President Clinton’s 
meeting with president Hafiz al-Asad in January 1994 nor his visit to Syria in October 
1994 could bridge the enormous gap between Syrian and Israeli positions in the peace 
process.   
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  However, Clinton’s visit to Damascus highlighted Syria’s stance on international 
terrorism; the U.S. had accused Syria of having a role in sponsoring terrorist groups 
residing in Syria and the parts of Lebanon territories which were under Syrian control. 
The most troublesome episode in Clinton’s visit to Syria was that, despite U.S. 
expectations, Hafiz al-Asad refused to publicly condemn the terrorist attacks against 
Israeli civilians that had taken place a few days before.293 Instead, Asad implicitly 
accused the United States of including Syria's name on the terrorist list because of Syria's 
conflict with Israel. Asad said, “The problem of terrorism is a charge made because of the 
conflict between us and Israel. That is a fact. None of you, in my opinion, Arabs and non-
Arabs, can help but know that the reason for the terrorism charge is not that the Syrians 
and those who are in Syria practice terrorist acts. Rather, the reasons have to do with the 
position on Israel. That is why this charge has been made for so long. And despite the 
desire of individuals and officials in Syria and the United States to settle this problem in 
different periods, we have not arrived at such a settlement so far.”294 
 
In conclusion, Clinton’s visit to Damascus did not produce any tangible results. 
Syria did not commit to resuming direct negotiations with the Israelis. Moreover, 
although Hafiz al-Asad talked about “peaceful, normal relations” with Israel, he did not 
further explain the nature and meaning of peace. Nor did the visit improve U.S. relations 
with Syria. The U.S. administration did not remove Syria’s name from the “terrorist list”, 
and therefore did not provide to Syria economic aid and technical support. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Progress on the Syrian-Israeli track 
 
1994-1996 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
As mentioned, Clinton’s meeting with Hafiz al-Asad in January 1994 and his visit 
to Syria later that year in November focused U.S. attention on Syria’s peace track with 
Israel. This, in return, encouraged Syria and Israel to end the prolonged stalemate in their 
peace negotiations. As a result, Syria and Israel held several peace negotiating sessions 
under American sponsorship during 1994 and 1995. 
 
 In a remarkable move toward reconciliation of Syrian-Israeli disputes, the 
Americans proposed that the Army Chiefs of Staff of both Syria and Israel hold private 
negotiations in an effort to break their deadlock. Both Syria and Israel accepted the 
proposal and the Chiefs of Staff met for the first time in December 1994 in Washington 
to discuss security issues. Due to the deep differences in Syrian and Israeli concepts of 
peace, the negotiations between Amnon Shahak and Hikmat al-Shihabi, respectively the 
Israeli and Syrian chiefs of staff, failed to produce any measurable progress. However, 
still maintaining that progress on the security issues would make it easier to make 
progress on other issues, the United States persuaded Syria and Israel to resume their 
negotiations on security arrangements.295 Consequently, Syria and Israel’s chiefs of staff 
met again in Washington in June 1995.  
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Chiefs of Staff Meeting I (December 1994) 
 
On December 21, 1994, after months of negotiations, the Israeli and Syrian Chiefs 
of Staff met in Washington D.C. According to the head of Syria’s negotiating team, while 
Clinton was in Damascus in November 1994, he persuaded Hafiz al-Asad to begin 
discussing security issues in an attempt to further progress on the Syrian-Israeli track.296 
At that time, the New York Times reported that both countries held private, high-level 
peace negotiations under U.S. sponsorship in Washington for the few months prior to the 
Chiefs of Staff meeting in December 1994.297 Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's Ambassador to 
Washington and its chief negotiator, met with Syria's Chief of Staff, Hikmat Shihabi. 
Also, Walid al-Moualem, Syria's Ambassador to Washington and the deputy head of its 
negotiating team, met with Israeli Chief of Staff, Ehud Barak.298   
 
The negotiations between the Army Chiefs of Staff failed to bring an end to 
Syrian-Israeli disputes over security arrangements. Maintaining that “officers on their 
own cannot reach a decision,” Syria, according to Foreign Minster Farouq al-Shara’, 
viewed such a meeting as an Israeli tactic to delay the negotiations.299 But the Clinton 
administration persuaded the Syrians to continue their negotiations with the Israelis on 
security issues. Syrian and Israeli chief negotiators had several meetings in early 1995. 
The negotiations led to a mutual understanding on security issues, titled “The Aims and 
Principles of the Security Arrangements.” Although this achievement was neither peace 
treaty nor a comprehensive agreement on security issues, it was considered a framework 
for progress in the Syrian-Israeli track.  
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The Aims and Principles of the Security Arrangements 
 
 In May 1995, Syrian and Israeli officials agreed to an unprecedented document 
that spelled out the objectives and principles of security arrangements between their 
countries. The agreement came at the time that a meeting between the two chiefs of staff 
in December 1994 failed to produce any progress on the Syrian-Israeli track. Aimed at 
renewing the talks, President Clinton encouraged Hafiz al-Asad to resume the 
negotiations. According to the head of Syrian delegation to the peace talks, Al-Moualem, 
“President Asad instead suggested that both sides, after analyzing why the talks between 
the chiefs of staff had failed, should reach an agreement on the aims and the principles of 
the security arrangement, to set a framework.”300 According to Al-Moualem, the 
importance of this agreement was that “it established the principle that the security of one 
side must not be at the expense of the security of the other side—the principle of equality, 
mutuality, and the fact that any arrangement on one side must be equal on the other.”301 
The aims of this agreement, according to the Christian Science Monitor, included 
“reducing, if not almost totally eliminating, the danger of a surprise attack; preventing or 
limiting daily friction along the border; and reducing the danger of a large-scale 
offensive, invasion, or comprehensive war.”302 Helena Cobban quoted the principles as 
follows: 
 
1. “The legitimate need of each of the parties is that the security of one party or the 
guarantees thereof should not be achieved at the expense of the other…” 
2. “[T]he security arrangements will be equal, mutual, and reciprocal on both 
sides…[and] if in the course of the negotiations, in transpires that the 
implementation of equality, from the geographic dimension, proves impossible 
with regard to specific arrangements, then experts from both sides will discuss the 
problematic aspects of the specific arrangement and solve them—whether through 
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modification (including additions or subtractions) or through some other agreed 
upon and acceptable solution with a single variable….” 
3. “Security arrangements must coincide with each party’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity…. [T]he arrangements will be confined to the relevant areas 
on both sides of the border.”303 
 
Helena Cobban concluded that, “According to participants, this agreement was 
possible only because the Rabin government had previously agreed to entertain the 
idea of pulling Israel completely out of the Syrian territory occupied in 1967 on the 
Golan.”304 Ultimately, this achievement paved the way for the second meeting of the 
Syrian-Israeli chiefs of staff in June 1995, COS II. 
  
Chiefs of Staff Meeting II (June 1995) 
 
 The optimism that followed the agreement on the Aims and Principles of the 
Security Arrangements led to the resumption of talks between Syria and Israel. With U.S. 
mediation, the two countries resumed their negotiations on security arrangements, one of 
several important disputes that had long prevented both sides from reaching a 
comprehensive solution. The previous rounds of negotiations had broken off on the 
grounds that Syria wanted complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights before 
normalization of relations with Israel, but Israel wanted a gradual, even partial, 
withdrawal after normalization of relations with Syria.  
 
The stalemate in the negotiations was ended by U.S. mediation in May 1995; the 
American Secretary of State visited President Hafez al-Asad in order to persuade Syria to 
return to the negotiating table. Syria agreed to another round of military chiefs of staff 
negotiations in June 1995, hoping that it could make further progress in the Syrian-Israeli 
track. The military delegations, headed by Israel’s Lieutenant-General Amnon Shahak 
and Syria’s Lieutenant-General Hikmat Shihabi, met on 27th through the 29th June 1995 
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in Washington. The meeting itself was a remarkable advance in Syrian-Israeli peace 
negotiations, but it was ultimately disappointing since the chiefs of staff could not reach 
an agreement to further the negotiations. According to Donald Neff, the parties agreed on 
the need to discuss four basic subjects: “a demilitarized zone separating Israeli and Syrian 
troops on the Golan Heights; a ‘limited forces’ zone behind the militarized zone; an early 
warning system; and confidence building measures such as joint patrols, exchanges of 
military delegations and a special communications network.”305  
 
Although Syria agreed to a demilitarized zone and a ‘limited forces’ zone, the 
negotiations failed to produce tangible progress because there were still wide and deep 
differences between the parties: Israel sought to remain on some strategic parts of the 
Golan Heights in order to observe Syria’s military movements using their own early 
warning system. Syria strongly disagreed with this proposition on the grounds that it 
would violate its national sovereignty. Israel had already sought confidence-building 
measures to advance normalization of relations with Syria before they agreed to commit 
to the concept of total withdrawal from Syria’s territories. Syria asserted that the 
normalization of relations and the confidence-building measures that Israel insisted on 
would only occur after the implementation of a peace treaty.  
 
Nevertheless, there was growing optimism for progress on issues such as the 
extent of the demilitarized zone and limited force zone. Although Syria insisted that 
overall security arrangements should be symmetrical, it made a remarkable concession in 
late May 1995: it would no longer insist on equal and symmetrical withdrawal of Israeli 
and Syrian forces from the Golan Heights. Because Syria has more territory than Israel, 
and in order to give the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations momentum, Syria showed more 
flexibility on the symmetrical extent of withdrawal of both countries forces from the 
Golan Heights. Israel argued that symmetrical withdrawal of Israeli forces would mean 
that a large portion of northern Israel would be demilitarized. 
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However, it was obvious that such optimism and progress on discussing the 
details of security arrangements would not bridge the differences between Syria and 
Israel. Even if both chiefs of staff could reach an agreement on details of security 
arrangements, the implementation of the agreement could happen only if the Israelis 
agreed to withdraw from the Golan Heights. Since it was still unclear if Israel would be 
willing to commit to withdraw from Syria’s territory, the meetings between the chiefs of 
staff were actually “talking more about talking than engaged in substantive negotiations. 
Nonetheless, U.S. officials believe that it is better than not talking at all. So they continue 
to encourage more meeting[s] on technical security issues as a way to give Prime 
Minister Rabin and President Asad time to make the basic and fateful decision whether 
peace is really in their own and their nation’s interest.”306  
 
The Wye Plantation Talks 
 
After a six-month interruption in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks, the negotiations 
resumed at Wye Plantation in Maryland on December 27, 1995. Under United States 
auspices, Syria and Israel renewed their negotiations aimed at ending the state of war and 
arranging timing and security of Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights.  
 
In the aftermath of the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the 
prospect for peace between Syria and Israel had dimmed.307 The Israelis were deeply split 
about returning the Golan Heights to Syria. Rabin’s successor, Acting Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres, lacked both Rabin’s military credentials and moral authority. Therefore he 
had not enough power to persuade Israelis that Syria could be trusted and that they could 
obtain security and full relations with Syria in return for territorial concessions.  
 
However, the assassination of Rabin and the succession of Peres changed the 
atmosphere and created a new opportunity for peace negotiations between Syria and 
Israel. This intensive new phase of negotiations came after a rather long hiatus in the 
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talks. After more than four years of negotiations aimed at ending the state of war between 
Syria and Israel, the two countries remained deeply distrustful of each other. However, a 
growing number of Syrians had come to accept the possibility of a peace with the state of 
Israel. 
 
But the previous rounds of negotiations had failed to produce any progress 
because of continuing disagreement about Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights 
and its insistence on normalization of relations prior to withdrawal. After the 
assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Syria showed greater seriousness about 
reaching an agreement with the new Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Peres also showed 
more interest in reaching a solution with Syria. That was the factor that encouraged the 
U.S. administration to become optimistic about possible important progress in the 
Syrian-Israeli disputes.  
 
Moreover, Israel’s initiatives in concluding a separate peace with the PLO and 
Jordan caused Syria's leadership to review their negotiating position. Syria's inability to 
restrain other Arab parties from concluding a separate, bilateral peace treaty paved a way 
for Syrians to deal with the Israelis based on their own national interests: the 
unconditional return of the Golan Heights. The discussions at the Wye Plantation were 
designed to advance Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations on the grounds that Israel would 
agree to withdraw from the Golan Heights, and in return Syria would offer full peace. 
 
Therefore, the U.S. encouraged both Syria and Israel to resume their suspended 
talks. Three rounds of talks took place in late 1995 and early 1996. Meeting under United 
States auspices, the Syrian and Israeli negotiating teams represented respectively by 
Walid al-Muallim308 and Uri Savir.309 The U.S. group was led by Clinton’s special 
Middle East envoy Dennis Ross. The first round of talks took place December 27-29, 
1995 and January 3-5, 1996. Encouraged by the progress in the negotiations, U.S. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Syria and Israel in early January 1996 to 
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bridge the gap between the negotiating teams, and to persuade Syria and Israel to allow 
their military officials to join the Wye Plantation peace discussion.  
 
The second round of talks, which did include senior military officials, occurred 
January 24-26 and January 29-31, 1996. According to some sources, the Israelis tried to 
expand these talks into full-scale negotiations like the negotiations that they concluded 
with the Jordanians. Syria, as they did before, insisted that discussion about other issues, 
like water and economic cooperation, could only be made after Israel’s commitment to 
withdraw from Syria's territories.310  
 
Fearing that the huge gap between Syria and Israel might derail the whole peace 
process, Secretary Christopher undertook another mission to the region in early February 
1996 in order to accelerate the search for peace between the two countries. The visit 
failed to bring a breakthrough to the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. Syrian radio, 
which usually represents the official Syrian view, asserted “Israel is hostile to real peace 
because it wants to hold on to land and impose its hegemony over the region.”311  
 
Following Christopher’s visit, the third round of Wye Plantation talks was 
convened February 27-29, 1996, and was supposed to resume the following week. The 
negotiations, however, were suspended by the Israelis on March 4,1996. It was obvious 
that there was no hope of reaching a solution because of an early Israeli election and the 
simultaneous Palestinian bombing of Israeli targets. The early election in Israel brought a 
pause in the peace process.312 Accordingly, Peres was unable and of course unwilling to 
make any territorial concessions before the election, which was scheduled for May 1996. 
The Golan Heights was one of several important issues in the election; the right-wing 
alliance was opposed to any territorial concessions and therefore campaigned against 
Shimon Peres, assuming he intended to remove settlers from the Golan Heights.     
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The Achievement of the Wye talks 
 
The Wye Plantation talks were remarkably different in structure and content from 
the previous Syrian-Israeli rounds of negotiations. The talks that opened on December 27, 
1995 were, in their way, a breakthrough. For the first time, Syria agreed to negotiate 
terms of normalization of relations prior to Israel’s commitment to withdraw from the 
entire Golan Heights. At the Wye talks, the Syrian and Israeli negotiators discussed 
different aspects of the Syrian-Israeli disputes over the nature of peace, security 
arrangements, and other issues related to the future of Syrian-Israeli relations. In an 
assessment, Syria's chief of the negotiating team, Ambassador Moualem, described the 
achievements of the Wye talks as “serious and useful.” He said “the result of the talks 
show that it is possible to achieve substantive progress on the main issues despite the 
existence of difficulties and gap between the positions of the two sides on some basic 
elements of peace.”313 Moualem also said,   
 
“We completed 75 percent of the work of negotiating an agreement. We agreed 
that there would be a complete Israeli withdrawal, to be implemented in two 
stages—though there was still a gap on the total implementation time, with them 
requiring three years, and us offering sixteen months. Regarding security 
arrangements, we agreed there would be early warning from air and space; zones 
of demilitarization and zones of limited forces in the area from Qunerita to Safad, 
that is, the “relevant areas”—though we still disagreed on the types and precise 
locations of these deployments. We even agreed on some confidence-building 
measures. Regarding normalization, I agreed on nine of the fifteen elements that 
were on the table.”314 
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On their part, (although they still avoided clarifying the extent of a possible 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights), the Israelis expressed satisfaction with the ongoing 
negotiations. In an interview, Israel’s chief negotiator, Uri Savir, said, “I am less doubtful 
than in the past about the Syrians determination to attain peace—real peace, as the Syrian 
call it…. We heard the Syrians also saying that an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement will put 
an end to the Middle East conflict, which is definitely a step forward.”315 
 
The Americans also confirmed that both parties achieved considerable progress in 
the negotiations. At the end of first round of talks, “Chief US negotiator Dennis Ross 
expressed his delight that more had been achieved in their six days of talks so far than 
during the four years of Israeli-Syrian negotiations that had gone before.”316 The Clinton 
administration took an active role in the negotiations, participating as a full partner in all 
sessions. Warren Christopher, the U.S. Secretary of State, went on two diplomatic 
missions to the Middle East after each round of talks, aiming to bridge the huge gap 
between the Syrian and Israeli points of view regarding the Golan Heights, the nature of 
peace, and security arrangements.   
 
Issues under discussion in the Wye Plantation talks 
 
The two most important issues under discussion in the Wye Plantation talks were 
the nature of peace and the issue of the Golan Heights. Although Peres placed priority on 
reaching an agreement with the Syrians, these issues continued to be intractable. Peres 
emphasized, “the main gap between Israel and Syria was over the nature of peace, 
reasserting that the depth of Israeli withdrawal would depend on the depth of peace.”317  
 
Syria, according to various sources, had promised full peace in exchange for full 
withdrawal. But the problem was the enormous gap between the two countries’ points of 
view concerning the nature of peace. According to some Middle East observers, “As far 
as Damascus is concerned ‘full peace’ is, in itself, a great concession to Israel because, 
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according to Security Council Resolution 242, on which the peace process is meant to be 
based, the Arabs should renounce belligerency in exchange for withdrawal from occupied 
land.”318 
 
The terms of full peace for the Syrians signified at least three things: an end to the 
state of war between Syria and Israel, balanced security arrangements, and the finalizing 
of disputed borders. Syria repeatedly stated, “full peace involves peaceful relations but 
not necessarily friendly relations and normalization.”319 The Syrian line was: “we have 
peace with many countries but close relations with only a few.”320 However, the Israelis 
envisioned full peace as not just normal relationship. They wanted Syria to end its good 
relations with Iran, to contain Islamic militants in neighboring Lebanon, and to close the 
Damascus headquarters of rejectionist Palestinian groups.321  
 
Economic cooperation was an important issue in the content of normalization of 
relations between Syria and Israel. One of Israel’s main goals was the integration into the 
Middle Eastern Market, and because of that they wanted Syria to open its borders and 
markets to Israeli goods. Because of its economic position, Syria was deeply concerned 
that the impact of the stronger Israeli economy on Syria would cause intense domestic 
problems. In an interview, Ambassador Moualem expressed Syria's position: 
 
“They wanted open borders, open markets for their goods, and so on. This would 
have an obvious effect on our own economy. Our economic regulations are not 
against them; we do not open our markets to any country. And how can you 
integrate two economies when one has a per capita income of $900 per year and 
other has a per capita income of $15,000 per year? Such integration is not 
possible, so we discussed a transitional period during which we could raise our 
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economy to the level where there can be competition without undue hardship on 
our society.”322 
 
Obviously, what the Israelis wanted extended beyond just a peace treaty. The 
Israelis simply wanted a peace treaty with Syria that would include full normalization of 
relations with Syria; a treaty that would allow them to remain in some strategic parts of 
the Golan Heights for security reasons. Moreover, Israel’s term of full peace would, 
ultimately, force Syria to capitulate to Israel’s increasing demands. As we saw, Israel had 
long tried to link the peace treaty with full normalization of relations with Syria; Israeli 
officials on several occasions said that the geographic depth of withdrawal would depend 
on the depth of peace.   
 
In contrast, Syria was prepared to end the state of belligerency and to give Israel a 
peace that at last would only include recognition of mutual and legitimate rights of both 
countries. Anything more than formal relations, from Syria's point of view, would not 
only take time, but would also require Syria to sacrifice its national interests. According 
to an observer, “The Israelis may have to learn the hard way that the Arabs are prepared 
to tolerate them but not to love them.”323 The essential problem was that the Israelis 
based their argument on a policy that had “neither legitimacy nor morality” on its side, 
because “it is using land taken by force as a bargaining counter to gain diplomatic 
advantage. No country nor any international accords, such as the UN Charter, condone 
such actions. In theory at least, the aggressor should not be allowed to profit from its use 
of force.”324  
 
The Suspension of Talks 
 
 The Wye talks, which brought new opportunities to the Syrian-Israeli 
negotiations, were ended by the Israelis on March 4, 1996 before the completion of the 
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third round. There were several reasons the negotiations were suspended; the two most 
important were the early election proposal and the threat of suicide bombers. 
  
Peres’s decision to hold an early election brought a rather long period of forty 
months stalemate in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. Under the shadow of elections, Peres 
was not able to focus on the Syrian-Israeli track while he was faced intense opposition by 
the Likud Party, particularly by Binyamin Netanyahu, Likud’s nominee for the Prime 
Minster post. The election campaign was intense because for the first time, in Israel’s 
history, a direct election for Israel’s new prime minister supposed to be held separate 
from the elections for Knesset. The Golan Heights was a main issue in the elections. The 
Likud right wing alliance campaigned against any territorial concession to the Syrians. 
They realized that “the Golan Heights was a potentially valuable wedge issue that could 
split traditional Labor voters away from their leadership and bring them over either to 
Likud or at least to Third Way, which was planning to field its own list of candidates in 
the election.”325 
  
Less than two weeks after Peres’s announcement to hold an early election, on 
February 25, 1996, a Palestinian suicide bomber blew himself up on a bus killing twenty-
four people in Jerusalem. On February 26, another suicide bomber blew himself up which 
led to killing of an Israeli solder. Also two more suicide bombings came a week later, 
which brought a total of Israeli causalities to thirty-one in several separate blasts.326 The 
emotional effects of suicide bombings were enormous on both the coming election and 
the Syrian-Israeli talks. The Israeli team that had been preparing to complete the third 
rounds of Wye talks received instruction to return home, and consequently the whole 
process was brought to an end by Peres’s March 4, 1996 decision to suspend the 
negotiations with Syria. Fifty-two months of direct Syrian-Israeli negotiations that had 
been launched at the Madrid Conference in October 1991 ended without an agreement, 
although both sides made significant progress during months of intense negotiations. 
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, at the Wye talks both Israelis and Syrians achieved a remarkable 
understanding of necessary steps to resolve their disputes. Although, the negotiations did 
not produce any formal agreement because Israel did not commit itself to withdraw from 
the Golan Heights and Syria did not concede to a list of political demands put forward by 
the Israelis.327 The Israelis wanted to gain symbolic gestures by demanding that Syria 
agree to such key issues as an exchange of embassies, trade, tourism and so on, prior to 
Israeli evacuation from the Golan Heights. These symbolic gestures were necessary, from 
the Israeli point of view, to give the Israeli public the illusion that they were getting back 
something instead of giving up the Golan Heights. In contrast, concession to such 
demands was viewed by Hafiz al-Asad “as extortion, an attempt to make him pay in kind 
for a territory that rightfully belong[s] to him.”328 
 
Moreover, the sense of horror that came after several suicide bombings in Israel in 
early 1996 had immediate effects on historic moves towards peace between Syria and 
Israel. It had also an important impact on Israel’s early elections that were to be held in 
May 1996; Peres lost the elections. The bombings brought an end to the negotiations 
between the Syrians and Israelis that had been scheduled to continue on February 27, 
1996 as part of completion of the Wye talks. Besides the Syrian talks, the bombings also 
jeopardized the entire peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis. The bombings 
undermined negotiations on the final status of Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
that were scheduled to begin in early May 1996. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Deadlock in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations 
 
1996-1999 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The achievement of the several rounds of talks between the Israelis and Syrians at 
Wye Plantation during the period between December 1995 and February 1996 led to a 
remarkable understanding. It brought optimism and a breakthrough in the Syrian-Israeli 
peace process. Both parties and the American peace coordinators were satisfied with the 
achievement of the negotiations.329 But despite this optimistic progress, political 
developments330 inside Israel and at the regional level drastically changed the situation on 
the ground.  
 
The negotiations that had already been suspended by Peres in early March 1996 
came to an intractable stalemate when Netanyahu won the general election of May 1996. 
Netanyahu’s victory exacerbated the problems of the peace process between Syria and 
Israel; not only was there no meaningful movement on the Israeli-Syrian track during 
                                                 
329. The Syrian Times reported on January 27, 1996 that the American coordinator of the peace talks, 
Dennis Ross, said, “they had achieved more than all the negotiations between the two parties since the 
Madrid conference.” (Middle East Contemporary Survey Vol. XX, 1996, (Westview Press, 1998), p. 661.) 
Moreover, Syrians and Israelis also stated their satisfaction. According to Asad, the Wye Plantation talks 
were “conducted in a better atmosphere than in the past.” Also, Uri Savir, the director-general of the Israeli 
foreign ministry and head of the Israeli delegation to the talks “asserted that a peace agreement could be 
reached before the end of 1996, and that the real remaining problem between Israel and Syria was mainly 
psychological.” (Eyal Zisser, “Syria,” Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. XX, 1996, (Westview 
Press, 1998), p. 661.) 
330. These developments were the result of several suicide bombings, Peres’s decision to hold an early 
election, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in April 1996. 
  
139
Netanyahu’s premiership,331 but the new Israeli Prime Minster tried to reverse the 
unwritten agreement that the Syrians had achieved with the Israeli Labor Party during 
several rounds of peace negotiations. “Netanyahu has criticized Yitzhak Rabin and 
Shimon Peres for deferring too much to Asad and has expressed the view that Syria can 
be made to accept ‘subarrangements’ that enhance Israel’s security without Israel having 
to return any territory on the Golan.”332 
 
 
Moreover, Operation Grapes of Wrath, which began in early April 1996, had 
enormous negative impacts on the peace process. The operation jeopardized Peres’s 
position in the election. It also showed that Israeli government preferred the use of 
military might to bring peace to its northern border. The operation brought enormous 
casualties, triggered Arab anger against Israel’s policies, and jeopardized the 
achievements of previous rounds of negotiations. It also led to the victory of the Likud 
Party in the election.  
 
The Operation Grapes of Wrath  
 
 
Grapes of Wrath333 was Israel’s biggest military incursion334 into Lebanon since 
its invasion in 1982-84. The operation began on April 11, 1996 when Israeli forces 
bombed electricity generating stations and other civilian and military infrastructure 
throughout southern Lebanon and Beirut. It ended on April 27, when an understanding 
was reached through an American mediator consulting with Syria and France.335 It 
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caused many civilian casualties and led to the displacement of more than 400,000 
Lebanese.336 During the operation, the Israeli army committed a massacre in which more 
than one hundred Lebanese civilians, who had taken refuge in the UN base in the village 
of Qana, were killed by artillery. Ironically, the operation that was designed to bring 
peace and security to the Israeli northern border brought only more international 
condemnation for the Israeli military intervention in Lebanon 
 
Following a series of suicide attacks in Israel by the two Palestinian resistance 
movements, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Israel and Hizbollah engaged in an escalation of 
violence in southern Lebanon. According to some sources337, in response to the killing of 
a Lebanese civilian, Hizbollah intensified rocket attacks on northern Israel, hoping to end 
the Israeli military occupation of southern Lebanon. In return, the Israeli government 
decided to take action, aiming to eliminate Hizbollah’s capabilities and infrastructure. 
Generally, Operation Grapes of Wrath had a number of related objectives: 
 
1) To respond to Hizbollah’s firing of Katyusha rockets at northern Israel and to 
destroy Hizbollah’s infrastructure in southern Lebanon. 
2) To force the Lebanese government to take stronger measures against Hizbollah 
and to rein in Hizbollah’s activities in southern Lebanon. 
3) To provide a platform for Peres to win the election which was to be held May 29, 
1996. 
 
By attacking Lebanon in April 1996, the Israeli prime minister, Shimon Peres, 
sought to achieve a variety of political and military goals. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
Israelis had faced resistance movements in southern Lebanon, which brought many 
casualties to the Israelis. In fact, with “the Grapes of Wrath,” Peres sought to reduce the 
                                                 
336. The subsequent Israeli invasion of Lebanon was “The horror of the attack on the U.N. compound, and 
the deliberate rocketing of an ambulance by an Israeli helicopter in which four children and two adults 
being evacuated from southern Lebanon died, and the killing of a mother and her seven children—
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Curtiss. “Despite 162 Death in Lebanon Peres Re-Election Remains Precarious,” Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs Vol. XV, No 1 (May-June 1996): p. 89.) 
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potential threat of those movements, particularly Hizbollah. However, there were several 
more important reasons why Peres initiated a massive invasion into Lebanon in April 
1996. Peres faced an early election in May 1996, and his decision to launch a military 
action against Lebanon was most likely motivated by his desire to win the election.338 In 
the aftermath of several suicide bombings in early 1996, security, as always, had been 
among a major concern for the Israelis. It was difficult for Peres to acquire a majority in 
the forthcoming election, mostly because he was viewed by the Israelis as less hawkish 
than his right wing challenger, Netanyahu. Peres needed to change his dovish image. He 
wanted to show, in the case of national security, he would use every possible means to 
minimize Israel’s vulnerability. The operation was an important message to the Israeli 
electorate that the dovish Peres would be no less hawkish than the rightwing Likud 
Party’s nominee.  
 
There was, perhaps, a more important reason Shimon Peres decided to initiate a 
massive retaliation against Hizbollah’s militant activities in southern Lebanon. Syria had 
often used the Lebanese resistance to indirectly increase pressure on the Israelis without 
providing enough incentive for the Israelis to retaliate militarily against Syrian targets. 
Since 1976, when Syria militarily intervened in the Lebanese Civil War,339 Syria has 
been a political and military force in Lebanon. It influenced various political and military 
events both between the Lebanese themselves and between the Lebanese and Israelis. 
Having thousands of military forces in Lebanon, Syria played a particularly important 
role in the conflict between Hizbollah and Israel. Moreover, Syria’s use of the Lebanese 
resistance gave Syria an opportunity to be in a position of strength in negotiating with the 
Israelis. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon made southern Lebanon a “free-fire zone”340, in 
which both Syria and Israel came into direct conflict through their proxies. In order to put 
                                                 
338. Moreover, as Fredric C. Hof said, the operation could make important contribution to the election of a 
new government in Israel. It was mostly because the operation showed Israel had no intention to withdraw 
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(October 1996): p. 110.) 
339. For more information about the Lebanese Civil war See: Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention 
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more pressure on the Israelis, Syria often sponsored, or at least ignored, anti-Israeli 
operations in southern Lebanon.341 Syria also, in some cases, used its influence to bring 
an end to the escalating tensions in southern Lebanon e.g., during Operation Grapes of 
Wrath Syria proved that it could play a crucial role in achieving a cease-fire and 
meaningful resolution to the conflict between Hizbollah and Israel.   
 
Prior to the escalation of tensions between Hizbollah and Israel, Syria played an 
important role in limiting the escalation of the crisis in southern Lebanon, thereby, 
providing a better environment for Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. After the 
announcement of early elections by Peres, and particularly after Peres’s suspension of 
talks on March 4, the Syrian leadership might conclude that there was no need to restrain 
the escalation of tensions in southern Lebanon. Accordingly, due to Syria’s influence in 
Lebanese internal politics, Syria’s position might have contributed to an escalation in the 
cycle of violence in southern Lebanon during the period before the Operation Grapes of 
Wrath began. Helena Cobban believes that “After Peres’s announcement of early 
election, however, and even more so after his suspension of peace talks on March 4, the 
calculation in Damascus regarding the need to limit escalation in Lebanon clearly 
shifted.” She continued, “Evidently, the parallel calculation on that score inside Israel’s 
political leadership was shifting during those weeks, too.”342 She concluded that 
throughout March 1996, tension in southern Lebanon rapidly moved toward a boiling 
point. It is plausible that Peres’s initiation of Grapes of Wrath was to minimize 
Hizbollah’s threat in such a way that would significantly change the Syrian/Israeli 
balance of power in southern Lebanon in favor of Israel.  
 
The U.S. role 
 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon brought increasing international condemnation of 
Peres’s government. Despite this criticism, the Clinton administration put all the blame 
on Hizbollah for provoking the attacks by firing Katyusha rockets at northern Israel. The 
                                                 
341. These operations were carried out against either the South Lebanon Army (SLA) or Israeli occupying 
forces in a southern Lebanon.  
342. Helena Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks: 1991-1996 and Beyond, p. 156. 
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U.S. did not put pressure on the government of Israel and most importantly showed its 
unambiguous backing for the Israeli invasion.343 White House spokesman Brian Cullin 
said, “The expression from our government is for Hizbollah and those who might have 
influence over Hizbollah to cease...provocative acts and end the cycle of violence…. 
Israel will need to feel more secure about its own national security before it can engage in 
the peace process again.”344 According to Patrick Seale  
 
“American support for Grapes of Wrath—indeed Clinton’s haste to reward Peres 
for the disastrous operation—came as a shock to the Syrians not least because, 
until 1996, their relations with the United States had, by their lights, been 
reasonably good. At Asad’s two meeting with Clinton…the American president 
had, to Asad’s satisfaction, reaffirmed his commitment to the search for a 
comprehensive settlements on the basis of land for peace…the United States had 
showed a sustained interest in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations.”345 
 
However, almost from the beginning, the U.S. administration took some 
initiatives to resolve the crisis. But it was only after the Qana massacre that the U.S. 
Secretary of State, aiming to bring parties to a diplomatic solution, traveled to the region 
and spent more than a week in the Middle East shuttling between Syria and Israel. The 
U.S. called for an end to Hizbollah attacks against Israeli targets in both southern 
Lebanon and northern Israel. It was also proposed that the Israelis would negotiate a 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon, but only after nine months of calm on the Israeli-
Lebanese border. Moreover, the Americans expected Syrians to take the responsibility of 
guaranteeing Israel’s security in southern Lebanon. However, it was neither within 
Syria’s ability to halt a total ban on resistance movements in southern Lebanon nor within 
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Syria’s national interests to do so. Syria’s manipulation of Lebanese resistance 
movements has often been a main pillar of Syria’s policy in Lebanon.  
 
While the Clinton administration worked to bring the crisis to an end, the French 
took some diplomatic initiatives. The French proposal346 recognized Syria’s role in 
Lebanon and gave Hizbollah the right to retaliate if Israel attacked Lebanese civilians. 
Lebanon accepted the French plan, providing momentum for the crisis to come to an end. 
The terms and conditions, in which both parties agreed to a cease-fire, were concluded as 
the Grapes of Wrath Understanding.  
 
Grapes of Wrath Understanding 
 
The operation that began on the eve of April 11 came to an end April 26 when 
Secretary of State Christopher (in consultation with Syria and France) was able to bring 
about an understanding between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. Syria played a pivotal role in 
achieving the understanding, which led to a cease-fire between Hizbollah and Israel. The 
cease-fire was based upon an unwritten agreement of July 1993, called the July 
Understanding, in which an informal agreement was reached between Israel and 
Hizbollah in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Operation Accountability. 
This agreement sought to limit attacks on the civilian populations of both sides.  
 
According to the understanding, both Israel and Hizbollah agreed that they would 
refrain from bombing civilian targets. But, if civilians were hit, the other side implicitly 
was permitted to retaliate. Therefore, this agreement effectively gave Hizbollah the right 
to attack Israeli targets if Israel attacked Lebanese civilians.347 These were rules of the 
game upon which on several occasions, during the period between July 1993 and April 
1996, Hizbollah retaliated against Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians by shelling the 
northern Israeli border. The retaliation did not provoke a massive Israeli response during 
                                                 
346. The French proposal was based mostly upon the unwritten agreement between Hizbollah and Israel in 
the aftermath of Israeli Operation Accountability in July 1993. 
347. “Hizbollah warns Israel it will respond in kind if Lebanese civilians come under attack.” (Mideast 
Mirror, December 21, 1994: Section: Lebanon, Vol. 08, No. 247.) 
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this period of time. The importance of this agreement was that it was written down and a 
Monitoring and Consultative Groups were established to observe implementation of the 
agreement. The new understanding was based upon these stipulations: 
 
“1) Armed groups in Lebanon will not carry out attacks by Katyusha rockets or by 
any kind of weapon into Israel. 2) Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire 
any kind of weapon at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon. 3) Beyond this, the 
two parties commit to insuring that under no circumstances will civilians be the 
target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical 
installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks. 4) Without 
violating this understanding, nothing herein shall preclude any party from 
exercising the right of self-defense.” 348 
 
The Monitoring Group consisted of the United States, France, Syria, Lebanon, 
and Israel. The United States also were to organize a Consultative Group consisting of 
these countries as well as the European Union and Russia. The understanding 
demonstrated once more Syria’s important role in Lebanon and that without Syria’s 
participation there could be no sustainable agreement between Lebanon and Israel. The 
United States also emphasized the importance of achieving a comprehensive peace in the 
region through resumption of the stalled negotiations between Israel and both Syria and 
Lebanon.  
 
In conclusion, Israel’s attempts to end militant activities originating in Lebanon 
against northern Israel has usually entailed massive bombardments, occupation of 
southern Lebanon, establishment of a security zone, and massive invasions such as 
Operation Peace to the Galilee in 1982, Operation Accountability in July 1993, and 
Grapes of Wrath in April 1996. Contrary to Israel’s goals, each attempt brought new 
incentives and more reasons for Lebanese resistance groups to attack Israel. From its 
origin in 1982, when the Israeli army invaded Lebanon, Hizbollah’s major goal has been 
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to bring an end to Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Israeli invasions into Lebanon 
could neither alter this goal nor bring peace and tranquility to the northern Israeli border. 
 
The occupation of southern Lebanon and the establishment of security zones 
brought no security to the Israelis. Instead, guerilla activities continued until the situation 
became intolerable, and then the Israeli government repeated attacks against militants that 
usually caused extensive damage to Lebanese property and resulted in enormous civilian 
causalities and a flow of refugees. 
 
In contrary to Peres’s goal, Operation Grapes of Wrath brought more international 
condemnation of the Israeli government. It also significantly jeopardized Peres’s position 
in the election of May 1996. Peres hoped the operation would show the Israeli electorate 
that he was not soft on issues related to the security. But his method of handling the crisis 
brought criticism to his government.  
 
The operation also had enormous effects on the peace process. Although the 
process had already stalled because of Peres’s March 4, 1996 decision, the Grapes of 
Wrath showed that Israeli government preferred use of military might rather than 
negotiation to bring peace to its northern border. The consequence of the operation, 
particularly the tragedy of Qana, triggered enormous Arab anger against Israeli policies 
and jeopardized the achievements of previous rounds of negotiations between Israel and 
its Arab parties. Generally, the situation in the aftermath of several suicide bombings, 
suspension of peace talks, and Operation Grapes of Wrath finally led to bringing the 
Likud Party to power. The result was a total stalemate in peace process negotiations 
between Syria and Israel during the years that Likud was in power, 1996-1999. 
 
Stalemate on the Syrian-Israeli Track During Netanyahu’s Premiership 
 
Several factors contributed to the Syrian-Israeli stalemate during Netanyahu’s 
premiership. The Syrian-Israeli negotiations came to an end on March 4, 1996 when 
Peres suspended peace talks with Syria in the aftermath of several suicide bombings that 
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severely jeopardized Peres’s position, and shifted the balance of power toward the anti 
peace camp in Israel. The negotiations came to an intractable stalemate when Netanyahu 
came to power and tried to reverse the achievement of previous rounds of talks between 
Syria and Israel.  
 
On Syria’s side, Peres’s announcement of the early election, and the new priority 
given by the Israelis to combating Palestinian attacks in the aftermath of the early 1996 
suicide bombings, contributed significantly to the suspension of the talks.349 The 
announcement of the early election, which created uncertainties about the future of the 
Peres government, made impossible any progress in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks. Being 
under pressure from within his own coalition, Peres decided to call an early election, 
hoping strengthening his position on the ongoing negotiations. But, under the shadow of 
these uncertainties, and because of narrow margins between the Labor and Likud parties 
in the polls, there was no hope the Syrian and Israeli delegations could reach an 
agreement.  
 
From Israel’s point of view, Syria’s refusal to denounce so called Palestinian 
terrorist attacks complicated the situation on the ground and brought more skepticism 
about Syria’s true commitment to making peace with Israel. Moreover, Syria’s absence 
from the anti-terrorism conference that was held following the incidents in Sharm al-
Shaykh, Egypt, drew more criticism for Syria’s position.  
 
Although Israel expected Syria would have to denounce terrorism in the aftermath 
of the suicide bombings, they were disappointed. Not only did Syria not denounce the 
bombings, but also it was absent from the anti-terrorism conference held in their 
aftermath. Syria refused for two main reasons. First, Syria distinguished between terrorist 
attacks and actions taken to liberate an occupied homeland. On many occasions, Syrians 
expressed the view that resistance inside occupied territory is a legitimate activity for the 
Palestinians. Second, the Syrians refused to attend the conference because they believed 
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that, according to Syria’s foreign minister, “the lack of proper preparations and the 
emotional atmosphere under which it [the conference] was taking place would serve 
Israeli interests only.”350 According to the Israelis, Syria’s refusal had an enormously 
negative effect on their ongoing negotiations with Syria. Therefore, the Israeli delegation 
halted the progress of negotiations and refused to renew it, hoping to put pressure on the 
Syrians to recognize Palestinian attacks inside Israel as terrorist attacks.  
 
As we saw, there was another obstacle that had a significant outcome to the 
Syrian-Israeli track and broadly jeopardized the achievement of previous negotiations. 
Operation Grapes of Wrath had both direct and indirect negative impacts on the Israeli 
election, and on the Syrian-Israeli track. On one hand, it undermined Peres’s position on 
the election campaign, on the other, it prepared the grounds for Netanyahu to criticize 
Peres’s peace partners, Arafat and Syria, for encouraging, or at least not restraining the 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah from attacking Israelis.351  
 
Moreover, the operation brought more frustration to the peace process. 
Particularly the unambiguous U.S. support for Peres during the Israeli operation in 
Lebanon discredited the U.S. as an honest broker and mediator in the Syrian-Israeli 
conflict. Syria was further disappointed when the United States took initiatives to support 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, hoping the invasion would strengthen Peres’s position in 
the coming election.352 The operation brought more frustration that even with the Labor 
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Party in power there would be no fundamental differences in Israeli policy toward peace 
with the Arabs.353  
 
Finally, Netanyahu’s victory further strained the poor relations in the Syrian-
Israeli peace negotiations.354 It completely deadlocked the already stalled peace 
negotiations with the Syrians. When he came to power, he outlined his government 
policy regarding peace negotiations with Syria on the basis that the Golan Heights would 
be considered very important to Israel’s security, and therefore his administration would 
consider peace with Syria base upon retaining the Golan Heights.355 Not only he did 
reject the possibility of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, he also abandoned the 
“Land for Peace” principle as a logical base for the peace process.356 Effectively, he 
pursued a policy to reverse the entire peace process, even the understanding that Syrian 
and Israeli negotiators had already reached during the Labor government. In general, 
during his premiership, there was no meaningful movement on the Syrian-Israeli track. In 
an analysis regarding the implication of Netanyahu’s victory, Benny Morris stated,  
 
“Netanyahu’s insistence on a ‘peace-for-peace’ rather than ‘land-for-peace’ 
formula; his assertion of Jerusalem’s ‘nonnegotiability’ and his threats to close 
down Palestinian institution in East Jerusalem; his insistence on ‘autonomy’ 
rather than statehood for the Palestinians; and his reiterated commitment…to the 
expansion of Jewish settlements (inevitably at the expense of the Palestinians) all 
bode ill. The gap between the PLO’s positions and Palestinian aspirations and 
expectations on the one hand and Netanyahu’s positions and hopes on the other is 
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simply too wide to be bridged, even given American mediating expertise and 
goodwill: No final stage peace settlement between the two seems possible.”357  
 
Tensions between Syria and Israel increased once Netanyahu took office in June 
1996. Netanyahu’s policy engendered Syrian anger and frustration. Syrian officials and 
media expressed their extreme disappointment on several occasions. In reaction to 
Netanyahu’s victory, Syria’s foreign minister said, “Anyone who claims they can achieve 
security and peace while holding on to the Golan and other occupied Arab territories is an 
advocate of war not peace. The adoption of such a policy will most certainly destroy 
opportunities for peace in the region and no Arab citizen anywhere can deal with such a 
policy.”358 On another occasion, the official Syrian Tishrin newspaper, reported: 
 
“The new Israeli government is dominated by rabbis, racists, generals and those 
who massacred Arabs, displaced them and called for destroying the peace process 
in the region…Netanyahu’s program starts with the title “destruction of the Basis 
of Peace,” [and proceeds with] how to draw the region to tragedies, disaster, 
killing and destruction, [and] how to bury the Arab’s land right and threaten their 
existence. He wants to establish a Greater Israel through settlements, more 
immigrants, terrorism and war.”359 
 
Disappointed with the attitude of the new Israeli government on the peace 
process, the head of Syria’s negotiating team expressed the concern that Netanyahu had 
no strategy for peace. He said, “Peace is our strategic option…. But you cannot achieve 
peace by yourself—you need a partner for peace. We do not yet see signs that the 
Netanyahu government is such a partner or that Netanyahu has a strategy for peace. He 
has a strategy for expanding the settlements, which are bullets in the heart of the peace 
process.”360 At the same time, Netanyahu also was strongly suspicious about any possible 
peace between the Arabs and Israelis. He once said,  
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“Our region…is rich in inter-Arab peace agreement and declaration of friendship 
and brotherhood that could unfold over many years and disappeared overnight. 
There is no reason, therefore, to expect that the quality of Arab-Israeli peace will 
be better than that of inter-Arab peace…. As long as the regimes around us are not 
democratic and peace-seeking by nature we will be not able to afford settlements 
in which they security component is not dominant…. As long as our area 
characterized by non democratic regimes, we will have to purse a policy that will 
preserve our ability to deter, and will not give up strategic assets that are vital to 
our security.  I believe that these principles can guide us also in obtaining a peace 
settlement with Syria… principles that place security as the first and most 
important tier in obtaining and maintaining peace.”361     
 
Efforts towards the resumption of talks  
 
Despite tensions in Syrian-Israeli relations following the suspension of talks in 
March 1996, the Americans made several attempts to renew negotiations after the 
formation of the new Israeli government. Hoping to revive the stalled peace process, 
Dennis Ross, the U.S. Middle East peace coordinator, met with Hafiz al-Asad in late July 
1996. But due to Netanyahu’s refusal to commit his government to the previous unwritten 
agreement, on one hand, and Syria’s insistence on resumption of the negotiations from 
the point at which it was suspended, on the other, the negotiations did not resume during 
Netanyahu’s premiership. During the period after the suspension of talks, Syrian officials 
repeatedly claimed that they reached the understanding with the Labor Party that Israel 
would withdraw from the entire Golan Heights in exchange for peace and normalization 
of relations with Syria; Hafiz al-Asad in his interview with CNN said, 
 
“Efforts on the part of the Americans, Israel and the Arabs were needed, but the 
effort was made and resulted in the sides making significant achievements which 
meant commitments by the sides. In this framework, understanding was reached 
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between Syria and Israel regarding the withdrawal of the Israelis from the Golan 
to the 4 June 1967 borders. After that we turned our attention [to the discussion 
of] the completion of the other elements of peace. This was done under the 
supervision, and with the knowledge, of the United States.”362 
 
In an interview, Walid Al-Moualem, said, “Prime Minster Rabin committed 
himself to withdrawal…. After Rabin was assassinated, Peres informed us in November 
[1995] through the Americans that he wanted to continue the talks, and he repeated the 
commitment.” Moualem continued that the agreement of Israel’s compliance with Syria’s 
essential demand of full withdrawal “had been made public on the Israeli side, following 
the publication in September of a book in Hebrew giving an accurate account, from 
Israeli sources, of what happened. Earlier, [Egyptian] President [Husni] Mubarak, had 
said in an interview with the Arabic newspaper al-Hayat that Rabin had informed him of 
his readiness for full withdrawal to the line 4 June 1967.”363 
 
Accordingly, since Syrians believed that they had reached an important 
achievement with the Israelis during previous rounds of negotiations, they had long 
insisted that the stalled negotiations could be resumed only “on the basis that the Israelis 
recognize the commitments made by the previous governments.”364 However, Al-
Moualem maintained, “The principle of land for peace alone is not sufficient…. We need 
Israeli acceptance of what Rabin committed Israel to—full withdrawal to the line of 4 
June 1967—and Israeli commitment to the “Aims and Principles of Security 
Arrangements” paper reached in May 1995 after Rabin’s visit to Washington. They also 
have to agree to resume talks from the point where they left off in February 1996.”365 
 
However, during Netanyahu’s premiership, Syria and Israel were engaged in a 
dispute about the commitment, if any, of full Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 line, 
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made by the Rabin and Peres government. Although there was little doubt that Israel 
made such a commitment to fully withdraw from the Golan Heights. Syria were reluctant 
to negotiate with Netanyahu’s government because as Syria’s ambassador to Washington 
once said, “to find a new basis for the negotiations and new terms of reference…. 
Netanyahu wants to disregard the work of the last four years. If we accept the precedent 
of going back to square one every time there is a change of government, we will never 
reach an agreement.”366    
 
Based upon Patrick Seale’s analysis, the commitments were “a tale of political 
deception, of saying one thing and meaning another, of missed opportunities and bitter 
disappointments.”367 He maintained “An examination of the evidence forces one to 
conclude that August 1993 Yitzhak Rabin certainly made a commitment on full 
withdrawal from the Golan to be implemented within the context of a peace package. The 
commitment was formally conveyed to Asad by Secretary Christopher. But the 
extravagant terms Rabin demanded in return, the absolute secrecy he insisted on, and 
above all, the timing of his offer, all suggest that he did not mean it. It was, in all 
probability, a political maneuver, of doubtful sincerity, made in the interest of other 
objectives.”368 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the beginning, Syrian-Israeli negotiations passed through a difficult and 
complex process. They were suspended several times due to either Israel’s domestic 
politics or Syria’s rigid position on its principle demand, full withdrawal from the Golan 
Heights. The negotiations were stalled usually by the Israelis, particularly when they 
were actively engaged in negotiating agreements with the other parties to the peace 
process. For example, in September 1993, when Israel reached an agreement with the 
Palestinians under the so-called Oslo Accord, the Syrian-Israeli peace talks were 
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interrupted for a while. The negotiations were suspended again when Israel was 
negotiating a peace treaty with the Jordanians in October 1994. On both occasions, the 
Syrians were informed through the Americans that the Israelis could not proceed on the 
Syrian track because the Israeli public needed more time to digest either the Oslo Accord 
or the Jordanian-Israeli agreement. 
 
According to Al-Moualem, it was only after the Israelis finalized Oslo II with the 
Palestinians in September 1995, and Peres became prime minister in November 1995, 
that the Israelis returned to Syrian track. They wanted to move very quickly.369 It was 
during that time that remarkable progress was made in most areas of disputed issues. Al-
Moualem said, “Both men [Rabin and Peres] wanted to achieve a settlement with Syria, 
but each had his own speed and conditions. Rabin was reluctant, suspicious, very 
cautious. He moved very slowly, inch by inch. When Peres became prime minister, he 
was in hurry—he wanted to enter the elections with the Syrian-Israeli agreement in his 
hand. He wanted to ‘fly high and fast,’ as he used to say.”370 
                                                 
369. “Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli peace Negotiations, an interview with Ambassador Walid Al-
Moualem,” p. 85. 
370. “Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli peace Negotiations, an interview with Ambassador Walid Al-
Moualem,” p. 85. 
  
155
 
 
Chapter 9 
 
Shepherdstown Talks 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 17 May 1999, Israelis overwhelmingly elected Ehud Barak as their Prime 
Minister. The election of Ehud Barak created encouraging momentum for the resumption 
of peace negotiations with both the Palestinians and Syrians. Barak’s emphasis on peace 
as an approach to bring security for the Israelis pleased the Arab parties in the peace 
process. In an interview before the election, he said, “I want to give a new momentum to 
peace agreements.” Although he insisted on an uncompromising position on Israeli vital 
interests, Barak said “I learned during many years -- decades -- of fighting that the right 
way to bring about personal security to Israelis and overall security to Israel is through 
peace agreement with our neighbors.”371 
 
The Impact of Barak’s Victory on the Peace Process 
 
Following his victory in the election, Barak stated that he would restart peace 
negotiations simultaneously with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians, aimed at achieving 
a comprehensive framework for peace in the Middle East within a 15-month timetable.372 
According to Barak, this would encompass implementation of the Wye River accord,373 
and discussion of final status arrangements with the Palestinians. Barak also set a 
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timetable for resumption of the stalled peace process with the Syrians, and for the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon.374 
 
Barak’s victory was welcomed by the U.S. administration, hoping the new Israeli 
government would provide an opportunity for the United States to facilitate the peace 
process in the Middle East. Syria also welcomed Barak’s election.375 According to the 
European Union envoy, Miguel Moratinos, who visited Syria following the Israeli 
election, Syrians viewed Barak’s victory as an opportunity to reach a final peace 
agreement with Israel within a reasonable time, possibly a year.376 In unprecedented 
interviews with Patrick Seale, the British writer and Hafiz al-Asad's biographer, both 
Syrian president Asad and Prime Minister Barak expressed their respect for each other. 
Barak said, “There is no doubt that President Assad has shaped the Syrian nation. His 
legacy is a strong, independent, self-confident Syria -- a Syria which, I believe, is very 
important for the stability of the Middle East.” He continued: "The only way to build a 
stable, comprehensive peace in the Middle East is through an agreement with Syria. That 
is the keystone of peace.” Barak emphasized that his policy is “to strengthen the security 
of Israel by putting an end to the conflict with Syria.” In retrospect, Hafiz al-Asad 
described Barak as “a strong and honest man” who has “wide support” and who “wants 
to achieve peace with Syria. He is moving forward at a well-studied plan.” Asad further 
described Barak as a leader who “can accomplish whatever he decides to do.”377 
 
Following the formation of the new Israeli government, substantive efforts took 
place to help Syrians and Israelis resume their negotiations. Hoping to broker a peace 
treaty, President Clinton took diplomatic initiatives to revive the long-suspended 
negotiations between Syria and Israel. He seemed willing to take whatever steps 
necessary to establish a peace treaty in his remaining months in office. Barak visited 
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Washington in July 1999 to arrange the resumption of peace negotiations. President 
Clinton sent a letter to Hafiz al-Asad, urging him “to seize the moment of opportunity for 
peace negotiations with Israel.”378 During the period before Israel and Syria agreed to 
resume their negotiations (from early July 1999 to December 1999), a number of secret, 
unofficial, and diplomatic missions took place to close the distance between the opening 
positions of the Syrians and Israelis. Following Barak’s election, Patrick Seale, Asad’s 
biographer, had a role in restoring the process, carrying a series of messages between 
Syria and Israel.379 James Baker, former U.S. Secretary of State, and Edward Djerejian, 
former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and Syria visited Syria in July 1999.380 Spanish Prime 
Minister, Jose Maria Anzar also visited both Syria and Israel in July 1999, hoping to 
bridge the differences over resumption of talks.381   
 
Despite all these diplomatic efforts, both Syria and Israel continued to insist on 
their positions. Syria wanted to resume the talks where they left off in March 1996. The 
Clinton administration did not support Syria's position.382 The United States came down 
on the Israeli side, confirming, “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and there 
were no agreement in this area.”383 The U.S. State Department’s spokesman also 
determined that “The United States only conveys, from one party to another, what we are 
authorized to convey”384, confirming that there had not been such a commitment by the 
Israelis to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights as the Syrians claimed. The Israeli 
government also made clear that “Israel never gave any commitment to withdraw to this 
or that line. The territorial issue, just like other issues, should be part of the negotiations 
and not a prerequisite to them.”385  
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However, Barak showed willingness to trade land for peace with Syria, although 
he refused to define the scope of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. He later 
insisted that Israel would never return to the pre-1967 border.386 In a review of the 
chronology of events, the Journal of Palestine Studies reported that Barak (following his 
meeting with President Clinton in July 1999) agreed to resume the talks from the point at 
which they left off in March 1996. But both sides could not agree on exactly where that 
point was. Syria continued to insist that the point was Rabin’s commitment for the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from the entire Golan Heights, while Israel claimed that the 
discussion about the June 4, 1967 line was only “hypothetical”, and that the talks should 
resume without preconditions.  
 
Following months of continuous diplomatic efforts, both Syria and Israel were 
frustrated by the inability to reach an agreement for resumption of their negotiations. But 
a breakthrough came following the meeting of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey in November 1999. Prior to the 
meeting, President Clinton and Barak, who attended the meeting, discussed the progress 
in the Syrian-Israeli track. After that, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright held a 
meeting with Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus, in early December, in which they reached an 
agreement for resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. On December 8, 1999, 
Clinton announced that Syria and Israel agreed to resume their negotiations “from the 
point at which they left off,”387 with no preconditions. He gave no details on what the two 
sides had already agreed to, nor did he state what the Syrian and Israeli positions were; a 
formulation in which each side could reserve the right to maintain their own 
interpretation of what the point was. 
 
There are several conditions that paved the way for the breakthrough. First of all, 
Barak’s victory created an opportunity for the United States to play an important role in 
bridging the differences, and to facilitate the resumption of talks. Following Barak’s 
election in May 1999, the Clinton administration had struggled to convince Syrians to 
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resume the negotiations because he was interested “in establishing a legacy as a 
peacemaker in his remaining office.”388 He lured the two sides together by proposing an 
ambiguous formula that Syrian-Israeli negotiations were to resume “from the point where 
they left off” without any specific references to what “the point” was. This formula 
satisfied both parties since they could interpret “the point” in their own way on the basis 
of all previous negotiations that took place under American auspices. To the Israelis “the 
point” meant no preconditions, no guarantees on withdrawal and, of course, no full Israeli 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights. To the Syrians “the point” meant the renewal of 
Rabin’s promise that Israel would fully withdraw from Syria’s territory in exchange for 
full peace and normalization of relations with Israel. 
 
Moreover, although Israel did not renew its promise to withdraw from the entire 
Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 line, Barak conceded that “Israel will have to pay a 
heavy territorial price”389 for making peace with Syria. In a plea to Israel’s parliament, 
Barak said, “The negotiations are opening without any prior conditions…. [but] we have 
not wiped out the past, neither Madrid, nor the contents of the contacts and talks with 
Rabin, Peres, and even not with Netanyahu.” He acknowledged that any peace deal with 
Syria would “include a painful withdrawal and the changing of the existing border,” 
saying that “the scope of [withdrawal] will be determined in negotiations, in accordance 
with the depth of the peace and the quality of security arrangements.”390 
 
The other condition that helped to end the stalemate was the fact that Barak 
pledged to withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon within a year of taking office, 
i.e., by July 2000.391 On several occasions, he even stated the possibility of withdrawing 
Israeli troops faster than the one-year period he had already pledged in his election 
campaign, with or without a Syrian-Israeli agreement.392 Barak’s announcement of his 
willingness to remove Israeli troops from Lebanon caused the Syrians moderate their 
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preconditions for returning to the negotiating table. Israel wanted Islamic resistance 
forces in southern Lebanon to be restrained in order to have a secure border after its 
withdrawal. Because Lebanese government had no authority in the south, and Syria 
already had significant influence on Lebanon, Syria was the only power broker that could 
restrain those forces from attacking the Israelis.393 Therefore, resumption of negotiations 
was crucial both for Syrians and Israelis; a unilateral Israeli withdrawal could escalate the 
conflict in southern Lebanon.394 Syria wanted to use Israel’s concern for its northern 
border security as a bargaining position. Therefore, they wanted Israel to withdraw from 
Lebanon as part of a comprehensive peace deal, which would include Israel’s withdrawal 
of the Golan Heights as well. 
 
At the same time, as the dominant military power in Lebanon, Syria could play an 
important role in stabilizing southern Lebanon in the aftermath of Israeli withdrawal. 
Therefore, although Barak said that he would withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon even 
without reaching an agreement with Syria, he preferred to restart negotiations with the 
Syrians to secure Israel’s northern border from attack by Islamic militants. Even after the 
negotiations started in December 1999, and stalled again in January 2000, Barak hoped to 
withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon within a framework of a peace agreement with 
Syria. According to the New York Times, Israel’s highest-ranking military official 
“urged the government not to abandon efforts to find a way back to the negotiating 
table.”395 There was fear that without a Syrian-Israeli agreement, Syria would “sabotage 
an Israeli withdrawal by fostering violent attacks in southern Lebanon or into Israel.”396  
 
Washington Talks 
 
 After the collapse of the Syrian-Israeli talks in early 1996, the Washington talks 
began on December 15, 1999 at the White House. The participants, Syria’s Foreign 
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Minister Faroq al-Shara’ and Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Barak, were the highest 
ranking ever. From the American point of view, this was a major change in the Syrian-
Israeli negotiations since it was for the first time that both countries held a meeting at 
such a high political level.397  
 
The negotiations resumed after months of secret and diplomatic efforts. Asad was 
convinced by the Americans that “Barak was prepared to meet his territorial demands in 
exchange for guarantees on security and other issues.”398 According to an analysis, after 
private diplomatic exchanges through U.S. mediation, both sides entered “the talks with a 
clear understanding of the other's requirements on issues relating to territory, timing, 
security and the nature of diplomatic, cultural, and trade relations.”399 This understanding 
brought an optimistic assessment about the prospect of a possible agreement between 
Syria and Israel, although both sides still had substantive differences over their disputes.   
 
Before the negotiations began, there were some expectations that the talks would 
proceed with remarkable speed. According to one estimate, a Syrian foreign minister 
maintained, “70 percent of the issues were already solved when the talks broke off in 
early 1996.”400 He also said,  "I am so optimistic to say that a few months could be 
enough to reach a peace agreement.” He added “We think we can achieve genuine results 
within a short time if all the parties have the good intentions.”401 One of Israel’s foremost 
experts on Syria, Moshe Maoz, believed, “Most of the issues have already been 
understood and agreed upon - not on paper but orally.” He said the meeting between 
Shara’ and Barak would be a very crucial meeting on principles and “once the principle 
are set, it won’t take long”402 Itamar Rabinovich, former head of the Israeli team 
negotiating with Syria, maintained that this meeting was “the most auspicious moment 
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yet for reaching an Israeli-Syrian accommodation.” He said, “Success could lead to peace 
between Israel and Syria, to a peaceful Israeli exit from Lebanon and to a revival of the 
quest for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. Failure could lead to a long-term 
collapse of the Israeli-Syrian track, to confrontation in Lebanon and to further disruptions 
of the precarious peace process.”403 
 
The Washington talks were a two-day, joint meeting between U.S. mediators, 
President Clinton, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and both Prime Minster 
Barak and Foreign Minister Shara’ for the purpose of discussing procedural matters and 
confidence-building measures. The goal of the meeting was mostly to set a time frame 
and ground rules for negotiations on the substantive issues that had long divided the two 
countries, including the status of the Golan Heights, security arrangements, water, and 
diplomatic relations. It was agreed to hold negotiations on January 3, 2000. In an opening 
speech, both President Clinton and Prime Minster Barak spoke briefly about an 
opportunity for a possible comprehensive peace in the Middle East. But Foreign Minister 
Shara’ gave a rather long prepared address, welcoming the resumption of talks but 
expressing Syria's grievances with Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights.  
 
Clinton called the talks "a big step along the path" to peace. He said, “For the first 
time in history, there is a chance of a comprehensive peace between Israel and Syria and 
indeed all its neighbors…. we have never had such an extraordinary opportunity to reach 
a comprehensive settlement.”404 Barak briefly said, “We came here to put behind us the 
horrors of war and to step forward toward peace. We are fully aware of the opportunity of 
the building of responsibility and of the seriousness, determination and devotion that will 
be needed in order to begin this march together with our Syrian partners to make a 
different Middle East, where nations are living side by side in peaceful relationship and 
in mutual respect and good neighborliness.”405 In his speech, Shara’ took advantage of 
the moment and made clear that Syria wanted to resume the negotiations from the point it 
was disrupted in early 1996. He said, “if these talks are to succeed as rapidly as we all 
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desire, no one should ignore what has been achieved until now….”406 He proclaimed, 
“Peace for Syria means the return of all its occupied land. While for Israel, peace will 
mean the end of the psychological fear which the Israelis have been living in as a result 
of the existence of occupation, which is undoubtedly the source of all adversities and 
wars.”407 
 
Shepherdstown Talks 
 
Although Syria and Israel officially resumed their negotiations in Washington in 
December 1999, the Shepherdstown Talks were the first meetings between Syria and 
Israel since 1996 in which both sides negotiated substantive issues of the peace process. 
It was also the last Syrian-Israeli meeting under President Clinton’s auspices. To date408 
there have not been any subsequent negotiations between Syria and Israel. Talks in 
Shepherdstown focused mostly on sequence: Israel’s demand that security should be 
addressed first, and Syria's insistence that Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights 
must be discussed before other issues. Mutual mistrust had always been a significant 
obstacle in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. The negotiations stalled several times because 
of procedural problems and, most importantly, what should come first. The 
Shepherdstown Talks were also stalled at the beginning over disagreement on how to 
proceed with the negotiations. The two sides could not reach a compromise. The U.S. 
proposed to set up four technical committees to address simultaneously the main issues of 
contention: border/withdrawal, security arrangements, water, and normalization of 
relations.  
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Although this arrangement brought a breakthrough for convening the Syrian-
Israeli talks, the negotiations failed to make any progress on confidence-building 
measures. The fact that the two sides had huge disagreements over which issues should 
take priority in the talks led to the suspension of negotiations. Only the committees on 
normalization of relations and security arrangements ever met. The other two 
committees, i.e. border/withdrawal and water, did not convene because the Israelis 
wanted to know the extent of Syria’s willingness to agree to security arrangements, such 
as the scope of demilitarized zones and establishment of an early warning stations, before 
discussing Syria’s demand for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. From 
Syria's point of view, negotiating issues such as these and other points of contention such 
as water rights, normalization of relations, and the nature of peace and future relations 
were pointless until they knew whether Israel was willing to fully withdraw from the 
entire Golan Heights. Therefore, the whole new process came to a complete deadlock and 
finally was suspended by the Syrians on the grounds that Israel refused to convene the 
border committee.  
 
The Seven-Page Document 
 
The seven-page document409 was written by the United States administration as 
the draft of a possible peace treaty between Syria and Israel. It was a summary of the 
issues that Syria and Israel had already agreed upon in the past and the differences that 
remained to be resolved through substantive discussions. The document was conveyed 
confidentially to the Syrian and Israeli negotiating teams, but it was leaked to an Israeli 
newspaper, Ha’aretz on January 13, 2000.410 As mentioned, following disagreement on 
procedural matters between Syria and Israel, the United States convinced both sides to 
discuss simultaneously most of the crucial disputes in four technical committees. But the 
committees could not bring a breakthrough to the talks since the Israelis did not want to 
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negotiate the borders and withdrawal issues prior to Syria’s commitment to fully 
normalize its relations with Israel and agree to Israel’s demands of security arrangements. 
The negotiations were suspended by Syria two days after convening technical 
committees. It followed Syria’s refusal to participate in the negotiations. The United 
States presented “the seven-page document”, hoping to bridge the differences that still 
existed between the Syrians and Israelis. The negotiations continued for another two days 
but finally ended without even a tentative agreement. 
 
 The document indicated411 both sides agreed to terminate the state of war and 
establish peace between them. Accordingly, Syria showed more flexibility on several key 
issues such as security arrangements and normalization of relations. In regard to the 
security arrangements, the two sides reached an agreement on “areas of limitation of 
forces and capabilities,”412 within which demilitarized zones will be established, although 
they disagreed on the extent of these zones. Syria insisted on a zone equidistant from the 
border while Israel wanted proportional zones that would extend more into Syrian 
territory.  
 
Syria made an important concession regarding the early warning stations. 
According to the document, Syria agreed that the early warning stations on Mt. Hermon 
be “operated by the United States and France under their total auspices and 
responsibilities.” During the previous rounds of talks that collapsed in 1996, Syria 
rejected the stationing of any Israeli and other foreign forces in the Golan Heights, 
arguing that technical devices, such as U.S. satellites, could provide Israel with enough 
information on Syrian military movements. On this point, Israel still insisted on “an 
effective Israeli presence.”  
 
The document also indicated recognition of “each others sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence and right to live in peace within secure and 
recognized boundaries.” According to the document, “the parties will establish full 
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diplomatic and consular relations, including the exchange of ambassadors.” They agreed 
to “promote beneficial bilateral economic and trade relations including…the free and 
unimpeded flow of people, goods and services between the two countries; remove all 
discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations; terminate economic boycotts 
directed at the other party…[and] promote relations between them in the sphere of 
transportation.” They also agreed to “promote cooperation in the field of tourism in order 
to facilitate and encourage mutual tourism and tourism from third countries.” 
 
In conclusion, although the document indicated that the two sides had agreed to 
several key issues, such as full diplomatic relations, free trade, open borders, and 
cooperation in tourism, it made clear that they still had not reached an agreement on 
many substantial issues. These included security arrangements, water sharing, the scope 
and timing of Israeli withdrawal, the position of the final border, and the extent of 
demilitarized zones. The document generally was more favorable to Israel because while 
Syria agreed to fully normalize its relations with Israel, the latter did not commit to fully 
withdraw from the entire Golan Heights. Syria significantly changed its previous position 
on security issues, allowing early warning stations to be established on Mt. Hermon.  
 
Suspension of Negotiations 
 
Following Syria's dissatisfaction with Israel’s refusal to negotiate the borders and 
withdrawal issues, the negotiations in Shepherdstown slowed down. The U.S. initiatives 
could not bring a breakthrough, although the parties agreed to discuss how to proceed in 
the negotiations. The Shepherdstown Talks ended without even a working framework for 
a provisional agreement on core disputes. But, before the negotiating teams broke up 
their meetings, it was agreed to resume a second rounds of talks on January 19, 2000. 
Syria later refused to participate in these negotiations unless Israel agreed to discuss 
withdrawal issues.   
 
There are several reasons why Syria refused further negotiations with the Israelis. 
Mistrustful and procedural problems frustrated the Syrians. The Syrian-Israeli peace 
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process had long been affected by mutual mistrust and disagreement over which issues 
should take priority in the negotiations. Despite this fact, Syria agreed to resume its long-
frozen negotiations with the Israelis in December 1999 without an explicit or even vague 
Israeli commitment to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights. However, from Syria's 
point of view, there was a reasonable chance for progress.  
 
Contrary to Syrian’s optimistic view, following the resumption of talks in 
Shepherdstown, however, Syria was convinced that neither the Americans nor the Israelis 
would be willing to put Syria's demands at the top of the agenda. Even the seven-page 
document, which was assumed to be the draft of a possible peace treaty, favored the 
Israelis and did not address the timing and the extent of Israeli withdrawal. There was yet 
another fact that caused the Syrians to abandon the negotiations. According to the New 
York Times, “the leak of the draft to an Israeli newspaper unsettled the Syrians, who had 
never before disclosed to their public what they were willing to give up. It was 
interpreted in the Arab world as Syria making big concessions without winning much in 
return.”413 
 
 Therefore, before it returned to the second round of the talks, which was 
scheduled for January 19, 2000, Syria restated its demands and apparently went back to 
its previous position: Syria insisted Israel first publicly commit in principle to an 
unconditional withdrawal from the entire Golan Heights before discussion on the nature 
and depth of peace took place. On January 16, 2000 Syria's foreign minister, Shara called 
Secretary of State Albright, saying, “Syria could not participate in further negotiations 
unless withdrawal topped the agenda.”414 He later reiterated Syria's position that “Syria 
would not return to the talks until Israel promised to withdraw to the 6/4/67 border.”415 In 
response, Israel’s prime minister vowed, “he would not commit in writing to withdraw 
from the Golan to get talks back on track.”416 Therefore, the process that might have 
brought both Syrians and Israelis to an honorable, comprehensive peace fell apart and led 
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to another series of stalemates. The only hope for breaking the stalemate was the meeting 
between President Clinton and Hafiz al-Asad, in March 2000, in Geneva.  
 
The Geneva Summit (March 2000) 
 
After a nearly two-month stalemate in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, President 
Clinton announced that he would meet with Hafiz al-Asad in an effort to bridge the 
differences between Syria and Israel, hoping it would lead to a renewal of the 
negotiations. This meeting was the first since President Clinton met with Syria's president 
in Damascus in November 1994. Prior to the summit, there were some expectations that 
the Geneva meeting would bring about a breakthrough in the stalled Syrian-Israeli 
negotiations, since a summit at the presidential level would not be held unless both 
parties had already known the general outcome.  
 
Moreover, as a result of extensive diplomatic efforts to facilitate the Syrian-Israeli 
peace talks during the 1990s, the Clinton administration was clear on the difficulties and 
differences in the Syrian and Israeli peace negotiations, on what caused the previous 
negotiations to be suspended. Due to this perspective, there were some hopes that the 
presidential summit would find a formula, a compromise solution that would satisfy the 
basic demands of both parties. In an interview with the Lebanese newspaper, al-
Mustaqbal, Syria's foreign minister said, “when Clinton invited Assad to meet him in 
Geneva, he told him he had something important to tell him which due to its importance 
could not be conveyed through the normal channels of communication. Accordingly we 
went to Geneva on the basis that we would be apprised of something important.”417 The 
Syrians, particularly, expected that President Clinton would bring a commitment that 
Israel would be ready for full withdrawal from the Golan Heights as part of a 
comprehensive peace deal.  
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In an analysis of what might be the achievements of the Clinton-Asad summit in 
Geneva, the New York Times reported, “The meeting itself has buoyed hopes that Israel 
and Syria might be close to finding a formula that meets the Syrian demand for full 
withdrawal and Israeli security concerns about a pullback down to the shores of the Sea 
of Galilee.”418 According to the report, “a significant breakthrough occurred a month ago, 
when Mr. Barak told his cabinet that his predecessors, including Yitzhak Rabin, had 
promised Syria an Israeli withdrawal to the border that existed between the two countries 
on June 4, 1967.”419 Consequently, this assessment brought the optimism that everything 
had already been prepared and settled. Moreover, since it was President Clinton’s last 
year in office, many Arab officials described the Geneva Summit as the last chance for 
achieving peace between Syria and Israel during Clinton’s presidency.420 On another 
occasion, the Israeli public security minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami, maintained that “it looks 
like the gaps between the sides are small, and there is time pressure on all sides.”421 
 
However, despite the high expectations, the United States played down the 
prospect that the Geneva meeting would lead to any quick progress in the Syrian-Israeli 
disputes, although the aim of the meeting was to bridge the differences preventing 
renewal of the direct Syrian-Israeli talks. Moreover, the Syrian and Israeli negotiators 
doubted that the meeting would facilitate an immediate advancement in the stalled 
Syrian-Israeli talks.422 However, since the previous rounds of negotiations were 
interrupted because of differences over procedural matters there was some hope that 
President Clinton would conclude a compromising formula that satisfy both parties. 
Contrary to expectations, President Clinton brought no “good news” to satisfy the basic 
needs of Syrian demands, and, furthermore, according to various sources, put pressure on 
the Syrians to be “more flexible” regarding Israeli demands for security arrangements, 
water issues, and normalization of relations.    
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At the summit, President Clinton recited “Barak's maximum requirements” to 
make peace with Syria. According to some sources, he brought “two entirely new Israeli 
demands: mastery of all the water (which Asad took to mean not only of Lake Tiberias 
but also of the tributaries of the Jordan River), and control of a zone hundreds of meters 
east of lake Tiberias (of which Syria has held the north east corner in 1967), pushing the 
border to the foot of the Golan escarpment.”423 That was totally unacceptable to the 
Syrians; President Asad apparently rejected these demands. Reciting maximum Israeli 
demands, instead of bringing a compromise solution, badly damaged U.S. role424 as an 
honest broker in the Syrian-Israeli disputes. According to Seale,  
 
“The summit never recovered from this unfortunate start. It turned into a fiasco, 
damaging Assad's hitherto friendly relationship with the American president. 
Assad returned home in a sour mood. He felt he had been tricked.”425 
 
Therefore, the summit came to a quick end, without any news conference or even 
a joint statement. There was no agreement on resumption of future talks. The Summit not 
only failed to produce any tangible or even incremental progress on the Syrian-Israeli 
track, but also made renewal of the negotiations very difficult since the negotiations had 
failed at the presidential level. Although President Clinton cautioned Hafiz al-Asad that 
“if progress were not achieved now in the peace process, it could be generations before 
they could resume again”426, the negotiations were stalemated on the ground that there 
were no compromising solutions by the Clinton administration. While the United States 
mediators knew the main obstacles in the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations, they failed to 
bring proposals to close the enormous gaps between the parties.  
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In an analysis why the Summit failed to produce any advancement on the Syrian-
Israeli track, one could say that miscalculation by both sides had some contributions for 
the failure of the summit. The Americans seemed to have believed that Syria would be 
more flexible on its core demands.427 This miscalculation were mostly upon the facts that 
since Hafiz al-Asad was not in good health428, on one hand, and because of the fact that 
all parties felt that time was running out rapidly, on the other, Syria would consider to 
conclude a peace deal with Israel in rather short period of time, possibly during President 
Clinton’s remaining time in the office.429 
 
At the same time, the Syrians expected that President Clinton would bring an 
Israeli commitment for its withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 Line. According to Patrick 
Seale, “Assad arrived with a large delegation for what he anticipated would be a historic 
effort to put the peace train back on the rails. The Syrians -- and most independent 
observers -- assumed that Clinton would bring Assad an assurance from Barak that he 
was at last ready to recognize the June 4 line as the border between the two countries, and 
that Clinton would in turn receive assurances from Assad on other subjects in dispute. 
Detailed negotiations on the entire peace package could then resume with a good chance 
of success.” He continued, “But Assad was in for a shock. His expectations were dashed 
in the very first minutes of the encounter. Instead of the “good news” he had expected 
about the border, he was taken aback when Clinton began to recite Barak's maximum 
requirements. Barak wanted control of all the waters -- not just of Lake Tiberias itself but 
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of the Upper Jordan River and the other tributaries flowing into the Lake from the 
Golan.”430 
 
Syria's reaction to the failure of the summit was mixed. While “the view in 
Damascus was that Syria was the victim of a conspiracy. It had been asked to capitulate 
to Israel's demands”, Syria's foreign minister, said in a statement “It is not possible to say 
that the summit failed or succeeded. The Geneva summit is part of American efforts that 
will continue with the aim of achieving just peace. If it appears until now that these 
efforts have not achieved the results hoped for, that's because, where the peace process is 
concerned, the Israeli government exercises the logic of force rather than the force of 
logic.” Shara continued:  
 
“Although we had no prior illusions, we were surprised that the American 
president did not bring anything new from the Israeli side, but came to request 
from Syria that which might help Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in his 
difficult circumstances….”431 
 
In conclusion the key reason, according to Seale, for the failure of the summit was 
that “Israel wants to push the Syrians back from the Lake not only beyond the June 4 line, 
but beyond the 1923 international border by several hundred meters in order to control 
the road which runs around the Lake…the Israelis are not only disputing Syria's demand 
that the border run along the June line; they even want to amend the 1923 line and push it 
further east.”432 While this was the major reason for the failure of the summit, Israel’s 
demand to remain in parts of the Golan Heights to control the early-warning station was 
another reason to break up the meeting.  
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Chapter 10 
 
 
Syrian Perspectives on the Main Issues of the Peace Process 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There are several main issues that had long been important in Syrian-Israeli 
negotiations. The nature of peace, the meaning of comprehensive peace, the extent of 
Israeli withdrawal, and security arrangements were among the main issues of peace 
negotiations between Syria and Israel. But Syria's strategic goal in the peace process has 
long been the return of the Golan Heights. Prior to 1993, Syria also maintained that 
Palestinian rights were equally important. However, after the conclusion of Palestinian-
Israeli agreement—the Oslo Accords—Syria was excluded from the negotiations over the 
Palestinian issues and therefore appeared to be reluctant about whatever the Palestinians 
preferred in their relations with the Israelis. These topics will be briefly discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
 
Syrian Goals in the Peace Process 
 
1) Return of the Golan Heights 
 
The most strategic of Syria’s goals in the peace process was to regain the Golan 
Heights, which were occupied by the Israelis in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.433 The 
importance of the Golan Heights for Syria lies not only in security, but also in the 
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symbolic value of these Heights.434 Hafiz al-Asad consistently insisted that a peace 
settlement must be based on the unconditional return of the entire Golan Heights, 
meaning all the territory taken from Syria in the 1967 war. He also made any 
considerable progress in the peace negotiations with Israel contingent on the full return of 
the Golan Heights. Because of Syria’s position on the Golan Heights, this issue has 
become one of the most important keys to securing a comprehensive peace in the Middle 
East. 
 
The Golan is significant because of its strategic geo-political situation in the 
region. It is located at the meeting point of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. On a clear 
day, the view from Mount Hermon, which rises to about 9,000 feet, reaches to Damascus, 
about 30 miles to the northeast. The Golan plateau also dominates the entire northern 
Israeli border with the Lebanon. The Golan Heights has military importance for both 
Syria and Israel. For Israel, the Golan Heights is a strategic buffer zone against any attack 
by the Syrians. For Syria, the Golan is important because it is located only forty miles 
from its capital, and there are no natural obstacles in the road to Damascus. In addition to 
its obvious military value, the area is one of the most important sources of water for 
Israel. The region gives Israel access to the headwaters of the Jordan River. In 
conclusion, despite the Golan Heights’ strategic importance, the military importance of 
this area is reduced in the era of ballistic missiles and unconventional warfare; its values 
are more symbolic.  
 
While the Golan Heights have a highly symbolic value for Syria, they were 
especially important to Hafiz al-Asad because the loss of the Golan occurred while he 
was Minster of Defense. Therefore, to recover the national dignity of Syria, Asad 
consistently insisted that a peace settlement must be based on the unconditional return of 
the full Golan Heights. The Israelis wanted to stay on some part of the Golan Heights in 
order to make sure that their security would not be at risk. But, Syria opposed the Israeli 
proposal. The Syrians believe that Israeli presence on the Heights challenges Syria’s 
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sovereignty over its entire territories, and that it is “a symbol of occupation and a 
permanent reminder of national humiliation.”435 
  
However, after entering the peace process, Syria showed flexibility in negotiating 
with Israel over security concerns, a demilitarization zones, and peacekeeping forces. 
Syria has long demanded full and immediate Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. 
Syria considers Israeli surveillance equipment for early warning stations on the Golan 
Heights against its national interests, but it might accept security arrangements that do not 
require an Israeli presence on Syrian territory. From the Israeli point of view, although 
the early warning stations have a military importance to protect Israel’s security 
concerns, the value of these stations is more symbolic.436 Syria believes that the U.S. 
could provide Israel with high-quality communication monitoring and high-resolution 
optic photos through U.S. satellites. 
 
2) Palestinian rights 
 
Syria had long insisted on the comprehensive peace, which from Syria’s 
perspective, means that peace had to address all Arab-Israeli disputes,437 including 
Palestinian rights. The rights of Palestinians, from Syria’s point of view, requires total 
Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian rights for self-determination 
in these areas, and the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland. Because 
of that, Hafiz al-Asad emphasized on several occasions that “Syria had no intention of 
signing a separate peace treaty with Israel and would insist that any accord cover the 
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interests of all parties.”438 Asad also said, “had Syria thought of its own interest only…it 
would have achieved a unilateral solution…but it did not and will not do this. The Golan 
was originally occupied in a battle waged for Palestine.”439 
 
Contrary to Syria’s interests, the Palestinians decided to negotiate a separate 
peace deal to resolve their conflicts with the Israelis. In August 1993, the Palestinians and 
Israelis reached an agreement after secret negotiations. The agreement posed extreme 
difficulties for Syria’s policy in the peace process. Disappointed by the Palestinians, 
Syria’s reaction was strong: criticizing Arafat for making such secret deal without 
achieving any remarkable progress. However, Syria did not try to sabotage the 
agreement, declaring it would neither hinder the agreement nor restrain the Palestinian 
protest against the accord. In an interview with an American television station, Hafiz al-
Asad said,  
 
“We were of this perception, of this understanding that the coordination among 
the Arab countries would achieve its objective of pushing the peace process 
forward and of achieving success and security for the peace process as a whole. 
Suddenly we hear about a secret agreement that takes place between some PLO 
leaders and Israel. From my point of view, this certainly was not their best option. 
And it’s not the best way to achieve peace. Nevertheless, we decided not to hinder 
the agreement which they had reached not to obstruct it. We said that this 
responsibility belongs to the Palestinian people and their institutions.”440 
 
Frustrated by the PLO action, Asad expressed he felt personally betrayed by the 
Oslo accord, saying he believed “it undercuts efforts to forge a comprehensive peace in 
the region.” He continued, “the Arabs are one people. Had I signed the type of agreement 
signed by Arafat, I would have faced major and numerous problems not for love of 
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Arafat or hate for me, but because Syrian citizens would believe that, by taking such a 
decision, I have turned my back on another Arab people.”441 
 
 
The Meaning of Comprehensive Peace 
 
 
Syria had long insisted on a comprehensive peace. The meaning of 
comprehensive from Syria’s point of view includes at least two elements: 1) the peace 
should address all Arab-Israeli disputes based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338; and 2) the 
Arab parties in the peace process should avoid making partial, separate deals with the 
Israelis; they should unify to coordinate a common role from a position of strength to 
secure Arab rights. 
 
Comprehensive peace from Syria’s view means that peace should secure Arab 
rights. These rights traditionally include the achievement of Palestinian rights and Israeli 
evacuation from the 1967 occupied land. Syria maintains all Arab-Israeli disputes are 
connected to each other; separate and partial agreements would not bring the conflict to 
an end. Hafiz al-Asad in a meeting with President Clinton in January 1994, emphasized 
that  
 
“To me, there is no difference between the Golan, South Lebanon and the 
occupied parts of Palestine or Jordan…It is all one Arab land as far as I am concerned, 
with no part of it more precious to me than another. What I demand for one part I demand 
for all, and that is only natural, because it is all one land for one nation…Peace cannot be 
peace unless it is comprehensive. You have before you three experiments that did not 
make peace or end the conflict: Camp David in 1978 with Sadat's Egypt, May 17, 1983 
with Amin Gemayel's Lebanon, and the Gaza-Jericho accord with Yaser Arafat on 
September 13, 1993. These are enough to indicate that unilateral solutions, even if they 
multiply, do not make peace.”442  
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Moreover, Syria maintains that the implementation of relevant UN resolutions on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict is an important component of comprehensive peace. Syria also 
encouraged other Arab parties in the peace process to emphasize on the implementation 
of UN Resolution 242 and 338. Syrians believe this would be the only way to secure 
Arab rights and to achieve a stable and durable peace between the Arabs and Israelis. In 
an interview, Syrian Foreign Minister Shara said:  
 
“What we want is to implement United Nations resolutions, in particular, UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. These resolutions call for Israel's 
withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands and safeguarding the Palestinian 
national rights. And we think these two requisites are important in order to 
establish a just and comprehensive peace in the region…there is no other 
alternative—if we want peace in the region—but to implement UN Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338.443 
 
The meaning of comprehensive peace does not mean negotiations on all issues 
between all parties at the same time. In an interview with CNN on October 28, 1997, 
Hafiz al-Asad asserted that comprehensive for him means comprehensive solution for all 
Arab-Israeli disputes, not simultaneous negotiations on all tracks. He said, “This does not 
mean that a step here should be coupled with another step there. I do not mean that 
negotiations among the different committees should take place simultaneously. No one 
insists on this because it is impractical. I am discussing the final solution, which must be 
comprehensive. However, it is natural that one committee will move quickly and another 
committee will move slowly. This is natural for discussions and will certainly take 
place.”444  
 
One of the other components of the comprehensive peace is the need for all Arab 
parties to avoid making partial, separate agreements with the Israelis. Syria wants all 
Arab parties to coordinate their views on the peace process to reach a common position in 
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order to play from a position of strength in the negotiations with the Israelis. Syrians 
believe that “Israel has focused on trying to disrupt Arab coordination by trying to lure 
some of the Arab parties into separate deals”445. Therefore, coordination between Arab 
parties in the peace process is crucial in order to avoid damages that could undermine 
Arab interests as a whole.  
 
Syria views the peace process as a battlefield, which requires Arab coordination 
to regain the occupied territories, and to achieve a just and sustainable peace in the 
region. In this regard, President Hafiz al-Asad had repeatedly said that “the battle of 
peace is no less fierce than a real war and that Syria's commitment to regaining full Arab 
rights and rejection of any concession leaves no alternative to waging the battle of peace 
using every possible resource.”446 Therefore, to win the battle of peace, Syrian officials 
believe that the Arabs must coordinate their positions.447 “There is no choice but to pool 
Arab ranks, making the battle of peace a battle for all Arabs and not just for those who 
take part in it.”448 
 
In general, Syria maintains the comprehensive peace as a way to restore Arab 
rights through negotiations with the Israelis. Explaining Syria’s vision in this regard, 
Hafiz al-Asad once said in a news conference with U.S. President Bill Clinton that,  
 
“Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a strategic choice that 
secures Arab rights; ends the Israeli occupation; and enables all peoples in the 
                                                 
445. Mideast Mirror, September 2, 1993, Section: The Arab Islamic World; Vol. 07, No. 169. 
446. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts August 19, 1993: Part 4 The Middle East, Africa And Latin 
America: A. The Middle East; Me/1771/A. 
447. To encourage other Arab parties to take part in a unified position, Syria argued that “the rights of the 
Arabs are clear, and the Arabs have not relinquished one iota of these rights or one inch of their territories. 
Arab demands are based on the international community's resolutions and charters, which denounce 
aggression, ban the occupation of territories by force and disapprove of changing the nature of these 
territories or planting them with settlements.” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts August 19, 1993: Part 
4 The Middle East, Africa And Latin America: A. The Middle East; Me/1771/A.) 
448. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts August 19, 1993: Part 4 The Middle East, Africa And Latin 
America: A. The Middle East; Me/1771/A. 
  
180
region to live in peace, security, and dignity. In honor we fought; in honor we 
negotiate; and in honor we shall make peace.”449 
 
  
Meaning of Normalization and the Nature of Peace  
 
The nature of peace is one of the most controversial disputes between the Syrians 
and Israelis. Although Syria had confirmed its commitment to normalizing its relations 
with Israel, the scope and the meaning of peace have been unclear. Therefore, despite the 
fact that there has been some progress in the Syrian-Israeli track, serious obstacles remain 
unresolved. The negotiations itself had long been deadlocked over the nature of the peace 
that Syria would agree to offer, and the scope of withdrawal to which Israel would be 
ready to concede. The Israelis want the Syrians to define what Hafiz al-Asad once called 
‘full peace’450 before even they consider withdrawal from the Golan Heights. At the same 
time, the Syrians maintain Israel must declare its readiness to withdraw from all of the 
Golan Heights before they normalize their relation with the Israelis.  
 
During the 1990s, Syria and Israel had several peace negotiations under the 
auspices of the United States. But most of talks ended with both sides reporting a 
continued deadlock over the same basic principles: the withdrawal and the nature of the 
peace. According to the New York Times, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was ready to 
give up large parts of the Golan Heights but he insisted that Syria must first elaborate on 
the nature of the peace treaty it is prepared to sign.451  
 
The concept of peace settlement, from Syria’s perspective, means “ending the 
state of war and leaving the matter of normalization of relations to future generations.”452 
The concept of full peace from Syria’s view is the implementation of Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. Syria’s Vice-President once said that “Syria's position in the 
peace process remains as clear as ever: peace must involve the implementation of the 
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Security Council Resolutions and therefore full (Israeli) withdrawal from the occupied 
territories.”453 From Syria’s point of view, these resolutions recognize the inadmissibility 
of the acquisition of territory by force, and request Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. 
Accordingly, Syria is not legally obliged to accept Israel’s demand and definition of a 
normal relationship. Asad once said,  
 
“First we must end the state of belligerency. That means the implementation of 
United Nations Resolution 242. and the end of belligerency will mean the 
beginning of a stage of real peace…. If the Israelis return to the 1967 frontier and 
the West Bank and Gaza become a Palestinian state, the last obstacle to final 
settlement will have been removed.”454  
  
From Syria’s perspective, normalization could follow only after full Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied lands. Syria also insisted that normalization is not an issue 
that could be imposed. It would come only as a result of confidence and trust between the 
states.455 Because of that, Syria usually refused to discuss the issues of normalization 
before the establishment of peace. According to Itamar Rabinovich,  
 
“Asad had accepted the notion of settlement and peace with Israel, but his concept 
of peace was consciously different from those of Sadat, Hussein, and Arafat. He 
saw the conflict with Israel in geopolitical terms and he saw its resolution through 
the same prism. Israel remained a rival, if not an enemy, and the terms of the 
peace settlement should not serve to enhance its advantage over the Arabs, Syria 
in particular, but rather to diminish it.”456 
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In contrast to Syria’s view, some Israelis maintain that with Syria, the only 
agreement Israel should accept is "peace for peace."457 Hence, Israel wants to have both 
peace and the land in return for peace with the Arabs. Syria has always been disappointed 
with such this policy.  Head of Syria’s delegation to the peace talks, Muwaffaq al-Allaf, 
expressed Syria’s position that, “Israel's refusal to abide by the requirements of Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, on which the peace process is based, and its insistence 
on raising issues which cannot be discussed before the establishment of peace and which 
do not constitute a precondition for peace, is a serious matter indeed.”458 
 
Syrian maintains that there is a meaningful correlation between withdrawal and 
normalization of relations. That means the peace should be implemented in proper 
sequence; Israel must first recognize Syria’s sovereignty on whole Golan Heights and 
commit to evacuate Syria’s territories in a reasonable timetable before Syria could open 
its borders and markets to the Israelis. Syria’s Foreign Minister, Faruq al-Shara’, in an 
interview in October 1994 simply explained: 
 
“Let us put things in the proper sequence. We do not want to have loopholes or 
snags here and there, which would be counterproductive. We want to move the 
whole people together to believe that peace is coming and this peace would be 
real and this peace would be comprehensive…at the same time, there could be no 
peace with Syria without a total withdrawal from the Golan…because just 
imagine if there was peace and a part of our occupied territory would remain 
under the Israeli control. I mean, what the reaction of the Syrian people would be. 
They would say: Well, this is capitulation, this is not peace, and they would not 
even think of dealing with the Israelis under any circumstances, even if the 
                                                 
457. In contrast to Likud’s policy on the peace process, Prime Minister Rabin recognized the formula of 
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reading of 242 and 338 as meaning peace for peace.  Security Council Resolution 338 calls for negotiations 
toward a just and durable peace in the region. (The New York Times, September 10, 1992: p. A8.) 
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government would issue orders to them. So peace should be honorable, it should 
be just, it should be balanced.”459 
 
Israel, however, expected that making peace with its Arab neighbors should 
facilitate Israeli incorporation and integration into the Middle East. Because of that, Israel 
insisted on achieving normalization of relations prior to its withdrawal from Syria’s 
territories. Therefore, on several occasions, Israeli officials made clear that the scope of 
Israeli withdrawal would be contingent on the extent of normalization. Israelis believe 
that peace without normalization of relations, the so-called cold peace, could easily revert 
to a conflict and eventually lead to another war.   
  
The problem is that Syria views Israeli economic and cultural penetration into the 
Arab world as the main concern for its national security and interests. Therefore, Syria’s 
strategic goal has long been to contain Israeli penetration into the Arab world. Then 
Syrian Vice-President Abdelhalim Khaddam declared in January 1994 that “the idea of a 
‘new Middle East’ in which Israel would become part of the Arab world is aimed at 
giving the Jewish state control of Arab resources…even if Israel withdrew from all the 
occupied Arab territories, it could still pose a threat to the Arabs, given its present arms 
buildup…. We refuse to have Israel as part of the Arab world.”460 
 
In general, Syria has been unwilling to normalize its relations with Israel mostly 
because of its psychological and economic dimensions: from a psychological perspective, 
Syria believes that it will take time “to direct Syrian popular attitudes from a state of war 
to a state of peace. This is not logical, especially since it is rare to find a household in 
Syria that has not lost someone on the battlefield…you can’t oblige them to buy Israeli 
goods or visit Israel if they are not convinced that Israel has changed from being an 
enemy to a neighbor…we cannot be obliged to make the peace warm.”461 From an 
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460. Mideast Mirror, January 5, 1994, Vol. 08, No. 2. 
461. “Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations: an interview with Ambassador Walid al-
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economic perspective, the chief of Syria’s negotiating team, Ambassador Moualem, 
explained Syria’s objections on the grounds that 
 
“They wanted open border, open markets for their goods, and so on. This would 
have an obvious effect on our own economy. Our economic regulations are not 
against them…how can you integrate two economies when one has a per capita 
income of $900 per year and the other has a per capita income of $15,000 per 
year? Such integration is not possible, so we discussed a transitional period during 
which we could raise our economy to the level where there can be competition 
without undue hardship on our society.”462 
 
 In conclusion, the basic Syrian conception of peace would have meant neither 
diplomacy nor trade relations; it means only the end to the belligerency between Syria 
and Israel. If Israel conceded to withdraw from the Golan Heights, Syria would be willing 
to maintain some kind of ‘cold peace’ with Israel. However, the warm peace and 
complete normalization of relations would be contingent on other issues such as the 
achievement of Palestinian rights.  
 
Meaning Of Withdrawal 
 
Syria insists on Israeli withdrawal to the line of June 4, 1967.463 This line was the 
confrontation line between Israel and Syria before Israel occupied Syria’s territory of the 
Golan Heights during the six-day war of June 1967. The line was neither an 
internationally recognized boundary nor a border recognized by both states of Israel and 
Syria. Previously Syria neither had recognized the 1923 line of demarcation nor the 
armistice line of 1949 as a border with Israel. The 1923 line was the result of the Anglo-
French partition of Greater Syria that was drawn by the British and French in the 
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463. For an explanation why Syria insisted on Israeli withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967 see: Itamar 
Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: the Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, pp. 142-143.  
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aftermath of World War I. The armistice line of 1949 was also derived from formal 
security agreements that were negotiated between Syria and Israel under United Nations 
auspices after the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948.464  
 
As mentioned above, while Syria has never recognized any border with Israel, it 
has long insisted on the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the line of June 4, 1967.465 Syria 
wants Israel to pull back to this line in order to have access to the northeastern shore of 
Lake Tiberias, which it lost in the six-day war of 1967. According to Frederic Hof, 
“major elements of the line of June 4, 1967 were set in place by war in 1948, armistice in 
1949 and, above all, by the failure of the Parties to convert their armistice to a treaty of 
peace in the early 1950s. As it became increasingly clear that peace was not on the 
horizon, Israel and Syria both sought to take maximum advantage of the territorial 
ambiguities left in place by their armistice.”466  
 
Contrary to Syria’s position that clearly insisted on Israel’s return to the line of 
June 4, 1967, “Israel’s stance on the question of withdrawal and the permanent boundary 
is more ambiguous than the Syrian and often contradictory.”467 Syria has long demanded 
the return of the entire Golan Heights, although it has shifted its initial position on 
demanding an immediate Israeli pullout. Syria also has long insisted on a specific and 
reasonable timetable for a total pullout. Nevertheless, Israel, especially during the Rabin 
administration, has repeatedly said it will withdraw from some parts of the Golan 
Heights, and not from the entirety of the Golan Heights.  
 
Furthermore, Israel has consistently refused to spell out the extent of the 
withdrawal until Damascus commits itself to a full peace with Israel. Rabin had also 
                                                 
464. The negotiations followed the end of the Israeli war known as the war of independence, and called for 
the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution of November 16, 1948. The purpose of this 
resolution was to end hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors and to facilitate permanent peace in 
Palestine.  
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1999).    
467. James Moore, “An Israeli-Syrian Peace Treaty: So Close And Yet So Far,” Middle East policy Vol. 
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repeatedly said that the depth of the withdrawal would be based on the depth of the 
peace. Rabin, since he established his administration in 1992, frequently used the vague 
formula of the correlation between the depth of peace with Syria and Israel’s withdrawal 
from the Golan Heights. According to the Jerusalem Post, Rabin used this formula to lure 
Hafiz al-Asad into making peace with Israel based on Israel’s conditions. “He [Rabin] 
based it on intelligence assessments that Syria had made peace a strategic option, maybe 
even a priority in light of global and regional changes. Even then, Rabin repeatedly 
asserted, Israel will unequivocally insist on the principle of gradual withdrawal and a 
comprehensive security arrangements package.”468  
 
Therefore, Israel and Syria remain far apart on crucial issues of the meaning of 
full peace and the extent of the withdrawal. In a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, Rabin said that Israel would be “willing to sign an accord for an 
unspecified Golan withdrawal to be completed in three stages over a five-to eight-year 
period…Israel could yield the Golan Druse villages at the end of the first phase, …in 
return for Syria establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel.”469 These three stages 
would include: 1) a minor withdrawal from some of the Golan Druse villages, 2) three 
years of normalization of relations as a test to see whether Syrians are serious about 
peace with Israel, and 3) a referendum on further negotiations over a general peace 
package and the extent of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights.470  
 
However, Syria’s response was a strong rejection. Farouq al-Shara’, Syria's 
Foreign Minister said that due to the smallness of the Golan Heights, there is no need for 
such a long trial period.471 The referendum proposal,472in which Rabin said a future peace 
treaty with Syria will be dependent on the will of the Israelis, brought two divided 
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reactions: some observers believed the referendum proposal was to push forward talks 
with Syria while others argued that “Rabin proposed a referendum to delay the prospects 
of any agreement with Syria, believing that President Hafez al-Assad is incapable of 
offering the kind of peace which would make possible an Israeli withdrawal from the 
Golan. They say the ploy is an excuse to give no further concessions on the extent of 
withdrawal.”473  
 
Hafiz al-Asad expected that the Golan Heights be treated like the Sinai, which 
was returned in its entirety to Egypt in exchange for peace. But the Israelis believed that 
Syrian leaders had not been willing to make any concessions as Anwar Sadat did once, 
when he made an unprecedented trip to Israel in 1977. Hence, Israel repeatedly insisted 
that its return of the Golan Heights is not to be the same as that of the Sinai, in which 
Israel withdrew from all of the Sinai Peninsula in return for making peace with Egypt. 
Rabin once said “Israel's return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt should not serve as a 
precedent for the Golan talks.”474 In response to a question regarding the implementation 
of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 on the Syrian-Israeli track, Rabin replied, “When we said 
that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 were applicable to peace with Syria, we 
implied that the IDF would withdraw to secure and recognized borders. We envisage 
withdrawal on the Golan Heights but not from the Golan Heights."475 By insisting on the 
withdrawal to “secure borders”, Rabin meant that Israel should keep parts of the Golan 
Heights for maintaining Israel’s security.476 However, regarding Israeli settlements in the 
Golan Heights, Rabin once hinted that Israel would be willing to remove settlements 
from the Golan Heights for the sake of making peace with Syria. He said:  
 
“Settlements may be removed only for the sake of peace. If we reach the point 
where we need to remove settlements for the sake of peace, I have been and will 
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remain in favor of it… For me, peace is higher value for Israel’s future and 
security than this or that settlements.”477 
 
Security Arrangements 
 
Security arrangements have long been one of the key issues in Syrian-Israeli 
peace negotiations. If the Israelis agree to withdraw from the Golan Heights, they would 
demand precise and guaranteed security arrangements in which they could prevent the 
risk of any surprise attack by Syria from the Golan Heights. Although both Israel and 
Syria agreed on the key issue of the creation of a demilitarized zone, the two countries 
have extreme differences on the issues of security arrangements. While Israel’s position 
was to remain on parts of the Golan Heights and to dismantle Syria’s weapon of mass 
destruction, the Syrians maintained that “security was a concern of both parties…security 
arrangements were to be parallel and reciprocal and without prejudice to the sovereignty 
of any party nor to the principle of equal rights for both.”478   
 
One of Israel’s main concerns is to prevent any surprise attack by Syria. Israel’s 
logic, according to former Prime Minister Barak, is that “Syria has a large standing army 
and can keep many, many troops and tanks constantly deployed near its border with 
Israel, so that a surprise attack is possible at any time. That's Israel's constant fear. Israel 
has a small standing army, so it uses the Golan as a land buffer that would slow down any 
Syrian surprise attack long enough for Israel to mobilize its reserves.”479 So the key point 
in Israel’s position is to do whatever is necessary to decrease its vulnerability. The 
dismantling of Syria's ability to mobilize such a surprise attack from the Golan Heights is 
among Israel’s main goals. 
 
Therefore, Israel insisted on substitute security guarantees in the case of its 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights. These substitutes include at least pushing Syria's 
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troops from the border, dismantling Syria's chemical weapons of mass destruction, 
installing early-warning stations on some parts of the Golan Heights, and the reduction of 
Syria's standing army. With respect to these issues, both Syria and Israel agreed on some 
key elements through negotiations between the chiefs of staff of Israel and Syria in the 
mid-1990s. However, there had been some significant disagreements on the principle of 
symmetry. Syria wants all security arrangements and demilitarized zones to be equal on 
both sides while Israel rejects this notion.480 Due to these polarized positions, Syria and 
Israel could not reach a peace treaty in the mid-1990s when Syria apparently proposed 
the notion of ‘full peace for full withdrawal’, and Israel accepted the concept of partial 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights. 
  
In general, Israel believes that Syria has a formidable ballistic missile capability 
and the capacity to use chemical weapons against Israel.481 Hence, Israel wanted the 
dismantling of Syria's chemical weapons arsenals. Moreover, Israel wanted both a 
tangible reduction in Syria's standing army and an area of limited forces deep into the 
Syrian heartland. Israel wanted to push Syria's troops and army equipment as far as 
possible from the frontier, almost to Damascus. Israel also believes that Syria's mass 
deployment of forces near the border could jeopardize its security. So Syria is expected to 
cut significantly its ground forces and army equipment.482   
 
However, such a reconstructing of Syria's army would be detrimental to its 
national security, which Syria is unlikely to accept. Because it has been faced some 
potential threats from its neighbors, Syria needs to strengthen its position. So it is 
implausible to expect Syria to accept such a plan as proposed by the Israelis, which 
would significantly reconstruct and reduce the size of its army.  
 
In addition to its need to maintain internal security in order to sustain its minority 
government, Syria has long been faced with unfriendly and, in some cases, antagonistic 
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relations with Iraq during the 1980s and 1990s. Turkey also has long been a main concern 
for Syria's national security. Syria's relations with Turkey had been strained because of 
Syria's alleged support for the Turkish Kurds in their conflict with the Turkish 
government on the one hand, and Turkey’s friendly relationship and military alliance 
with Israel on the other. Moreover, Syria had to deal with the enormous instability and 
civil war in Lebanon during the 1975-1990. Syria still deploys thousands of its armed 
forces in Lebanon. Therefore, Damascus believes that they need stronger military forces 
not only to maintain Syria's national security but also to further regional security for the 
Levant. Furthermore, due to the long history of conflict with Israel the suspicion would 
remain for a while; and in the case of making peace with Israel, it would be implausible 
for the Syrians to trust Israeli intentions in the near future. 
  
In addition to Israel’s demand for dismantling Syria's chemical weapons of mass 
destruction and reductions in Syria's standing army, Israel also wanted to maintain its 
sophisticated, long-range, electronic observation devices as early-warning stations on 
some parts of the Golan Heights, particularly on Mt. Hermon.483 Israel’s logic, 
according to Omri Bar-Lev,484 a former Israeli colonel, is that it needs the warning 
time to mobilize its reserve forces.485 
 
From the beginning of its establishment, Israel has been concerned about a 
surprise attack from its hostile neighbors, and therefore the rationale behind its defensive 
strategy has been not only to prevent such an attack but also to reduce the fear of a 
surprise attack. Hence, the Israelis, themselves, want to keep maintaining the early 
warning stations that they have already set up on the Golan Heights. According to Bar-
Lev, the Israelis are apprehensive about putting the nation's fate in the hands of others. So 
the idea of operating the early warning stations by international forces would be rejected. 
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Bar-Lev believes that “The central warning (stations) need to be in our hands…. We must 
always rely on ourselves...so warning and our ability to make sure agreements are being 
kept are central components in any arrangement.”486 
 
Although such early warning stations have genuine security values, the 
importance of these stations for Israel is more symbolic than real. To justify their 
occupation of Syria's territories and to prevent a surprise Syrian attack, Israeli officials 
have long insisted that the Golan Heights is a strategic asset and therefore critical to 
Israel’s national security. Once the Golan is given back, Israeli officials argue, Israel will 
lose crucial positions. Accordingly, only Israeli presence on the Heights, or at least early 
warning stations manned only by the Israelis, could guarantee Israel’s security. 
  
Syria has its own legitimate reasons for opposing Israel’s demands. First, Syria 
argues that security arrangements should not compromise the integrity of either side. As 
one Syrian diplomat said, “We do not want to have a Syrian early warning station in 
Israel, and we will not allow an Israeli one on our territory.”487 Second, technically, early 
warning stations manned by the Israelis could be used for other military or non-military 
purposes. In each case, these stations could undermine Syria's national security. Third, an 
Israeli warning station on Mount Hermon is a symbol of continuing Israeli occupation of 
Syria's territory. Syrians believe it would be “a permanent reminder of national 
humiliation…. This would be the height of insult to our dignity as a people and a stigma 
to our national pride.”488  
 
The previous round of talks between Syria and Israel which took place in the first 
half of the 1990s stalled and finally collapsed in 1996 over Syria's intractable position 
rejecting any Israeli or foreign presence in the Golan Heights. Syria argued that technical 
surveillance, i.e., U.S. satellites, would be enough monitoring, and it could provide Israel 
with the intelligence about Syria's military movements. 
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However, during dramatic progress in Syrian-Israeli negotiations in December 
1999-January 2000, Syria agreed to provide Israel with an early warning station on the 
Golan Heights if it were operated by U.S. and French military observers.489 Although this 
proposal could appear to be important progress, Israel insisted on their previous position; 
the need for Israel’s presence on the Golan Heights and the negotiations stalled again. 
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Chapter 11 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections: first, a conclusion for previous chapters, 
and second, a general conclusion. 
 
Chapter 2: U.S.-Syrian Relations 
 
U.S.-Syrian relations have been strained in recent decades. The relations 
deteriorated due to both facts and misperceptions. The two countries each perceived the 
other as seeming to ignore or sabotage its regional interests. Several factors have always 
strained the relationship between Syria and the United States. The American plot to 
subvert Syrian government in the mid 1950s was the beginning of a decades long 
confrontation and animosity between the United States and Syria. The Syrians maintained 
that because of U.S. strategic relations with Israel, the United States sought to contain 
Syria's legitimate interests in the region. The fact that the United States became Israel’s 
chief benefactor in its conflict with the Arabs exacerbated the relations between the two 
countries.  
 
Syria and the United States have been challenged over several regional issues; 
most prominent among them is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria's alleged role in 
international terrorism and its support for radical Palestinian and Lebanese groups has 
had enormous negative effects on its relations with the United States, as well. Before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States viewed Syria as an opponent of peace in 
the Middle East, and as a country whose main goals was to prevent Americans from 
achieving their interests in the Middle East.  
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Prior to the 1990s, Syria's close relations with the Soviet Union provided an 
opportunity for the Soviets to expand their influence in the Middle East. The United 
States, therefore, viewed Syria in the context of the Cold War and rivalry with the Soviet 
Union. The Americans considered Syria an outpost and surrogate of the Soviets in the 
Middle East. Therefore, as much as the United States tried to exclude the Soviets from 
having an important role in Middle East affairs—particularly in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict—they also sought to contain Syria's regional role. The United States, therefore, 
tried to exclude Syria from the Arab-Israeli peace process in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, or at least to marginalize Syria’s role. There was no reference to Syria in the two 
peace agreements that were signed under American auspices during this time: the Camp 
David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978, and the stillborn May 17, 1983 Accord 
between Lebanon and Israel.  
 
Syria objected to these accords on the grounds that these unilateral agreements 
would not resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and finally would lead to Israeli penetration 
and integration into the Middle East. This unilateral U.S. policy provoked Syria to disrupt 
U.S. peace initiatives in the Middle East. Syria, therefore, adopted a policy to isolate 
Egypt from the Arab world, and to sabotage the May 17 Accord through its proxies in 
Lebanon. These events exacerbated the already strained relations between Syria and the 
United States, and prevented the two countries from finding common interests for 
regional cooperation. 
 
However, the collapse of the Eastern European countries and the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s led to drastic changes in the Middle East. These 
changes provided new opportunities for the United States and Syria to cooperate at the 
regional level. The United States appreciated Syria's participation in broader regional 
issues, such as taking part in the U.S.-led coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
and in the negotiations of the Madrid peace conference in November 1991. In spite of this 
cooperation, the United States refused to upgrade its relations with the Syrians. The U.S. 
continued to include Syria on its list of states sponsoring international terrorism. They 
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also imposed sanctions on Syria, preventing Syria from receiving American economic aid 
and purchasing American advanced technology. These sanctions have long been among 
the main obstacles keeping relations between the two countries from achieving normalcy. 
 
Chapter 3: The Madrid Peace Conference 
 
Syria was the first Arab country that agreed to attend the Madrid peace 
conference. Several reasons caused Syria to attend this conference. Among these reasons, 
Syria's desire to improve its relations with the United States was significant. Syria's 
participation in the conference brought new opportunities for this country to end its 
isolation in the region and to some extent adjust its foreign policy to the new 
circumstances in the Middle East. 
  
In the early 1990s, new changes in the international and regional arena diminished 
Syria's political and military positions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria lost 
its main patron; it, therefore, could no longer pose any tangible military threat to Israel. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought enormous uncertainties to Syria. These 
uncertainties made Syria more vulnerable to U.S. hegemonic power in the region. These 
circumstances marked the emergence of a new political and regional system in the 
Middle East. Syria had no option but to adopt its foreign policy to the new changes in the 
region. Syria, therefore, participated in the U.S.-led coalition against the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait and agreed to attend the Madrid peace conference, hoping to improve its relations 
with the United States and achieve its goals through diplomatic initiatives. On one hand, 
without participating in the conference, the Syrians would have no hope for playing an 
important role in the Middle East peace process. On the other, the United States, as 
sponsor of the conference, could have enormous difficulty in bringing the Arabs and 
Israelis to a negotiating table without Syria's participations. Therefore, mutual interests 
brought the two countries to the point at which, with cooperation at the regional level, 
they could achieve their goals.  
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Because of the importance of cooperation with the United States, Syria retreated 
from its previous position. The Syrians earlier wanted Israel to commit to full withdrawal 
from the Golan Heights before they would agree to attend the Madrid peace conference. 
Moreover, Syria agreed to attend the conference despite the fact that they were frustrated 
by the events that discouraged them and other Arab parties from participating in the 
conference. These events included Israel’s refusal to trade land for peace, Israel’s 
rejection of Palestinian participation in the conference as an independent partner, and the 
building of new settlements in the occupied lands. 
 
Chapter 4: The Oslo Peace Process 
 
Despite its vague references to the main issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
Oslo Accords were the beginning of numerous rounds of talks between the Palestinians 
and Israelis. Although these negotiations brought expectation that they would lead to a 
reconciliation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, they were derailed because Israel was 
extremely reluctant to recognize basic Palestinian rights. The less ready Israelis were to 
recognize the Palestinians legitimate rights—especially when Binyamin Netanyahu came 
to power in May 1996—the more frustrated Palestinians became in regard to the 
implementation of the Accords. The Israelis deliberately excluded substantive issues of 
their disputes with the Palestinians and postponed them to the future negotiations. The 
Accords brought neither security nor prosperity for the Palestinians. It, therefore, 
significantly led to the frustrations among them. The frustration increased uncertainties 
among the Palestinians and was one of the main causes of a cycle of violence on both 
sides.  
 
While the Accords led to the improvement of Israel’s relations with many 
countries, it slowed down the progress in the Syrian-Israeli track. Syria explicitly 
objected the Accords on the grounds that the Accord undermined Arab’s positions on the 
negotiations with the Israelis. Syria’s objection deteriorated the already poor relations 
with the Israelis. The immediate consequence of the Accords for Syria was that Syria had 
no option but to revive its policy toward peace. Syria was excluded from the negotiations 
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on behalf of the Palestinian issues; therefore its emphasis on the concept of 
comprehensive peace was pointless. Syria, therefore, focused on the recovery of its own 
territory.  
 
In spite of its negative impacts on Syria, the Oslo Accords once again placed 
Syria in a position that it could play an important role in the peace process through its 
leverage over opponent Palestinian groups who resided in Syria. Both Israelis and 
Americans wanted Syria to silence Palestinian opposition to the Oslo Accords. Although 
reluctant to do so, Syria showed a willingness to see whether the implementation of this 
agreement would lead to normalization of relations between the Palestinians and Israelis.  
 
Chapter 5: Slow Progress After the Oslo Accords (1993-1994) 
 
During the period between the initial phase of the Madrid peace conference in 
October 1991 and the conclusion of the Oslo Accords there was little progress along the 
Syrian-Israeli track. In the aftermath of the Oslo Accord, Syria rather preferred to show 
the insufficiencies of the Accords and the fact that such a unilateral solution would not 
lead to a just and honorable peace between the Palestinians and Israelis.  
 
The slow progress and frustration, which resulted from the prolonged deadlock in 
the bilateral negotiations between Syria and Israel, brought more uncertainty about the 
future of the whole peace process. Fearing that increasing uncertainties would make the 
resumption of the negotiations more difficult, the United States, therefore, emphasized on 
the importance of Syria’s role in the peace process. In order to facilitate the negotiations, 
the U.S. took various diplomatic initiatives. President Clinton’s meeting with Hafiz al-
Asad in Geneva in January 1994 and his visit to Damascus later that year in October were 
attempts to assure the Syrians that their role was vital to the conclusion of a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East.  
 
During this period, there were various events that triggered more violence in the 
region, and consequently derailed the peace process. Among these events was the Hebron 
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Massacre of February 1994. The immediate effect of the massacre was the suspension of 
talks by all Arab parties to the peace process. The Palestinian opponents of the peace 
process took advantage of the events to show that peace would be impossible. Realizing 
the difficulties of the peace process, Syria persuaded other Arab parties to resume their 
talks with the Israelis. Syria continued to hope for the conclusion of a comprehensive 
peace with Israel at the time that those extremists on both sides tried to sabotage the 
peace process. Syria's goal was to demonstrate its willingness to help the Americans to 
facilitate the peace negotiations, hoping it would lead to both the improvement of their 
relations with the United States and progress in their negotiations with the Israelis.  
 
But another setback stalled further progress in the Syrian-Israeli track. The 
Jordanians decided to ease their relations with the Israelis through a separate, unilateral 
agreement. From Syria's point of view, the treaty severely damaged Arab unity, Arab 
interests, and Syria's credibility in coordinating Arab positions. Syria could no longer 
insist on a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Because of all these 
ramifications, Syria viewed Jordan’s treaty with Israel as a betrayal of the Arabs. 
 
The conclusion of separate peace deals with Israel by the Palestinians and 
Jordanians with Israel created more pressure on the Syrians to conclude an agreement 
with the Israelis on their own behalf. Given the fact that other parties to the peace process 
had already reached an agreement with Israel, how could Syria coordinate a 
comprehensive peace between the Arabs and Israelis? Understanding their own restricted 
alternatives, Syria had to shift its foreign policy to bargaining for recovering of the Golan 
Heights.  
 
This revisionism was a remarkable breakthrough in Syria's foreign policy. Up to 
that point, Syria refused to talk explicitly about the nature of and pre-requisites for peace. 
At this time, Syria showed more willingness for the negotiations to be resumed, hoping 
they could reach an agreement with the Israelis. There was remarkable progress in the 
Syrian-Israeli track afterward, although both countries failed to conclude a peace treaty. 
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Chapter 6: Progress on the Syrian-Israeli track (1994-1996) 
 
Under American auspices, the Syrian-Israeli track achieved remarkable progress 
in the sporadic negotiations that took place between December 1994 and March 1996. 
Several rounds of talks convened in the United States between high-ranking officials on 
each side, providing a framework for the achievement of a general agreement on security 
issues and related disputes. After the conclusion of a separate peace agreement between 
Israel and both the Palestinians and Jordanians, the United States and Israel focused their 
attention on the Syrian track, hoping to end the prolonged stalemate, which resulted from 
enormous differences on basic issues of the peace process.    
 
Maintaining that progress on the security issues would make it easier to progress 
on other issues, Syria and Israel’s chiefs of staff met in Washington, in December 1994. 
Although the meeting failed to produce any tangible progress, it furthered confidence-
building measures between the two countries. In this phase, although Syria agreed to both 
a demilitarized zone and a limited force zone, the negotiations failed to reach a concrete 
conclusion on the grounds that Israel sought to remain in some strategic parts of Syria's 
territory for security reasons. For the first time, Syria showed more flexibility on disputed 
security arrangements and agreed to normalize their relations with Israel if the later 
withdrew from the entire Golan Heights. 
 
After another hiatus stalemate in the Syrian-Israeli track, the negotiations were 
resumed under American auspices at Wye Plantation. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin 
provided new momentum for the Syrian-Israeli track. At the time that Shimon Peres took 
office, the two countries appeared to show more flexibility in order to reach an 
agreement. Various issues of the peace process such as normalization of relations and 
other issues related to the future of Syrian-Israeli relations were discussed during these 
rounds of negotiations. The achievement of these negotiations was greater than that of the 
four previous years. But before the completion of the third round of talks, the 
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negotiations at Wye Plantation were suspended by Peres on March 4, 1996 and remained 
deadlocked until Barak came to power. 
 
Chapter 7: Deadlock In The Syrian-Israeli Negotiations (1996-1999) 
 
Following the suspension of the Syrian-Israeli talks, the election of Binyamin 
Netanyahu exacerbated the already strained process between Syria and Israel. Netanyahu 
deliberately tried to set new terms and conditions for the negotiations that undermined the 
achievement of previous rounds of talks. The Syrians were frustrated when Netanyahu 
proposed a policy of peace for peace, negotiations without preconditions and the 
retention of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The Syrians were extremely 
disappointed when they realized that the United States was either reluctant or unable to 
put pressure on Israel to pursue the achievement of the previous rounds of talks. 
Whatever was behind the U.S. policy, the result was, at least from Syria's point of view, 
that the United States could not be an honest broker. 
 
An important factor prevented Syria and Israel from reaching an agreement for 
the resumption of talks during Netanyahu’s government. Syria insisted that the 
negotiations must be resumed from the point at which they were suspended by Peres in 
March 1996, meaning that they had reached an agreement with the previous Israeli 
governments: full peace in exchange for full withdrawal. But Netanyahu refused to 
commit his government to the unwritten agreement, and insisted on the resumption of 
negotiations without any conditions.  
 
Chapter 8: Shepherdstown Talks (January 2000)    
 
After series of frustrating stalemates in the Syrian-Israeli track, the election of 
Ehud Barak in May 1999 created new momentum for the resumption of the peace process 
between Israel and other Arab parties. Barak’s announcement that he would withdraw 
Israeli troops from southern Lebanon produced an encouraging impetus for the Syrian-
Israel track.  
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Because of continuing disagreements over procedural matter between Syria and 
Israel, the United States played an important role to convince both sides to resume their 
negotiations. The problem was that Syrians maintained that they had reached an 
agreement with the Israelis regarding full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in 
return for full peace. The Syrians were anger that the United States did not support 
Syria’s position, maintaining there had not been such a commitment made by the Israelis 
as Syria claimed. The negotiations finally resumed after tremendous diplomatic efforts. 
Fearing a unilateral withdrawal could lead to escalation of violence in southern Lebanon, 
The Israeli government wanted to reach an arrangements with Syria prior to their 
withdrawal, hoping the Syrians could restrain Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.  
 
The meeting between the highest ranking of Syrian and Israeli officials in December 
1999 provided an opportunity that under American auspices Syria and Israel could reach 
an agreement. The negotiations continued in Shepherdstown but the talks were soon 
interrupted because of enormous disagreements over the same procedural matters that 
had prevented Syria and Israel previously from reaching a reasonable agreement over 
their disputes. Although the United States facilitated the negotiations between Syria and 
Israel, they failed to build confidence between the parties, or at least to assure them that 
their basic and fundamental demands would not be sacrificed to the other side’s demands.    
 
The talks in Shepherdstown stalled right at the beginning. Israel was reluctant to 
discuss the scope of its withdrawal from the Golan Heights before Syria identified the 
nature of peace and the extent of its future relations with Israel. At the same time, Syria 
maintained it would be pointless to discuss these issues unless they knew whether Israel 
was willing to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights. Americans proposed 
simultaneous negotiations on main disputed issues, but the Israelis appeared reluctant to 
continue the talks within this framework.  
 
The Syrian-Israeli negotiations were suspended once again because of mistrust 
and rigidity on both sides. Neither Israel nor Syria appeared to be willing to compromise 
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on a conceptual framework for the establishment of a peace agreement between them. 
Although they could assure the Israelis that peace would not jeopardize Israel’s national 
security, the United States was reluctant to put pressure on Israel to concede to Syria's 
demand. Due to the Israeli lobby in the United States, it was not clear to what extent the 
Clinton administration could pressure Israel to pursue the negotiations, even if the 
administration had been willing to do so.  
 
The United States, however, succeeded in convincing the Syrians that it was in 
their interests to be more flexible in the negotiations with the Israelis. Syria showed that 
they were ready to make peace with Israel if the latter agreed to withdraw from Syria's 
territory. Syria, therefore, made various concessions to both U.S. and Israel. Among these 
concessions were the key issues of security arrangements, normalization of relations, and 
establishment of early warning stations on the Golan Heights. 
  
Chapter 9: Syrian Perspectives on the Main Issues of the Peace Process 
 
There are several issues that have long been most important in the Syrian-Israeli 
negotiations. These issues include Syria's insistence on Israel’s withdrawal from the 
entire Golan Heights, normalization of relations, the nature of peace, and security 
arrangements.  
 
The Golan Heights   
 
Syria explicitly made any progress in negotiations with the Israelis contingent on 
the unconditional return of the entire Golan Heights. Syria, however, appeared to 
accommodate Israel’s demands for security arrangements if the latter would not demand 
any presence on the Heights. It was an important concession when Syria endorsed the 
plan under which the United States and France would control the warning stations in 
order to meet Israel’s concern for security. 
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Due to the rigidity of both sides, the Golan Heights remains an intractable 
obstacle in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. None of the Israeli governments committed to 
total withdrawal, although the Labor Party periodically hinted that Israel might partially 
withdraw from the Golan Heights. The correlation that the Israelis made between the 
withdrawal and normalization of relations complicated the negotiations and made them 
the most intractable obstacles in the negotiations for peace during the 1990s.  
 
Palestinian rights 
 
Syria has long viewed the Palestinian-Israeli dispute as the core of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Syria, therefore, insisted on a comprehensive plan that would address all 
Arab-Israeli disputes. But both the Palestinians and Israelis, however, opposed any 
possible Syrian role in their negotiations, and therefore, tried to exclude Syria from 
negotiating on behalf of the Palestinians. The conclusion of a separate agreement 
between the Palestinians and Israelis within the context of the Oslo Accords disappointed 
the Syrians. Syria, consequently, retreated from its previous position and appeared to 
become neutral toward the Palestinian-Israeli talks. Syria moderated its policy thereafter, 
maintaining that the Palestinians could make whatever arrangements would serve their 
interests. Syria, therefore, neither hindered the agreement nor restrained the other 
Palestinian opposition groups from sabotaging the agreement. 
 
Comprehensive Peace 
  
Syria has long insisted that peace should be comprehensive. For Syria a 
comprehensive peace means the peace in the Middle East should address all Arab-Israeli 
disputes; agreements should be based on the relevant UN resolutions; and that the Arab 
parties should coordinate their positions and avoid making separate, partial agreements 
with the Israelis. Syria viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict as intertwined disputes, 
maintaining any plan should include Israeli evacuation of the Arab lands that were 
occupied by Israel in the June 1967 War and provide the Palestinians self-determination 
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in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although Syria insisted on the comprehensiveness of 
the peace process, it recognized that comprehensive does not necessary mean concurrent. 
 
Normalization and the nature of peace  
 
Syria once proposed full peace for full withdrawal, but refused to define what it 
meant by full peace. The Syrians made pronouncing their definition contingent upon 
Israel’s commitment to full withdrawal to the line of their positions prior to the outbreak 
of the 1967 June War. But the Israelis wanted Syria to state the exact nature and the 
scope of the peace that the Syrians offered before they would even discuss issues of 
withdrawal.  
 
The Syrian-Israeli negotiations were deadlocked because both sides were 
unwilling to discuss the very basic issues of their disputes. Syria maintained it would be 
pointless to clarify the aspects of peace as long as they do not know whether the Israelis 
would remain on the Golan Heights. The Israelis tried to use the issues of withdrawal as 
leverage to put more pressure on the Syrians to reveal their meaning of peace and to 
normalize their relation with Israel. Syria originally maintained that peace means an end 
to the state of war. The Syrians argue, based on the relevant UN resolutions, Syria was 
neither obliged to define the meaning of the nature of peace nor to normalize their 
relations with Israel.  
 
Withdrawal 
 
Syria does not recognize any border with Israel. Historically, there are two lines 
that have been marked to separate Syria and Israel: the 1923 demarcation line, which was 
drawn by the British and French in the aftermath of World War I, and the 1949 armistice 
line, which was the result of the first Arab-Israeli ceasefire. Neither of these lines is 
recognized by Syria as a border. However, Syria insisted that Israel withdraw to the line 
of June 4, 1967, which marked the Syrian and Israeli positions prior to the outbreak of the 
1967 June War. Syria insisted on this line for two reasons: in the case where no 
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demarcation line is recognized by both Syria and Israel, a return to their positions prior to 
eruption of the 1967 June war would be reasonable. Second, although the demarcation 
line of 1923 did not provide Syria access to Lake Tiberias, Syria took advantage of the 
territorial ambiguities in this region and extended its access to the lake. In negotiations 
with the Israelis, Syria insisted on territorial integration of this area and, therefore, 
wanted to restore its access to the Lake. 
 
Contrary to Syria's position that clearly defined its border with Israel, the latter 
refused to define the extent of its border with Syria. Israel, however, once hinted that in a 
case of withdrawal, Israel would withdraw to a secure border, which meant Israel’s 
intention to remain on parts of Golan Heights for security reasons. On several occasions, 
Israeli officials declared that the depth of withdrawal from the Golan Heights would be 
based on the depth of peace with Syria. Syria strongly rejected such a vague formula and 
refused to agree to any territorial concessions.  
 
Security arrangements 
 
Israel’s main security concern was to prevent any possible surprise attack by Syria 
from the Golan Heights. Israel, therefore, insisted on remaining in strategic parts of the 
Golan Heights as well as dismantling Syria's capability to mobilize such an attack. Syria 
demonstrated its willingness to reach an agreement with the Israelis to assure them that 
such an attack would not happen. Although they first insisted on equality and symmetry 
of the demilitarized zones and areas of limited forces on both sides, Syria later 
compromised with the Israelis in order to further the negotiations. Israel, however, 
wanted a demilitarized zone extending deep into Syria's territory to within the vicinity of 
Damascus and that the Syrian standing army be significantly reduced. In negotiations for 
security arrangements, Israel maintained that Syria had the capability of using ballistic 
missiles and chemical weapons. Israel, therefore, insisted on dismantling Syria's ability to 
use these arsenals. Moreover, the Israelis argued that to prevent any surprise attack from 
Syria, they must maintain their long-range electronic surveillance equipment on some 
parts of the Golan Heights. Syria strongly rejected this demand based on the grounds that 
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such presence would be a symbol of occupation and a national humiliation. Syria, 
however, in an unprecedented shift, agreed to allow other countries, the United States and 
France, to maintain the early warning stations. 
  
Besides the importance of its water resources, the military significance of the 
Golan Heights for Israel is more symbolic and psychological than real. Israel’s ballistic 
missile capability and its military superiority have significantly reduced its vulnerability 
to any attack from Syria. Moreover, Syria agreed to allow the early warning stations to be 
operated on the Golan Heights, although not by the Israelis. Other technical surveillance 
such as U.S. satellites could also provide Israel with intelligence about Syria's military 
deployment. If an agreement were to be reached, Syria would have no objection to U.S. 
troops deployed in the demilitarized zones as peacekeeper. Therefore, this would help 
Israel to make sure that there would be no such surprise attack from Syria.  
 
It is crystal clear that Syria would accept neither any territorial infringement nor 
agree any Israeli presence on the Golan Heights. However, Syria made great concessions 
on other issues such as security arrangements and normalization of relations in order to 
further the negotiations.  But as a result of huge differences, they failed to reach a general 
conclusion although remarkable progress was achieved during the various rounds of 
negotiations between Syrian and Israeli delegations with American mediators.  
 
General Conclusion 
 
Realistically, there is little hope for peace between Syria and Israel unless the 
United States takes evenhanded, diplomatic initiatives to bring the Syrians and Israelis to 
the conclusion that peace—with all its pre-requisites—is in the interests of both 
countries. It is obvious that there can be no peace between Syria and Israel while Israel 
continues its occupation of the Golan Heights. It is unlikely that Israel will withdraw 
from the Golan Heights unless they reach an agreement with the Syrians that will secure 
their access to Golan’s water and provide maximum needs for Israeli security. Even if 
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Syria agrees to Israel’s conditions it is not clear that to what extent Israel will be willing 
to fulfill Syria’s basic demands.  
 
Therefore, any Syrian-Israeli peace is dependent on a variety of factors, 
functioning together in a complicated process. The United States could play an important 
role by assuring Israel that their security needs will be met and promising Syria that their 
lost territories will be return to them in its entirety. The United States also could 
strengthen confidence-building measures between the parties and assure them that peace 
will provide their basic needs, and in no way will the conflict be settled at the expense of 
either’s interests.  
 
Syria's position on the peace process is clear, straightforward. It is based upon the 
relevant UN Resolutions 242 and 338. These resolutions calls only to provide security 
guarantees to Israel but are in no way obliges Syria to fully normalize their diplomatic 
and economic relations with Israel prior to Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights. 
Taking the Israeli side, the United States did not emphasize the implementation of the 
relevant UN resolutions during the series of Syrian-Israeli talks in the 1990s, although in 
the beginning it apparently endorsed these resolutions be the basis for the negotiations of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Prior to Syria's acceptance of these resolutions, the United 
States strongly condemned Syria's position. But when Syria insisted that these resolutions 
be the framework for the reconciliation of their disputes with Israel, the United States 
failed to support Syria's request.  
 
Without having an internationally recognized framework for solving their 
disputes, on the one hand, and being suspicious to each other’s true intentions, on the 
other, both parties, particularly the Israelis, made demands ever harder to fulfill for the 
establishment of a possible peace treaty between themselves. There would be no hope for 
the reconciliation of the Syrian-Israeli disputes while the latter made depth of its 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights contingent upon depth of peace with Syria, which has 
neither a legal nor logical base. Basically, there could be no peace while Israel intended 
to remain on parts of the Golan Heights and insisted that Syria extend a demilitarized 
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zone deep into its territory, practically to the vicinity of Damascus. It would be pointless 
that the Israelis expected the Syrians to comply with their demands and show that they 
really wanted a genuine peace with Israel while they were not willing to reveal their plan 
for withdrawal from the Golan Heights.  
 
Syria simply maintained that it was worthless to even negotiate the peace process 
in a framework in which they could not know whether the negotiations would lead to the 
recovery of their occupied lands. How could the Syrians agree to normalize their relations 
while Israel continued their occupation of Syrian territory? If confidence building is an 
important factor in the reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, how could that be 
possible while Israel demands to remain on parts of Syria's territory?   
 
There was a variety of reasons that prevented Syria and Israel from reaching a 
peace treaty during the several rounds of negotiations under American auspices in the 
1990s. Besides unresolved issues such as the Golan Heights and Syrian and Israeli 
rigidity on their positions, the biased role of the United States in the Syrian-Israeli talks 
left the process at an intractable impasse. Prior to the start of the negotiations, the United 
States proposed that they be based upon the UN Resolutions 242 and 338. But once the 
negotiations began in November 1991, the United States, perhaps under Israeli pressure, 
and due to the impetus of domestic politics, demonstrated that they were reluctant to 
conduct the Syrian-Israeli talks within the framework of the relevant UN resolutions. On 
their side, the Israelis were not only reluctant but strongly resistant to the idea that the 
Syrian-Israeli peace process to be based upon UN Resolutions 242 and 338. 
 
Because it was not clear what the basis of Syrian-Israeli negotiations to be, Syria 
and Israel spent much of their time arguing about procedural matters and what issues 
should take priority in the negotiations. During this period, although the United States 
facilitated the negotiations between the Syrian and Israeli delegations, they clearly failed 
to take an evenhanded policy, urging both Syrians and Israelis to comply with the basic 
and logical needs of peace—pushing the Israelis to withdraw from Syrian territory that 
they occupied in 1967 in return for full peace, and urging the Syrians to moderate their 
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positions, allowing new demarcation of border. A reasonable guarantee by the Syrians 
that they will not jeopardize Israel’s security after Israeli withdrawal from Syria's 
territory and the acceptance of a logical security arrangement by the Israelis could further 
the negotiations.  
 
In order to advance the negotiations, the United States should have taken concrete 
steps to prevent the negotiations from being derailed over procedural matters. The 
Americans could play a constructive role on what issues should take priority in the 
negotiations. Instead they demonstrated they were a facilitator that could not settle the 
differences, using every possible means available to them to reconcile the disputes. If 
Syria was key to the peace process, it was rational that the United States improved its 
relations with Syria in order to further the negotiations between the parties. But the 
United States did not change its policy toward Syria in spite of the fact that peace in the 
Middle East was in the interests of the United States and that Syria could play an 
important role toward the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the region. The 
United States, however, explicitly made the improvement of its relations with the Syrians 
contingent upon progress in the peace process between Syria and Israel. The progress that 
was unlikely without a good relations between Syria and the United States. Moreover, 
because of huge differences between Syria and Israel over the nature of peace, on one 
hand, and both the Israeli and Syrian rigidity in compromising the basic needs for making 
a just and comprehensive peace, on the other, only the United States could bring a 
breakthrough to the Syrian-Israeli track. 
 
But the domination of the U.S. Congress by the pro-Israeli lobby, on one hand, 
and the pro-Israel bias of the U.S. administrations, on the other, restricted any 
maneuverability for the improvement of U.S.-Syrian relations. The peace process, 
however, was perhaps the most important avenue open to Syria to seek better relations 
with the United States and to convince U.S. officials that Syria's role was indispensable 
to the process. Syria displayed willingness to enter into a process that would definitely 
further U.S. interests in the region. Syria appeared to be more flexible, and willing to 
conclude a peace treaty with Israel if the latter agreed to withdraw from Syria's territory.  
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But Israel was reluctant and even opposed to making such a commitment and the United 
States failed to urge Israel to comply with the basic requirement of relevant UN 
Resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Consequently, these difficulties enormously 
complicated the Syrian-Israeli peace talks, and further strained U.S.-Syrian relations. 
 
In general, the Syrian-Israeli talks passed through a difficult and complex process. 
The Israelis did not take these negotiations seriously while they negotiated a peace treaty 
with other Arab parties. The negotiations came to several stalemates, some of them 
lasting for a rather long period of time. The rigidity of both Syria and Israel and mistrust 
between the two countries complicated the whole process. This situation continued even 
after Hafiz al-Asad died in June 2000. When Bashar al-Asad succeeded his father, he 
reconfirmed in his first interview that there would be no change in Syria’s position on the 
peace process. 
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Documents 
 
 
Resolution 242 (1967) 
of 22 November 1967 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to 
work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the 
United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the 
Charter, 
 
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: 
 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; 
 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State 
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the 
Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 
 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the 
efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. 
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting. 
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Resolution 338 (1973) 
of 22 October 1973 
 
The Security Council 
 
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all 
military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of 
this decision, in the positions they now occupy; 
 
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
 
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start 
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and 
durable peace in the Middle East. 
Adopted at the 1747th meeting 
by 14 votes to none. 1/ 
 
 
 
U.S.-Soviet Invitation to the Mideast Peace Conference in Madrid, October 
18, 1991490 
After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, the United 
States and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the 
prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet 
Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace 
settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab 
states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace.  
Toward that end, the president of the U.S. and the president of the USSR invite you to a 
peace conference, which their countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct 
negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on 30 October 1991. 
 
President Bush and President Gorbachev request your acceptance of this invitation no 
later than 6 p.m. Washington time, 23 October 1991, in order to ensure proper 
organization and preparation of the conference.  
                                                 
490. William B. Quand, The Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution; Berkeley: University of California Press, c1993), 
Appendix N. 
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Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the opening of the conference. 
Those parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after 
the opening of the conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe 
that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues such as arms control and 
regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other 
subjects of mutual interest.  
The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held at ministerial level. 
Governments to be invited include Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Palestinians will be 
invited and attend as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Egypt will be 
invited to the conference as a participant. The European Community will be a participant 
in the conference, alongside the United States and the Soviet Union and will be 
represented by its presidency. The Gulf Cooperation Council will be invited to send its 
secretary-general to the conference as an observer, and GCC member states will be 
invited to participate in organizing the negotiations on multilateral issues. The United 
Nations will be invited to send an observer, representing the secretary-general.  
The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the parties or veto agreements 
reached by them. It will have no authority to make decisions for the parties and no ability 
to vote on issues or results. The conference can reconvene only with the consent of all the 
parties.  
With respects to negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the joint 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning 
with talks on interim self-government arrangements. These talks will be conducted with 
the objective of reaching agreement within one year. Once agreed the interim self-
government arrangements will last for a period of five years. Beginning the third year of 
the period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will take place on 
permanent status. These permanent status negotiations, and the negotiations between 
Israel and the Arab states, will take place on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.  
It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to making this process succeed. It is 
their intention to convene the conference and negotiations with those parties who agree to 
attend.  
The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise of ending decades of 
confrontation and conflict and the hope of a lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope 
that the parties will approach these negotiations in a spirit of good will and mutual 
respect. In this way, the peace process can begin to break down the mutual suspicions and 
mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the parties to begin to resolve their 
differences. Indeed, only through such a process can real peace and reconciliation among 
the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians be achieved. And only through this process 
can the peoples of the Middle East attain the peace and security they richly deserve.  
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